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Abstract
Searchable encryption allows a user to outsource encrypted data to a remote server,
whilst preserving the user’s ability to locate specific data items within the encrypted
data that satisfy some query. In its simplest form, searchable encryption allows a user
to locate all data items that contain a particular keyword.
In this thesis, we analyse searchable encryption schemes and assess their suitability
for various scenarios occurring in the real world. Despite the existence of practical
searchable encryption schemes in the literature, there is limited evidence of their de-
ployment. We discuss issues that we consider to be inhibiting the widespread adoption
of searchable encryption. This work aims to present searchable encryption as a useable
technology and, by analysing the efficiencies of the various schemes within the differ-
ent scenarios, we intend to make the design of new real-world searchable encryption
protocols an easier task.
We also present two new searchable encryption schemes. A number of searchable
encryption schemes have been proposed that are secure in the presence of a semi-honest
server, which may deviate from the protocol in order to conserve its own resources. In
existing schemes, the search queries a user can perform are not particularly expressive.
We use techniques from publicly verifiable computation to build a searchable encryption
scheme that can evaluate more expressive queries in a verifiable manner; that is, the
user is able to verify whether or not the server has computed the search honestly.
Our second construction allows users with different access rights to the data to
receive search results which are dependent on their access rights. We call this type of
scheme searchable encryption with multi-level access. Most existing searchable encryp-
tion with multi-level access schemes are built using attribute based encryption, a form
of public key cryptography. Symmetric key cryptography uses simpler and easier to im-
plement primitives, compared to its public-key counterpart. We present a construction
that extends a well-known searchable symmetric encryption scheme to support users
searching the data at different access levels.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Thesis Outline and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Author Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
This chapter provides the motivation for, and structure of, the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, almost all data is stored digitally. Public cloud service providers provide
an infrastructure that gives businesses and individuals access to computing power and
storage space to support this digital data on a flexible pay-as-you-go basis. This allows
them to bypass the costs associated with having their own data centres such as hard-
ware, construction, air conditioning and security costs. This makes cloud computing a
very cost-effective solution for both bulk data processing and data storage.
According to a government survey on information security and data breaches relat-
ing to digital data in 2017 [103], 46 per cent of all UK businesses identified at least one
attack by an unauthorised outsider and suffered a data breach in the last 12 months (up
from 24 per cent the previous year). The number is higher for medium and large firms,
of which 66 per cent and 68 per cent respectively suffered at least one data breach.
This demonstrates a clear need for secure data storage in order to ensure the confi-
dentiality of data. However, encrypting data is just one part of the solution. Encrypting
data ensures that, in the event of a compromise, no meaningful information should leak
about the data itself if the data is compromised, yet it also reduces the possibility of
13
1.2. Thesis Outline and Contributions
performing computations on the ciphertexts, such as searching for keywords or specific
items within the data.
Suppose that, just as in a typical cloud storage environment, your data is stored
in encrypted form on a remote server due to local data storage constraints. To locate
a piece of data we could download the entirety of the encrypted data, decrypt it, and
search over the unencrypted data. Alternatively, perhaps we could create an index for
the encrypted data that is stored locally and used to navigate the encrypted files. Both
of these methods provide adequate solutions in theory, yet in practice they present
several problems. Firstly, the size of the encrypted data may not be known a priori, or
be known in advance to be very large, both of which deem the process of downloading
all of the encrypted data highly inefficient and costly. Furthermore, the reason for
storing the data remotely in the first place is due to the unavailability of local storage,
so downloading all the data in this case would not be an option. Creating an index
would require locally storing a file which may be of size in the order of the number of
encrypted files, which again may not be feasible due to local storage restrictions. In
addition, the index itself could potentially leak information about the encrypted data,
compromising confidentiality.
Searchable encryption (SE) provides a solution to this problem by supporting the
outsourcing of encrypted data to a remote server, whilst maintaining the ability to
search for specific keywords within the encrypted data.
1.2 Thesis Outline and Contributions
In this thesis we investigate different methods for searching on encrypted data. In
Chapter 2, we introduce some notation and background material relevant to the re-
mainder of the thesis. In Chapter 3, we define the paradigm of searchable encryption,
along with associated security definitions and adversarial models. We also give an
overview of the related literature in the field.
Chapter 4 establishes four scenarios in order to categorize the searchable encryption
schemes in the literature. These scenarios are categorized in terms of the number of
users and the tasks that these users are able to perform within the system. The aim
of this chapter is to present searchable encryption in a real-world setting and map the
various schemes in the literature to each of these scenarios. We define a set of features
that can vary within each scenario, such as the number of data items to be searched
over and the type of search query required. We also analyse the efficiencies of a number
of searchable encryption schemes, and use this information to map the schemes into the
scenarios. We highlight which scheme is most suitable according to the varying features.
14
1.3. Author Contributions
Although the literature on searchable encryption is vast, searchable encryption schemes
do not seem to be widely deployed. The aim of this work is to aid the deployment of
searchable encryption by helping potential users to choose the most suitable scheme
for a given scenario.
Chapter 5 focuses on a branch of searchable encryption called verifiable searchable
encryption, which assumes a more powerful adversary. In this model the server is not
trusted to compute the search honestly, hence an extra algorithm is needed to perform
verification of search results. We first identify some similarities between the models of
searchable encryption and verifiable outsourced computation. We then use techniques
from the field of verifiable outsourced computation to construct a verifiable searchable
encryption scheme with more expressive queries.
The focus of Chapter 6 is on multi-level access within searchable encryption schemes.
In many real-world scenarios for searchable encryption, not all users will have the same
access rights to the encrypted data. Most schemes in the literature that provide a
solution to this issue are based on computationally intensive cryptographic paradigms,
such as attribute-based encryption. We present a symmetric key solution to multi-
level access within searchable encryption which provides a more practical alternative.
Within this chapter we also present numerous generic ways of extending a single-user
searchable encryption scheme to one that supports multi-level access.
We draw our conclusions and identify areas of future work in Chapter 7.
1.3 Author Contributions
The work presented in this thesis is derived from three published papers [7, 120, 121],
all of which I am listed as the main author. As my supervisor, Keith Martin is a co-
author on all three papers, and helped to inspire and guide my ideas throughout the
research.
The work in Chapter 4 was co-authored by Keith Martin. The main body of work
was developed by myself, guided by helpful notes and comments from Martin. The
ideas in Section 4.5 were inspired through discussions with delegates at the ‘Future
Directions in Computing on Encrypted Data’ symposium which was held in Bristol in
November 2015.
The paper that formed the basis of Chapter 5 was co-authored by James Alderman
and Christian Janson. I recognised the similarity of the system models within their
area of research, verifiable computation and my own area of research which inspired
the work. I lead the development of the system model and the security notion of index
privacy. The rest of the work of [120] was jointly developed by all authors.
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1.3. Author Contributions
The paper from which Chapter 6 was derived was co-authored by James Alderman.
Most of the main ideas of the paper were developed by myself through invaluable
discussions with Alderman.
16
Chapter 2
Background Material
Contents
2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Negligible functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Pseudorandom functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 Pseudorandom permutations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.4 Hash functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.5 One-way functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Encryption schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.1 Symmetric-key encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Public-key encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.3 Attribute-based encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.4 Predicate-based encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.5 Broadcast encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.6 Order-Preserving Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Verifiable Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.1 Verifiable and publicly verifiable computation . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2 Verifiable delegable computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 Types of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Methods of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.1 Game-based security proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.2 Simulation-based security proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.3 Security Model for Symmetric-Key Encryption . . . . . . . . 34
2.6.4 Security Model for Public-Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . 35
17
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This chapter provides details on the notation used throughout the thesis,
along with background information on relevant cryptographic primitives and
security notions.
2.1 Notation
In this section, we give details of some common notation used throughout the remainder
of the thesis.
We use Z to denote the set of integers, N ⊂ Z to denote the set of natural numbers,
Zp∗ is the multiplicative group {1, ...p−1}, and the symbol ∅ represents the empty set.
We use [i, j] and [n] to represent the sets of integers {i, i+ 1, ...., j−1, j} and {1, ..., n},
respectively, where i, j, n ∈ N and i < j. The notation S\{s} represents the set S with
the element s removed, and {si}i∈[n] represents the set {s1, ..., sn}.
In our binary operations true is denoted as 1, and false as 0. We use ∨ to denote
the binary operator OR, which produces a result of 1 if either one of the operands are
1. We use ∧ to denote the binary operation AND, which produces a result of 1 only if
both operands are 1.
We use P[A] to denote the probability of event A occuring.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we give details of some common cryptographic primitives used in the
remainder of the thesis.
2.2.1 Negligible functions
We use negligible functions when defining the security of an encryption scheme. In
this thesis we deal with encryption schemes that are computationally secure as opposed
to information-theoretically secure, which remain secure against computationally un-
bounded adversaries. The one-time pad is a common example of an encryption scheme
18
2.2. Cryptographic Primitives
exhibiting this form of security. It is not always possible to achieve such high levels
of security. In practice, where the presence of a computationally unbounded adversary
may be unrealistic, a computationally limited adversary is assumed which is bounded
to run in polynomial time with respect to the security parameter used in the key gen-
eration algorithm of the encryption scheme. Similarly inverse polynomial probabilities
are considered to be a significant threshold. If there exists a polynomial p(n) and an
adversary can break the security of an encryption scheme with probability 1p(n) then
the scheme is considered to be insecure. If the probability of breaking the security of
the encryption is asymptotically smaller than 1p(n) for every possible polynomial, then
the encryption scheme is considered secure as the probability is so small [87, Definition
3.4]. This is referred to as negligible probability. We define a negligible function as
follows:
Definition 2.2.1 (Negligible Function). A function negl : N → R is defined as negli-
gible if for any polynomial p(x) there exists a natural number λ ∈ N such that, for all
natural numbers x > λ:
negl(x) <
1
p(x)
.
2.2.2 Pseudorandom functions
A pseudorandom function is a family of functions that, given a random instance from
this family of functions, and the ability to pass it inputs and receive the outputs, it
is hard to tell whether the function you are interacting with is a random instance
from the family of functions or a truly random function. In practice pseudorandom
functions are used in place of truly random functions as the family of functions defining
a pseudorandom function is much smaller than that defining the set of all truly random
functions. We define random a pseudorandom function as follows:
Definition 2.2.2 (Pseudorandom Function (PRF)). A function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}κ →
{0, 1}m is a PRF if:
• Given a key K ∈ {0, 1}κ and an input x ∈ {0, 1}n one can efficiently compute
fK(x).
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms D, there exists a negligible func-
tion negl such that:
|P[K $← {0, 1}κ, DfK (1κ)]− P[f $← F , Df (1κ)]| ≤ negl(κ),
where F = {f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}.
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2.2.3 Pseudorandom permutations
Pseudorandom permutations are defined similarly to pseudorandom functions, except
it is required that their output be indistinguishable from that of a truly random per-
mutation, rather than a truly random function. A pseudorandom permutation is in
fact an invertible pseudorandom function which we define as follows:
Definition 2.2.3 (Pseudo Random Permutation (PRP)). Let f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that f is a pseudoran-
dom permutation if, for every K ← {0, 1}κ, fK(·) is one-to-one (this in fact implies that
f is a bijection as it also length-preserving) and, for all probabilistic polynomial-time
distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function negl such that:
|P[DfK(·)(1κ) = 1]− P[Df(·)(1κ) = 1]| ≤ negl(κ),
where K ← {0, 1}κ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random
from the set of permutations mapping κ-bit strings to κ-bit strings [87, Section 3.6.3].
Definition 2.2.4 (Strong PRP). A PRP f is a strong PRP if the inverse f−1 of the
PRP is also a PRP.
2.2.4 Hash functions
A hash function is an algorithm that maps arbitrary sized input to a (usually) fixed size
output. Hash functions are generally used to compare values which cannot be stored in
the clear. In this these we use a type of hash function known as a keyed hash function,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.5 (Keyed Hash Function). A keyed hash function is a pair of proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen,H) that satisfy the following:
• K $← KeyGen(1κ) is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security
parameter 1κ and outputs a key K;
• There exists a polynomial ` such that H takes as input a key K and a string
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a string HK(x) ∈ {0, 1}`(k).
A hash function is defined as collision resistant if the probability of two different inputs
hashing to the same output is negligible. That is, for any probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A we have that:
P[K $← KeyGen(1κ), (x1, x2)← A(K, 1κ) : x1 6= x2, HK(x1) = HK(x2)] ≤ negl(k).
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2.2.5 One-way functions
A one-way function is a function that is easy to compute on the entirety of its domain,
but it is hard to invert the function given the image of a random input. It is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.6 (One-way Function). A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is a one-way
function if:
• f can be evaluated in polynomial time.
• For every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A there is a negligible
function such that:
P
X
$←{0,1}κ
[A(f(X)) ∈ f−1(f(X))] ≤ negl(κ),∀κ.
2.3 Encryption schemes
This section presents information on encryption schemes that are used in the thesis,
along with their formal correctness definitions. Encryption is a common method for
protecting the confidentiality of data. In order to make sense of encrypted data you
need to have access to the secret key that is required to decrypt the data. Access to
encrypted data is usually granted on an all-or-nothing basis, meaning that you can ei-
ther decrypt the entire data, or you cannot. However, advanced encryption techniques
such as attribute-based encryption (Section 2.3.3), predicate-based encryption (Sec-
tion 2.3.4) and searchable encryption (Chapter 3) are able to facilitate partial access
to the encrypted data, such as evaluating a query over the encrypted data.
The algorithms in the encryption schemes can either be deterministic or proba-
bilistic. A deterministic algorithm always outputs the same ciphertext when supplied
with the same key and plaintext, whenever it is executed. In contrast, a probabilistic
algorithm produces a random ciphertext, even on executions involving the same key
and plaintext.
Throughout this thesis, we will use M to denote the plaintext space, C to denote
the ciphertext space, K to denote the keyspace, and κ ∈ N to denote the security
parameter of an encryption scheme..
2.3.1 Symmetric-key encryption
In symmetric-key encryption, the key used to encrypt the data is the same as the
key used to decrypt the data. This presents the major issue associated with using
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symmetric-key encryption, which is how to share the secret key. The symmetric secret
key must be kept secret at all times in order to ensure the confidentiality of the en-
crypted data and a secure method is required to distribute the key to all parties whom
we wish to have the capability to encrypt and decrypt data.
Definition 2.3.1 (Symmetric-key Encryption (SKE)). Let K be the key space, M be
the plaintext space and C be the ciphertext space. A symmetric-key encryption scheme
consists of the following three algorithms:
• SK $← KeyGen(1κ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the security
parameter κ ∈ N and outputs a secret key SK ∈ K.
• c $← Enc(m,SK): A probabilistic or deterministic algorithm that takes as input a
plaintext m ∈M and the secret key SK, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• m or ⊥← Dec(c, SK): A deterministic algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext
c ∈ C and outputs either m ∈M or ⊥.
An SKE scheme is correct if, when using the same key, the decryption algorithm
reverses encryption. That is, if a plaintext is encrypted using a key SK, then running
the decryption algorithm on this ciphertext using the same key will return the original
plaintext.
Definition 2.3.2 (Correctness of SKE). An SKE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N,
for all m ∈M:
P[SK $← KeyGen(1κ),
c
$← Enc(m,SK),
m← Dec(c, SK)] = 1.
2.3.2 Public-key encryption
In public-key encryption, the key used to encrypt the data is different from the key used
to decrypt it. The decryption key must be kept secret, however the encryption key can
be made public. This solves the issue associated with key transfer in SKE, since a user
is able to encrypt a plaintext for someone using a public key which can be made freely
available, for example by publishing it online. This means that the party encrypting
the data needs to know the recipient of the data before encryption in order to use the
correct public key.
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Definition 2.3.3 (Public Key Encryption (PKE)). Let K be the key space, M be the
plaintext space and C be the ciphertext space. A public-key encryption scheme consists
of the following three algorithms:
• (PK,SK) $← KeyGen(1κ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter κ ∈ N and outputs a public and secret key pair (PK,SK) ∈ K.
• c $← Enc(m,PK): A probabilistic or deterministic algorithm that takes as input
a plaintext m ∈M, the public key PK, and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• m or ⊥← Dec(c, SK): A deterministic algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext
c ∈ C and outputs either a plaintext m or ⊥.
The correctness of PKE is similar to that of SKE, in that the decryption algorithm
reverses the encryption algorithm.
Definition 2.3.4 (Correctness of PKE). A PKE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N, for
all m ∈M:
P[(PK,SK) $← KeyGen(1κ),
c
$← Enc(m,PK),
m← Dec(c, SK)] = 1.
2.3.3 Attribute-based encryption
The paradigm of attribute-based encryption is a form of PKE where a user’s key is
associated with general descriptive attributes. These attributes can be descriptors
such as the user’s role, location, type of subscription or the department the user works
in, for example. Ciphertexts are associated with monotonic access structures, which
means that if there exists a set of attributes that satisfy the access structure, then
any superset of this set will also satisfy the access structure. The access structures are
composed of ∨ and ∧ gates, and a ciphertext can only be decrypted if the attributes
on the secret key satisfy the policy determined by the access structure.
There are two variants of attribute-based encryption. The one we will describe
is referred to as ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption, while the other is known
as key-policy attribute-based encryption. In key-policy attribute-based encryption the
monotonic access structure is associated with the keys instead of the ciphertext, and the
ciphertext is associated with a set of descriptive attributes. We give a formal definition
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of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption only as this is the only variant we utilise
in the thesis.
Attribute-based encryption allows a user to encrypt data without knowing the spe-
cific identity of the recipient(s); the user only needs to specify a policy involving a
general set of attributes that they require the recipient to possess. For example, an
employee at a company could encrypt data so that every manager in the finance de-
partment is able to decrypt it by embedding the policy ‘FINANCE ∧ MANAGER’
into each ciphertext. Applying an access structure to each ciphertext allows the data
owner to enforce a more fine-grained access policy to the encrypted data, whereas in
standard SKE and PKE (Definitions 2.3.1 and 2.3.3), access to the encrypted data is
all-or-nothing, meaning that a user is either authorized to decrypt all data items or
none at all. We denote a set of attributes A that satisfy a policy A as A |= A.
Definition 2.3.5 (Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE)). Let U
be the attribute space, M be the plaintext space, K be the key space, C be the cipher-
text space and A∗ be the access structure space. A ciphertext policy attribute based
encryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• (PK,SK) $← Setup(1κ,U): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter κ ∈ N and outputs a master public key and master secret key pair
(PK,SK) ∈ K.
• c $← Encrypt(m,A, PK): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input an access
structure A ∈ A∗, a plaintext m ∈ M and the public key PK, and outputs a
ciphertext c ∈ C associated with access structure A.
• SKA $← KeyGen(SK,A, PK): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the
master secret key SK and a set of attributes A ∈ U that describe the key (or the
user that the key is produced for). It outputs a secret key SKA ∈ K associated
with the set of attributes A.
• m or ⊥← Decrypt(SKA, c, PK): A deterministic algorithm that takes as input a
ciphertext c ∈ C associated with an access structure A, a secret key SKA associated
with some set of attributes A, and the public key PK. It outputs a plaintext
m ∈M or ⊥.
Definition 2.3.6 (Correctness of CPABE). A CP-ABE scheme is correct if for all
κ ∈ N, for all (PK,SK) $← Setup(1κ), for all attribute sets A ∈ U , for any key
SKA
$← KeyGen(SK,A, PK), and for all access structures A ∈ A∗, if A satisfies A,
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then:
m← Decrypt(SKA, c, PK).
2.3.4 Predicate-based encryption
Predicate-based encryption is a generalisation of ABE that associates ciphertexts with
a set of attributes X, and the secret keys with a predicate F (as opposed to the access
structure in ABE). Decryption succeeds if F (X) = 1. Unlike ABE, predicate based en-
cryption is both attribute hiding and predicate hiding, meaning that both the predicates
and attributes are concealed (there are some examples of ABE that also conceal this
information [108, 96] but, ABE is not necessarily attribute hiding by definition). Pred-
icate based encryption can support the following types of queries over the encrypted
data: disjunctive queries, polynomial evaluation (where the set of attributes is Zn and
the predicates are in the form of polynomials in Zn[x]; the predicate evaluates to 1
if the corresponding polynomial evaluates to 0 on the attributes), threshold queries,
and predicates corresponding to conjunctive normal form (CNF) or disjunctive normal
form (DNF) formulae.
Definition 2.3.7 (Predicate Based Encryption (PBE)). Let P be the predicate space,
K be the key space, M be the plaintext space, C be the ciphertext space and U be the
attribute space. A Predicate Based Encryption (PBE) scheme consists of the following
four algorithms:
• (PK,SK) $← Setup(1κ,P): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter κ ∈ N and a predicate space P, and outputs a master public key and
master secret key pair (PK,SK) ∈ K.
• SKp $← KeyGen(SK, p, PK): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the
master secret key SK and the description of a predicate p ∈ P. It outputs a
secret key SKp ∈ K associated with the predicate p.
• c $← Encrypt(m,A,PK): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a set of
attributes A ∈ U , a plaintext m ∈ M and the public key PK, and outputs a
ciphertext c ∈ C associated with the set of attributes A.
• m or ⊥← Decrypt(SKp, c, PK): A deterministic algorithm that takes as input a
ciphertext c ∈ C associated with some set of attributes A ∈ U , and a secret key
SKp associated with a predicate p ∈ P. It outputs a plaintext m ∈M or ⊥.
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Definition 2.3.8 (Correctness of PBE). A PBE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N,
for all (PK,SK)
$← Setup(1κ), for all plaintexts m ∈ M, for all p ∈ P, for any key
SKp
$← KeyGen(SK, p), and for all sets of attributes A ∈ U , if f(A) = 1, then:
m← Decrypt(SKp, c, PK),
and if f(A) 6= 1 :
P[(PK,SK) $← Setup(1κ),
SKp
$← KeyGen(SK, p),
c
$← Encrypt(m,A,PK),
⊥ ← Decrypt(SKp, c, PK)] = 1− negl(κ).
2.3.5 Broadcast encryption
Broadcast encryption provides an efficient way of allowing different sets of authorised
users access to encrypted data delivered via a broadcast channel. The trivial way of
achieving this would be to distribute a unique public and secret key pair to each user
in the authorised set, and then encrypt the data using each of the different public keys.
Hence, if there are n users in the authorised set then this method requires n different
encryptions of the same data to be broadcast to all users in order for each authorised
user to be able to decrypt the data.
Using broadcast encryption requires only one ciphertext to be broadcast to all users,
which can reduce the bandwidth required. When encrypting data using a broadcast
encryption scheme, a set of authorised users are input into the encryption algorithm,
along with the plaintext. Encryption ensures that only users belonging to the set of
authorised users input into the encryption algorithm are able to decrypt the resulting
ciphertext. Broadcast encryption works by distributing keying information to each user
so that authorised users are able to construct the decryption key, whereas unauthorised
users are not.
A Broadcast encryption (BE) scheme consists of a set of three polynomial time
algorithms BE = (BE.KeyGen,BE.Enc,BE.Dec) such that KeyGen generates the public
key and n secret keys for each user in the system, Enc takes the set of authorised users,
a plaintext and the public key as input, and outputs the BE encryption for the set of
authorised users, and Dec takes a user’s identity, their secret key, the BE encryption of
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a plaintext,the public key and the set of authorised users, and outputs either the data
(if the user is authorised to view the data), or ⊥ otherwise.
In the following definition we consider a data owner broadcasting a ciphertext to a
set of users, some of which may not be authorised to decrypt it.
Definition 2.3.9 (Broadcast Encryption (BE)). Let U be the user identity space, G ⊆
U a set of authorised users, K be the keyspace, C be the ciphertext space and M be
the plaintext space. A Broadcast Encryption (BE) scheme consists of the following four
algorithms:
• (PK,SK) $← Keygen(1κ, h): A probabilistic algorithm that takes a security pa-
rameter κ ∈ N (and possibly a value h which determines the maximum number of
users that can be revoked from the system), and outputs a public and secret key
pair (PK,SK) ∈ K.
• SKu $← Add(SK, u): A probabilistic algorithm that takes a user identity u ∈ U
and the secret key SK, and outputs a secret key SKu ∈ K.
• c $← Encrypt(m,G, PK): A probabilistic algorithm that takes a plaintext m ∈M,
a set of users G ⊆ U that are authorized to decrypt the resulting ciphertext and
the public key PK. It outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• (m or ⊥) ← Decrypt(SKu, c): A deterministic algorithm run by a user that
takes a ciphertext c and the user’s secret key SKu. The algorithm outputs either
a plaintext m or ⊥.
Definition 2.3.10 (Correctness of BE). A BE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N,
(PK,SK)
$← Keygen(1κ, h), for all u ∈ U , for all G ∈ U , for any key SKu $←
Add(SK, u), for all plaintexts m, if u ∈ G:
P[(PK,SK) $← KeyGen(1κ, h),
SKu
$← Add(SK, u),
c
$← Encrypt(m,G, PK),
m← Decrypt(SKu, c, PK)] = 1.
2.3.6 Order-Preserving Encryption
Order-preserving encryption is a form of deterministic encryption that produces cipher-
texts that preserve the ordering of the underlying plaintexts. In order to define OPE
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we first give a definition of an order-preserving function:
Definition 2.3.11 (Order-Preserving Function). For A,B ⊆ N with |A| ≤ |B|, a
function f : A→ B is order-preserving if for all i, j ∈ A, f(i) > f(j) iff i > j.
Definition 2.3.12 (Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE)). Let DE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec)
be a deterministic encryption scheme with keyspace K, plaintext space M and cipher-
text space C. DE is an order-preserving encryption scheme if Enc(K, ·) is an order
preserving function from M to C for all K output by KeyGen.
Definition 2.3.13 (Correctness of OPE). An OPE scheme is correct if the underlying
deterministic encryption scheme DE is correct. See definitions 2.3.2 and 2.3.4.
2.4 Verifiable Computation
This section presents information on verifiable computation schemes
2.4.1 Verifiable and publicly verifiable computation
Verifiable Computation (VC) allows a client with limited resources to efficiently out-
source the computation of a function f on various inputs x1, ..., xn to a more powerful
server, and to verify the correctness of results. In verifiable computing we consider a
semi-honest but curious server (Definition 3.3.2) which may not perform the compu-
tation honestly or give a false result in order to save its bandwidth or computational
resources. Due to this a user receiving computation results from the server needs to be
able to verify that the server executed the computation correctly. The server computes
the function on the specified input and returns the results, e.g. f(xi), along with a
proof that the server computed the function correctly on the given input. It is required
that the verification of the proof requires less computation by the client than if the
client computed the actual function.
Other notable approaches in the realm of querying remote data can be found in
[8, 10, 11, 23, 24, 28, 53].
Definition 2.4.1 (Verifiable Computation (VC)). Let F be the function space, X be
the input space and K be the keyspace. A VC scheme consists of the following four
algorithms:
• (EKf , SKf ) $← KeyGen(1κ, f): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the
security parameter 1κ along with a function f ∈ F to be computed. It outputs a
public and secret key pair (EKf , SKf ) ∈ K. The public key EKf will be used by
the server to compute the function f .
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• (σf,x, V Kf,x) $← ProbGen(x, SKf ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input
x along with the secret key SKf . It outputs the public encoded input σf,x, along
with a secret verification key V Kf,x.
• θf(x) $← Compute(σf,x, EKf ): A probabilistic function that takes as input the en-
coded input σf,x along with the public evaluation key EKf . It outputs an encoding
of the computation result, θf(x), evaluating f(x).
• y ← Verify(θf(x), V Kf(x), SKf ): A deterministic algorithm that takes as input the
encoded result θf(x), the verification key V Kf and the secret key SKf . It outputs
a value y which is either the result of the computation f(x) or ⊥ if θf(x) is not a
valid input.
Definition 2.4.2 (Correctness of VC). A VC scheme for a set of functions F is correct
if for all f ∈ F and for all x in the domain of f :
P[(EKf , SKf )
$← Setup(1κ, f),
(σf,x, V Kf,x)
$← ProbGen(x, SKf ),
θf(x)
$← Compute(σf,x, EKf ),
f(x)← Verify(θf(x), V Kf(x), SKf )] = 1.
Gennaro et al. [67] considered the use of garbled circuits, whilst Parno et al. [115]
introduced publicly verifiable computation (PVC) built from key policy attribute based
encryption (KP-ABE), where a single client computes an evaluation key for the server
and publishes information enabling other clients to outsource computation to the server.
Any client may verify the correctness of a result.
2.4.2 Verifiable delegable computation
Alderman et al. [6] considered an alternative system model that used ciphertext pol-
icy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) to allow clients to query computations on
data held by the server (or initially outsourced by a client) called Verifiable Delegable
Computation (VDC). The data is given public, descriptive labels to allow the clients to
request computations on subsets of the data. This can naturally be applied to problems
like querying on remote data.
Definition 2.4.3 (Verifiable Delegable Computation (VDC)). Let F be the function
space, S be the server space and K be the keyspace. A verifiable delegable computation
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
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Figure 2.1: Verifiable Delegable Computation.
• (MK,PP ) $← Setup(1κ,F): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input security
parameter and a family of functions F . It outputs a master secret key MK and
public parameters PP .
• PKf $← FnInit(f,MK,PP ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the
master secret key, public parameters and a function f ∈ F . It outputs a public
delegation key PKf which can be used to request computations of the function f .
• SKSi $← Register(Si,MK,PP ): A probabilistic algorithm used to enrol a compu-
tation server into the system. It takes as input the server identity Si ∈ S along
with the master key and the public parameters. It outputs the server’s secret key,
which is used to sign computations carried out by that server.
• EKDi,Si $← Certify(Si, Di, {`(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,MK,PP ): A probabilistic algorithm
that takes as input a server identity, a set of data points Di and associated labels
{`(xi,j)}, the family of functions Fi and the master secret key. It outputs an
evaluation key EKDi,Si which enables server Si to compute all functions f ∈ Fi
on data Di, where Di = {xi,j}mij=1 is a set of mi data points each labelled `(xi,j).
• (σf,X , V Kf,X , RKf,X) $← ProbGen(f, {xi,j}xi,j∈X , Si, PKf , PP ): A probabilistic
algorithm that takes as input a function f , a set of data point labels {`(xi,j)}
belonging to server Si, the public delegation key PKf and the public parameters.
It outputs a value encoding the function f and the input values, denoted σf,X , a
public verification key V Kf,X and a retrieval key RKf,X .
• θf(X) $← Compute(σf,X , EKDi,Si , SKSi , PP ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes
as input the encoded input value σf,X , the evaluation key EKDi,Si, the server’s
secret key SKSi and the public parameters. It computes the function f on the
encoded inputs and outputs and produces an encoded result θf(X) for f(X).
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• yf(X) ← Verify(θf(X), V Kf(X), RKf(X), PP ): This deterministic algorithm can be
run in two parts:
– (RTf(X), τθf(X)) ← BVerif(θf(X), V Kf,X , PP ): This algorithm takes as in-
put the encoded output θf(X) along with the verification key and the public
parameters. It outputs a retrieval token RTf(X) which encodes the output of
the computation f(X) and a token τθf(X) which is assigned value 1 if θf(X)
is a valid encoding of the computation result, or 0 otherwise.
– yf(X) ← Retrieve(RTf(X), τθf(X) , V Kf,X , RKf,X , PP ): This algorithm takes
as input the retrieval token RTf(X), the encoded result τθf(X), the verification
key V Kf,X , the retrieval key RKf,X along with the public parameters. It
outputs the value yf(X) which is either the result of the computation f(X) if
the server performed correctly, or ⊥ otherwise.
Definition 2.4.4 (Correctness of VDC). A VDC scheme for a family of functions F
is correct if; for all Si ∈ S, for all Di and for all f ∈ F :
P[(PP,MK) $← Setup(1κ,F),
PKf
$← FnInit(f,MK,PP ),
SKSi
$← Register(Si,MK,PP ),
EKDi,Si
$← Certify(Si, Di, {`(xi,j)}xi,j∈Di ,Fi,MK,PP ),
(σf,X , V Kf,X , RKf,X)
$← ProbGen(f, {xi,j}xi,j∈X , PKf , PP ),
θf(X)
$← Compute(σf,X , EKDi,Si , SKSi , PP ),
(RTf(X),τθf(X)
)← BVerif(θf(X), V Kf,X , PP ),
f(X)← Retrieve(RTf(X), τθf(X) , V Kf,X , RKf,X , PP )] = 1.
2.5 Types of data
In this section we define the data types that we use in the thesis.
Definition 2.5.1 (Static). A static dataset is one that does not change over time.
That is, it is a fixed dataset in the sense that no data items can be added, removed or
updated in the dataset once initialised.
Definition 2.5.2 (Dynamic). A dynamic dataset is one that can change over time.
Data items can be added, removed or updated after the dataset has been initialised.
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2.6 Methods of proof
There are two main methods of proving the security of a cryptographic scheme: game-
based methods and simulation-based methods. In this section we outline both of these
methods.
2.6.1 Game-based security proofs
This method of proof is defined in terms of an attack game between two probabilistic
entities: an adversary and a challenger. The game is modelled as a probability space
and the security notion is related to the probability of some event in this probability
space occurring. The challenger can be thought of as a legitimate user and will usually
have access to the secret parameters in the system. The adversary models an entity
that wants to achieve something against the wishes of the legitimate user and has access
to the public parameters and usually some oracles.
An oracle is a system that the challenger provides to the adversary in order to give
them some extra information that would otherwise be unavailable to them. Oracles are
used to create a realistic environment for the adversary, in order to give them access
to all the information that an adversary attacking the scheme in the real world might
have. For example, an adverwsary might be able to observe the inputs and outputs
to an encryption algorithm in a real world system that requires a secret key as input.
However, if the adversary in the game does not have access to the secret key then they
cannot run this algorithm themselves, so an oracle is used to allow the adversary access
to this information. In this case the oracle gives the adversary the ability to encrypt
any plaintext of their choosing and receive a valid ciphertext without having access to
the secret key. We denote an adversary A having access to an oracle O that has fixed
inputs (x1, ..., xn) and computes a function F as AOF (·,...,·,x1,...,xn), where · denotes an
input that is chosen by the adversary.
2.6.2 Simulation-based security proofs
In a simulation-based proof there are two different worlds: an ideal world, where the
cryptographic scheme is secure by definition and in which an adversary interacts with
a simulated version of the cryptographic scheme, and a real world which reflects an ad-
versary interacting with the actual cryptographic scheme. The idea behind simulation-
based proof is that if the cryptographic scheme in question is secure, then the adversary
cannot tell which world it is in, i.e. whether it’s interacting with a simulation or the
actual scheme. The only information the simulator in the ideal world receives is that
which is assumed to be leaked to an adversary in the real world, so it cannot run any of
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the algorithms or know any secret parameters of the cryptographic scheme in question.
Using only the specified information, the simulator has to fulfil the following three tasks
[101]:
1. It must generate a view for the real adversary that is indistinguishable from its
real view in the real world;
2. It must extract the effective inputs used by the adversary in the execution; and
3. It must make the view generated be consistent with the output that is based on
this input.
A simulation-based proof shows that if an adversary cannot tell whether it is in-
teracting with a simulator or the real cryptographic scheme then the cryptographic
scheme does not leak any information other than that which is known to be leaked.
To illustrate this concept, take the example of a symmetric-key encryption scheme. In
the real world, the adversary issues a plaintext to the challenger and receives a genuine
ciphertext in return. In the ideal world, the adversary receives a simulated cipher-
text that the simulator generates without the secret key or access to the algorithms
of the cryptographic scheme. If the adversary cannot tell which world they are inter-
acting with then this shows that the real ciphertext leaks no secret information. This
is because the simulator is not in possession of any of the secret information, hence
it would be impossible for them to output a ciphertext that leaks this information or
any information that the adversary does not already know. If the adversary is unable
to distinguish between a simulated ciphertext (that leaks no information) and a real
ciphertext, then this implies that the real ciphertext also leaks no secret information,
because if it did then this would enable the adversary to distinguish which world it is
in. The inability of the adversary to distinguish which world it is operating in proves
the security of the cryptographic scheme.
Oracles can also be used in simulation-based proofs. However, if used, it needs to
be shown how their output can be simulated in the ideal world.
There are two main types of security associated with game-based and simulation-
based proofs in the SE literature: selective security and adaptive security. We discuss
the differences between these two notions of security in Definitions 2.6.1 and 2.6.2.
Definition 2.6.1 (Selective security). If a cryptographic scheme is selectively secure,
then the adversary must make all oracle queries and challenge selections in a batch
prior to receiving any inputs such as oracle query responses and public parameters.
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Definition 2.6.2 (Adaptive security). If a cryptographic scheme is adaptively secure
then the adversary is able to make oracle queries and select challenge values that depend
on the results of previous queries and any inputs they receive.
Adaptive security is considered to be the stronger, more desirable, notion of security,
since it more accurately reflects the abilities of a real-world adversary. However, these
types of proof can be hard to construct, so the notion of selective security is commonly
used.
We use game-based methods to define the security of our encryption schemes in
Chapters 5 and 6. Our verifiable searchable encryption scheme presented in Chapter 5
is constructed using attribute-based encryption and verifiable computation techniques.
It is standard practice in the literature surrounding these paradigms to use game-based
proofs. We used this method also to keep in line with the relevant literature and the
intuition behind our security notions were well represented using games. In Chapter 6
we explored both methods of proof for our construction. The simulation-based method
required the construction to have three random oracles in order to achieve adaptive
security and support a dynamic dataset. The issue with using the simulation-based
method for this construction came with simulating the index for the adversary ahead
of time whilst still being able to simulate consistent search results before and after the
addition of data items to the index. The random oracles allowed the challenger to alter
the content of the simulated index using the search queries and the tokens for adding
and deleting data items. Due to the complexity of our construction the simulation-
based method was very complex and difficult to follow. The game-based method was
more intuitive and easy to follow for the reader and allowed us to prove security in the
standard model without the use of random oracles.
In Section 2.3 we defined several types of encryption scheme and their associated
definitions of correctness. In Sections 2.6.3-2.6.7 we define the security of each of these
encryption schemes.
2.6.3 Security Model for Symmetric-Key Encryption
The two most widely adopted notions of security for SKE are that of indistinguisha-
bility under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) and indistinguishability under chosen
ciphertext attack (IND-CCA). The notion of security that we use in this thesis is that
of IND-CPA, which ensures that the ciphertexts in an IND-CPA secure SKE scheme do
not leak any information about the underlying plaintext. We assume that an adversary
is able to obtain encryptions of arbitrary plaintexts, i.e. they are able to build up a
dictionary of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. However, when given a ciphertext, they are
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unable to distinguish the underlying plaintext from a choice of two possible plaintexts
that were chosen initially by the adversary. Let SKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and A be
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary.
We formally define the notion of IND-CPA security in Game 2.1 and Definition 2.6.3.
The game is initialized with the challenger C generating a secret key SK and choosing
a random bit b. The adversary A is given the security parameter 1κ and access to the
LoR oracle. The LoR oracle takes as input a pair of plaintexts m0,m1 chosen by A.
The oracle firsts checks if the two plaintexts are the same size and, if so, returns the
encryption of plaintext mb under key SK to the adversary. If the two plaintexts are not
the same size, the oracle returns the failure symbol ⊥ and terminates. The adversary
eventually outputs a bit b′ as its guess for the value of b. If (b′ = b) then the challenger
outputs 1; and otherwise outputs 0.
ExpIND−CPAA,SKE (1
κ)
1 : SK
$← KeyGen(1κ)
2 : b
$← {0, 1}
3 : b′ ← AOLoR(·,·,1
κ)
(1κ)
4 : if (b′ = b)
5 : return 1
6 : else
7 : return 0
OLoR(m0,m1, 1κ)
1 : if (|m0| 6= |m1|)
2 : return ⊥
3 : else return Enc(mb, SK)
Game 2.1: IND-CPA for symmetric-key encryption
Definition 2.6.3 (IND-CPA for Symmetric-Key Encryption). For a SKE scheme
SKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) we define the advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary A as:
AdvIND-CPAA,SKE (1
κ) = P[ExpIND-CPAA,SKE (1κ) = 1]−
1
2
.
A SKE scheme SKE is IND-CPA secure if for all probabilistic polynomial time
adversaries A we have:
AdvIND-CPAA,SKE (1
κ) ≤ negl(1κ).
2.6.4 Security Model for Public-Key Encryption
Analogously, the most widely adopted notions of security for PKE are that of IND-
CPA and IND-CCA. We define the notion of IND-CPA security for PKE formally in
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Game 2.2 and Definition 2.6.4. The IND-CPA games are defined similarly for SKE and
PKE, with the exception that a public key as well as a secret key is generated at the
start of the game in the PKE version. The public key is given to the adversary.
ExpIND−CPAA,PKE (1
κ)
1 : (SK,PK)
$← KeyGen(1κ)
2 : b
$← {0, 1}
3 : (m0,m1)← A(PK, 1κ)
4 : cb
$← Enc(mb, PK)
5 : b′ ← A(cb, 1κ)
6 : if (b′ = b)
7 : return 1
8 : else
9 : return 0
Game 2.2: IND-CPA for public-key encryption
Definition 2.6.4 (IND-CPA for Public-key-Encryption). For a PKE scheme
PKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) we define the advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary A against a notion IND-CPA as:
AdvIND-CPAA,PKE (1
κ) = P[ExpIND-CPAA,PKE (1κ) = 1]−
1
2
.
A PKE scheme PKE is IND-CPA secure if for all probabilistic polynomial time
adversaries A we have:
AdvIND-CPAA,PKE (1
κ) ≤ negl(1κ).
2.6.5 Security Model for Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion
The security for CP-ABE is similar to that of SKE. It is required that the ciphertexts
leak no information regarding the underlying plaintexts. As there are multiple users
in the CP-ABE scheme it is also required that the users cannot collude to learn more
information regarding the plaintexts outside the union of their access rights. To mimic
the collusion of users in the IND-CPA game for CP-ABE, the adversary is given access
to an oracle, KeyGen(·), which takes as input an attribute set of the adversary’s
choosing and outputs the secret key for that attribute set. This allows the adversary
in the game access to multiple decryption keys for different the attribute sets that they
query to KeyGen(·). We define a selective game (Game 2.3) and an adaptive game
(Game 2.4) for CP-ABE. We define the attribute universe as U .
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ExpsIND-CPAA [CPABE, 1
κ,U ] :
1 : (A′, st) $← A(1κ,U)
2 : (PK,SK)
$← Setup(1κ,U)
3 : (m0,m1, st)
$← AKeyGen(·)(st, PK)
4 : if |m0| 6= |m1|
5 : return 0
6 : b
$← {0, 1}
7 : c′ $← Encrypt(mb,A′, PK)
8 : b′ $← AKeyGen(·)(c′, st)
9 : if b′ = b
10 : return 1
11 : else
12 : return 0
Oracle KeyGen(A)
1 : if A 6|= A′
2 : return Keygen(SK,A, PK)
3 : else
4 : return ⊥
Game 2.3: Selective IND-CPA game for CP-ABE.
In the selective game the adversary receives the security parameter and policy
universe as input and chooses their challenge policy A′ before any keys are generated.
The challenger then generates the master secret key SK and the public key PK and
gives PK to the adversary. The adversary is then allowed a polynomial number of
queries to query the oracle, KeyGen(·), for secret keys associated with any attribute
set A ⊆ U of their choosing, except for those such that A |= A′. The adversary then
outputs two plaintexts (m0,m1), the game is terminated if |m0| 6= |m1| to prevent a
trivial win for the adversary. The challenger chooses a bit b uniformly at random and
encrypts plaintext mb using the challenge policy chosen by the adversary as input to
the Encrypt algorithm. The adversary is then allowed to query KeyGen(·) under the
same conditions as previously and eventually outputs their guess b′ for b. The adversary
wins the game if b′ = b.
The adaptive game, Game 2.4, is run similarly to that of the selective game, except
that the adversary is allowed to query KeyGen(·) before selecting their challenge
policy. The KeyGen(·) oracle keeps track of which attribute sets have been queried
before the adversary selects the challenge policy. If the adversary chooses a policy A′
such that A |= A′ for some previously queried attribute set then the game terminates,
to avoid a trivial win for the adversary. The adaptive game then proceeds analogously
to the selective game.
Definition 2.6.5. For a CP-ABE scheme CPABE = (KeyGen,Encrypt,KeyGen,Decrypt)
we define the advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A against a notion
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ExpIND−CPAA [CPABE, 1
κ,U ] :
1 : Q← {∅}
2 : (PK,SK)
$← Setup(1κ,U)
3 : (m0,m1,A′, st)
$← AKeyGen(·)(PK)
4 : if |m0| 6= |m1|
5 : return 0
6 : for all A ∈ Q do
7 : if A |= A′
8 : return 0
9 : b
$← {0, 1}
10 : c′ $← Encrypt(mb,A′, PK)
11 : b′ $← AKeyGen(·)(c′, st)
12 : if b′ = b
13 : return 1
14 : else
15 : return 0
Oracle KeyGen(A)
1 : if A 6|= A′
2 : Q← Q ∪ {A}
3 : return Keygen(SK,A, PK)
4 : else
5 : return ⊥
Game 2.4: Adaptive IND-CPA game for CP-ABE.
X ∈ {IND−CPA, sIND−CPA} as:
AdvXA,CPABE(1
κ,U) = P[1← ExpXA,CPABE(1κ,U)]−
1
2
.
A CP-ABE scheme CPABE is secure with respect to a notion
X ∈ {IND−CPA, sIND−CPA} if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries
A we have:
AdvXA,CPABE(1
κ,U) ≤ negl(1κ).
2.6.6 Security Model for Predicate-Based Encryption
The security of PBE is similar to that of CP-ABE, except that it also requires cipher-
texts to be attribute hiding as well as not leaking any information about the plaintext.
As in CP-ABE it is also required that colluding users cannot learn any information
from the encrypted data outside of the union of their access rights. In the security
game for PBE the adversary is given an oracle, KeyGen(·), to allow them to obtain
keys for any predicate p ∈ P of their choosing, subject to certain restrictions. The
predicate universe is denoted by P and the attribute universe by U .
In the selective game the adversary receives the security parameter, predicate uni-
verse and attribute universe as input and chooses their challenge attribute sets A0, A1
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ExpsIND−CPAA [PBE, 1
κ,U ,P] :
1 : µ← 0
2 : (A0, A1, st)
$← A(1κ,U ,P)
3 : (PK,SK)
$← Setup(1κ,P)
4 : (m0,m1, st)
$← AKeyGen(·)(st, PK)
5 : if |m0| 6= |m1|
6 : return 0
7 : if (µ = 1) ∧ (m0 6= m1)
8 : return 0
9 : b
$← {0, 1}
10 : c′ $← Encrypt(mb, Ab, PK)
11 : b′ $← AKeyGen(·)(c′, st)
12 : if b′ = b
13 : return 1
14 : else
15 : return 0
Oracle KeyGen(p)
1 : if p(A0) 6= p(A1)
2 : return ⊥
3 : if p(A0) = p(A1) = 1
4 : µ← 1
5 : else
6 : return Keygen(SK, p, PK)
Game 2.5: Selective IND-CPA game for PBE.
before any keys are generated. The challenger then generates the master secret key
SK and the public key PK and gives PK to the adversary. The adversary is then
allowed a polynomial number of queries to query the oracle, KeyGen(·), for secret
keys associated with any predicate p of their choosing, except for those such that
p(A0) 6= p(A1). The adversary then outputs two plaintexts, (m0,m1). The game is
terminated if |m0| 6= |m1| and also if the adversary has queried a predicate p to the or-
acle KeyGen(·) such that p(A0) = p(A1) = 1 and the chosen plaintexts are not equal,
to prevent a trivial win for the adversary. The challenger chooses a bit b uniformly at
random and encrypts plaintext mb using the challenge attribute set Ab chosen by the
adversary, as input to the Encrypt algorithm. The adversary is then allowed to query
KeyGen(·) under the same conditions as previously and eventually outputs their guess
b′ for b. The adversary wins the game if b′ = b.
The adaptive game, Game 2.6, is run similarly to that of the selective game, except
that the adversary is allowed to query KeyGen(·) before selecting their challenge
attribute set. The adversary is able to query KeyGen(·) for a key corresponding to
any predicate of their choosing. A set Q is generated by KeyGen(·) to keep track of
the queries the adversary has made to the oracle. After a polynomial number of queries
the adversary selects their challenge attribute sets, A0, A1, along with two plaintexts
m0,m1. If the sizes of the two plaintexts are not equal then the game terminates, to
39
2.6. Methods of proof
ExpIND−CPAA [PBE, 1
κ,U ,P] :
1 : Q← ∅, chall← 0
2 : (PK,SK)
$← Setup(1κ,P)
3 : (A0, A1,m0,m1, st)
$← AKeyGen(·)(1κ, PK)
4 : if |m0| 6= |m1|
5 : return 0
6 : if there exists p ∈ Q : p(A0) 6= p(A1)
7 : return 0
8 : if there exists p ∈ Q : (p(A0) = p(A1) = 1) ∧ (m0 6= m1)
9 : return 0
10 : b
$← {0, 1}
11 : chall← 1
12 : c′ $← Encrypt(mb, Ab, PK)
13 : b′ $← AKeyGen(·)(c′, st)
14 : if b′ = b
15 : return 1
16 : else
17 : return 0
Oracle KeyGen(p)
1 : if chall = 0
2 : Q← Q ∪ p
3 : return Keygen(SK, p, PK)
4 : else
5 : if p(A0) 6= p(A1)
6 : return ⊥
7 : if (p(A0) = p(A1) = 1) ∧ (m0 6= m1))
8 : return ⊥
9 : else
10 : return Keygen(SK, p, PK)
Game 2.6: Adaptive IND-CPA game for PBE.
prevent the adversary from a trivial win. There are two other conditions that also need
to be met, that is, for any predicate p ∈ Q it is required that p(A0) = p(A1). Lastly
it is required for any predicate p such that p(A0) = p(A1) = 1 we have that m0 = m1.
These requirements are to prevent a trivial win for the adversary. The adaptive game
then proceeds analogously to the selective game.
Definition 2.6.6. For a PBE scheme PBE = (Setup,Encrypt,KeyGen,Decrypt) we de-
fine the advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A against a notion
X ∈ {IND−CPA, sIND−CPA} as:
AdvXA,PBE(1
κ,U ,P) = P[1← ExpXA,PBE(1κ,U ,P)]−
1
2
.
A PBE scheme PBE is secure with respect to a notion X ∈ {IND−CPA, sIND−CPA}
if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A we have:
AdvXA,PBE(1
κ,U ,P) ≤ negl(1κ).
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2.6.7 Security Model for Broadcast Encryption
The security of BE requires that a user be unable to distinguish ciphertexts that are
encrypted under a group of identities that the user does not belong to. In the security
game for BE the adversary is given access to an oracle, Add(·), to allow them to obtain
keys for any identity outside of the set of challenge identities. The identity universe is
denoted by U .
ExpIND−CPAA [BE, 1
κ,U ] :
1 : chall← 0, U ← ∅
2 : (PK,SK)
$← KeyGen(1κ,U)
3 : (S∗,m0,m1, st)AAdd(·)(1κ, PK,U)
4 : b
$← {0, 1}
5 : c∗ $← Encrypt(mb, S∗, PK)
6 : chall = 1
7 : b′ $← AAdd(·)(c∗, st)
8 : if b′ = b
9 : return 1
10 : else
11 : return 0
Oracle Add(u)
1 : if chall = 0
2 : U ← U ∪ u
3 : return SKu
$← Add(SK, u)
4 : else
5 : if u ∈ S∗
6 : return ⊥
7 : else
8 : return SKu
$← Add(SK,PK, u)
Game 2.7: Adaptive IND-CPA game for BE.
The game is initialized by setting the value of chall to 0. The challenger then runs
KeyGen to generate the keys for the system, (PK,SK). The public key PK is given to
the adversary, who is then also given access to the oracle, Add(·). The adversary can
make a polynomial number of queries to this oracle, before outputting their challenge
identity set, S∗, and a pair of plaintexts (m0,m1). The set U keeps track of the queries
made to the oracle, if there exists an identity u ∈ U such that u ∈ S∗ then the game
is terminated to prevent a trivial win for the adversary. The challenger selects a bit b
uniformly at random and encrypts the plaintext mb under the set of identities S
∗, to
create the challenge ciphertext c∗, which is sent to the adversary. The adversary is then
allowed another round of queries to Add(·) subject to the same restrictions as before.
Eventually the adversary outputs their guess b′ for b and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 2.6.7. For a BE scheme BE = (KeyGen,Add,Encrypt,Decrypt) we define
the advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A against the notion IND-
CPA as:
AdvIND−CPAA,BE (1
κ,U) = P[1← ExpIND−CPAA,BE (1κ,U)]−
1
2
.
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A BE scheme BE is secure with respect to the notion IND-CPA if for all probabilistic
polynomial time adversaries A we have:
AdvIND−CPAA,BE (1
κ,U) ≤ negl(1κ).
2.6.8 Security Model for Verifiable Computation
The security of VC requires that an incorrectly computed result cannot be verified as
a correct result by the client. In the security game for VC the adversary is given access
to an oracle ProbGen(·), to allow them to obtain the encoded inputs for a function f
and an input of their choosing.
ExpVERIFYA [VC, 1
κ, f ] :
1 : (EKf , SKf )
$← KeyGen(1κ, f)
2 : (x, st)
$← AProbGen(·)(1κ, f, EKf )
3 : (σf,x, V Kf,x)
$← ProbGen(x, SKf )
4 : θf(x)
$← AProbGen(·)(σf,x, st)
5 : y ← Verify(θf(x), V Kf,x, SKf )
6 : if (y 6=⊥) ∧ (y 6= f(x))
7 : return 1
8 : else
9 : return 0
Oracle ProbGen(z)
1 : (σf,z, V Kf,z)
$← ProbGen(z, SKf )
2 : return σf,z
Game 2.8: Adaptive VERIFY game for VC.
The game is initialized by the challenger running Setup to generate key pair
(EKf , SKf ) for a function f . The key EKf is given to the adversary, along with access
to oracle ProbGen(·). The adversary can make a polynomial number of queries to this
oracle before choosing a challenge input x. The challenger then runs ProbGen using the
challenge input x to generate the encoded input σf,x, which is given to the adversary.
This algorithm also generates the verification key V Kf,x, however this is withheld
from the adversary to prevent them from verifying their computations themselves.
The adversary is then allowed another round of queries to the oracle ProbGen(·),
and eventually outputs an encoded result, θf,x, that they believe to be an incorrect
computation of f(x) that will be verified as correct by the client. The adversary wins
the game if the experiment outputs 1, meaning θf,x encodes an incorrect result that is
accepted as correct.
Definition 2.6.8. For a VC scheme VC = (KeyGen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) we de-
fine the advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A against the notion
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VERIFY as:
AdvVERIFYA,VC (1
κ, f) = P[1← ExpVERIFYA,VC (1κ, f)]−
1
2
.
A VC scheme VC is secure with respect to the notion VERIFY if for all probabilistic
polynomial time adversaries A we have:
AdvVERIFYA,VC (1
κ, f) ≤ negl(1κ).
2.6.9 Security Model for Verifiable Delegable Computation
The security of VDC is described similarly to that of VC (Section 2.6.8). It ensures that
an incorrectly computed result by a server cannot be verified as correct. In this setting
the verification can be done publicly. In the security game for VDC the adversary is
given access to the following oracles: FnInit(·), Register(·) and Certify(·, ·, ·, ·),
which are run as per the algorithms FnInit,Register and Certify respectively. We denote
the adversary having access to these three oracles as AO.
ExpPUB−VERIFYA [VDC, 1
κ,F ] :
1 : (MK,PP )
$← Setup(1κ,F)
2 : (f,X, {`(xj)}xj∈X , st) $← AO(1κ,F , PP )
3 : PKf
$← FnInit(f,MK,PP )
4 : (σf,X , V Kf,X , RKf,X)
$← ProbGen(f, {`(xj))}xj∈X , PKf , PP )
5 : θ
$← AO(σf,X , V Kf,X , RKf,X , PKf , PP, st)
6 : (RTf,X , τθ)← BVerif(θ, V Kf,X , PP )
7 : yf(X) ← Retrieve(RTf(X), τθ, V Kf,X , RKf,X , PP )
8 : if ((yf(X), τθ) 6= (⊥, reject)) ∧ (yf(X) 6= f(X))
9 : return 1
10 : else
11 : return 0
Game 2.9: Adaptive PUB-VERIFY game for VDC.
The game is initialized by the challenger running Setup to generate the key MK
and the public parameters, PP . These public parameters are given to the adversary.
The adversary can then make a polynomial number of queries to the specified oracles
before outputting the challenge inputs: the function f , the input values X and the
labels `(xj) for each input value in X. The challenger then runs FnInit and ProbGen
to generate the key for the function, PKf and the encoded input σf,X , the verification
key V Kf,X and the retrieval key RKf,X . The adversary is given these four values
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and access to the specified oracles. Eventually the adversary outputs their challenge
response θ, which they believe to be an incorrectly computed result for f(X) that will
be successfully verified. The challenger then runs BVerif and Retrieve to obtain yf(X),τθ .
The adversary wins if θ encodes an incorrect result that is verified as correct i.e. if
(yf(X), τθ) 6= (⊥, reject) and yf(X) 6= f(X).
Definition 2.6.9. For a VDC scheme
VDC = (Setup,FnInit,Register,Certify,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) we define the advan-
tage of a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A against the notion PUB-VERIFY
as:
AdvPUB−VERIFYA,VDC (1
κ,F) = P[1← ExpPUB−VERIFYA,VDC (1κ,F)]−
1
2
.
A VDC scheme VDC is secure with respect to the notion PUB-VERIFY if for all
probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A we have:
AdvPUB−VERIFYA,VDC (1
κ,F) ≤ negl(1κ).
2.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented the notation that we use throughout the thesis. We also
define several encryption schemes, along with their security models, and cryptographic
primitives that we make use of in the remainder of the thesis.
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This chapter introduces searchable encryption and reviews the relevant lit-
erature.
3.1 Introduction
Searchable Encryption allows an entity to search over encrypted data that they have
outsourced to a remote server. In its simplest form, this involves locating encrypted
data items on the server that contain a specified keyword. A searchable encryption
scheme generally involves three entities:
• Server: A remote server (such as a pay-as-you-go cloud server) on which en-
crypted data is stored. We assume that the data stored on the server is of a
sensitive nature, so it is undesirable to reveal it to any third parties, including
the server. Note that in some cases, for example medical records, it may be illegal
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Figure 3.1: Searchable Encryption model.
to reveal the records. We thus assume that the data items remain encrypted at
all times when on the server.
• Data Owner: This entity initiates the scheme and holds the master secret key
(used to generate search queries in the single user case or user secret keys in the
multi-user case1). The data owner is always able to submit search queries to
the server2 (referred to as reading data), as well as encrypt data to be stored on
the server (referred to as writing data). The data owner is able to control which
additional users (if any) are able to read or write data in the scheme.
• User(s): SE schemes contain a varying numbers of users that have the capability
to either write data, read data, or do both of these tasks, as determined by the
data owner.
The data owner associates metadata with each data item to be encrypted, usually
consisting of keywords contained within the data item or keywords describing the data
item’s contents along with an identifier for the data item, and then creates an encrypted
index using this metadata. The set of data items is encrypted separately using a
standard encryption scheme, so the focus of searchable encryption is how the encrypted
index is created. In this work we do not consider the retrieval of the encrypted data
items from the server. The encrypted index and encrypted data items are outsourced
to the server and, in order to search for a keyword in the encrypted index, the data
owner (or a user) produces a search query which the server uses to locate the relevant
data items.
1In the multi-user setting the data owner is enrolled as user and generates a user secret key in order
to produce search queries.
2In the multi-user setting this is done by the owner enrolling as a user.
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Figure 3.1 depicts the basic architecture of an SE scheme, which consists of the following
five steps:
1. Data encryption. The data to be outsourced to the server is encrypted by the
data owner (or a user, depending on the scenario) and sent to the server. In
general the encrypted data will consist of two parts:
(a) Encrypted data items: The data items the data owner wishes to outsource to
the server are typically encrypted using symmetric key cryptography. Each
encrypted data item is identified by a unique identifier (ID).
(b) Secure index: A secure index is created which enables the server to use a
search token to learn the IDs of the relevant encrypted data items and locate
them on the server.
2. User’s secret key transfer. The data owner generates a secret key for a user
and transfers it to them. The user is able generate search queries using their
secret key.
3. Search query. A user (or data owner) generates a search token for a keyword ω
they wish to search for in the encrypted data and sends it to the server, allowing
it to ascertain which encrypted data items satisfy their query.
4. Search results. The search results returned to the user can take two forms:
(a) IDs of the encrypted data items that satisfy the query associated with the
search token;
(b) Encrypted data items that satisfy the query associated with the search token.
The former response is advantageous over the latter in situations where the user
does not require access to the actual data item (during statistical analysis of the
encrypted data, for example) since it involves lower communication costs. The
latter response involves the server locating the encrypted data items satisfying
the query by locating them using the set of IDs, which increases the search time.
In this thesis, we consider schemes which generate search results consisting of IDs
of encrypted data items that satisfy the query associated with the search token
only; the retrieval of the actual data items is beyond the scope of this thesis.
5. Decryption. If search results contain encrypted data items, a decryption key
needs to be obtained from the data owner in order to recover the data items.
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Many different SE schemes have been proposed, with a range of properties. There
are two main branches of research in the field of searchable encryption: symmetric
searchable encryption and public-key searchable encryption. In Section 3.4.3 and 3.4.2
we give a chronological overview of the SE schemes in the literature within these two
branches of research. Here we give some general definitions of SE schemes.
In these definitions we consider the model outlined in Section 3.1 where a data owner
is outsourcing some encrypted data to a server but wishes to maintain the ability to
search over the data, or control who is able to search the data.
Definition 3.1.1 (Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE)). Let K be the key space,
Ω be the keyword space, ID be the data item identifier space, ∆ = Ω × ID be the
metadata space and D ⊆ ∆ be the set of metadata associated with data items to be
indexed. A searchable symmetric encryption scheme typically consists of the following
four algorithms (we assume the data items themselves are encrypted separately using a
secure encryption scheme):
• SK $← KeyGen(1κ): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner that takes as
input the security parameter 1κ ∈ N and outputs a secret key, SK ∈ K.
• ID $← BuildIndex(D, SK): This algorithm can be probabilistic or deterministic as
required and it is run by the data owner. It takes as input the set of metadata D
associated with each data item along with the secret key SK and outputs a secure
index ID.
• Tω ← Query(ω, SK): A deterministic algorithm run by the data owner to produce
a search query. It takes as input a keyword ω ∈ Ω along with SK and outputs a
search query Tω.
• Rω ← Search(ID, Tω): A deterministic algorithm run by the server to produce the
search results. It takes as input the secure index ID and a search query Tω and
outputs the search results Rω.
Definition 3.1.2 (Correctness of SSE). An SSE scheme, SSE = (KeyGen,BuildIndex,
Query,Search), is correct if for all κ ∈ N, for all SK $← KeyGen(1κ), for all D ⊆ ∆,
for all ID ← BuildIndex(D, SK), for all ω ∈ Ω:
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P[SK $← KeyGen(1κ),
ID $← BuildIndex(D, SK),
Tω ← Query(ω, SK),
Rω ← Search(ID, Tω)] = 1.
In Defintion 3.1.1 we do not specify any additional users in the system. In the
literature it is standard for SSE to be defined for a single entity encrypting the data
and creating the search tokens, however for Public-Key Searchable Encryption (Def-
inition 3.1.3) it is standard to assume that more than one entity could be creating
the encrypted data because it is generated using a public key. The suitability for the
different types of searchable encryption to different scenarios and users are discussed
further in Chapter 4.
Definition 3.1.3 (Public Key Searchable Encryption (PKSE)). Let K be the key space,
Ω be the keyword space, ID be the data item identifier space and ∆ = Ω × ID be the
metadata space. A public key searchable encryption scheme typically consists of the
following four algorithms (we assume the data items themselves are encrypted separately
using a secure encryption scheme):
• (PK,SK) $← KeyGen(1κ): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner that
takes as input the security parameter 1κ ∈ N and outputs a public and secret key
pair, (PK,SK) ∈ K.
• ID $← BuildIndex(D, PK): This algorithm can be probabilistic or deterministic as
required and is run by either the data owner or an additional user. It takes as
input the set of metadata D ⊆ ∆ associated with each data item to be indexed
along with the public key PK and outputs a secure index ID.
• Tω ← Query(ω, SK): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner to produce
a search query. It takes as input a keyword ω ∈ Ω that the data owner or user
wishes to search for along with SK and outputs a search query Tω.
• Rω ← Search(PK, ID, Tω): A deterministic algorithm run by the server to produce
the search results. It takes as input the secure index ID and a search query Tω
and outputs the search results Rω.
Definition 3.1.4 (Correctness of PKSE). A PKSE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N,
for all (PK,SK)
$← KeyGen(1κ), for all D ⊆ ∆, for all ID $← BuildIndex(D, SK), for
all ω ∈ Ω:
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P[(PK,SK) $← KeyGen(1κ),
ID $← BuildIndex(D, PK),
Tω ← Query(ω, SK),
Rω ← Search(ID, Tω)] = 1− negl(κ).
Multi-user searchable symmetric encryption (mSSE) was introduced by Curtmola
et al. [55]. Work in SSE previous to this considered the single-user setting where only
the data owner was able to query the encrypted data. The work of [55] considers the
extension of SSE to allow multiple users to query the encrypted data as determined by
the data owner. It supports a dynamic set of users where revocation and addition of
users is controlled by the data owner.
In the following definition we specify which entity runs each algorithm, we assume
a data owner that owns the data and sets up the system and additional users that are
able to generate search queries. These entities are defined in more detail in Section 3.1.
Here we assume an honest-but-curious model where the server is trusted to update the
server state, stS (see Definition 3.1.5), after a user is revoked.
Definition 3.1.5 (Multi-user Searchable Encryption (MSSE)). Let K be the keyspace,
Ω be the keyword space, ID be the data item identifier space, ∆ = Ω × ID be the
metadata space and U be the universe of users. An MSSE scheme consists of the
following six algorithms:
• SK $← KeyGen(1κ): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner that takes as
input the security parameter 1κ ∈ N and outputs a secret key SK ∈ K.
• (ID, stO, stS) $← BuildIndex(D,G, SK): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data
owner. It takes as input the set of metadata D associated with each data item
along with the secret key SK and a set G ⊆ U of authorised users and outputs a
secure index ID along with a server state stS and a data owner state stO.
• (Ku, stO, stS) $← AddUser(SK, stO, u): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data
owner to add a user to the system. It takes as input the new user’s identity u
and the data owner’s state stO along with the secret key SK and outputs the new
user’s cryptographic key Ku ∈ K.
• (stO, stS)← Revoke(SK, stO, u): A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner
to revoke a user from the system. It takes as input the identity of the user that is
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to be revoked u and the data owner’s state stO along with the secret key SK and
outputs updated data owner and server states, stO, stS.
• Tω ← Query(ω,Ku): A deterministic algorithm run by a user (note that the data
owner can also be enrolled as a user) to produce a search query. It takes as input
a keyword ω ∈ Ω that the user wishes to search for along with their secret key Ku
and stS (which is retrieved from the server). It outputs a search query Tω.
• Rω ← Search(stS , ID, Tω): A deterministic algorithm run by the server to produce
the search results. It takes as input the secure index ID and a search query Tω
along with the server state stS and outputs the search results Rω, which is either
the set of data items containing the keyword ω, denoted Dω, or ⊥.
Definition 3.1.6 (Correctness of MSSE). An MSSE scheme is correct for all κ ∈ N, for
all G ⊆ U and u ∈ G, for all SK output by KeyGen(1κ), for all D ⊆ ∆, for all ID output
by Buildindex(D,G, SK), for all ω ∈ Ω, for all Ku output by AddUser(SK, stO, u), we
have that:
P[SK $← KeyGen(1κ),
(ID, stO, stS) $← BuildIndex(D, SK),
(Ku, stO, stS)
$← AddUser(SK, stO, u),
Tω ← Query(ω,Ku),
Dω ← Search(stS , ID, Tω)] = 1.
Definition 3.1.7 (Verifiable Searchable Encryption (VSE)). Let K be the keyspace, let
U be the universe of users and let A be the universe of attributes. We define a pre-index
δ(D) of a set of data items D as the set of attributes associated with each data item,
such as keywords contained in each data item. A VSE scheme comprises the following
algorithms:
• (SK,PP ) $← KeyGen(1κ, A) : A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner and
takes as input the security parameter and a universe of attributes (keywords and
data values). It outputs the data owner’s master secret key SK that is used for
further administrative tasks and public parameters PP , both of which are provided
to the remaining algorithms where required.
• ID $← BuildIndex(δ(D), SK, PP ) : A probabilistic algorithm run by the data owner
that takes as input the pre-index of the data δ(D) ⊆ A, the master secret key SK,
and outputs a searchable index ID for the pre-index δ(D).
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• Tω $← Query(ω, SK,PP ) : A deterministic or probabilistic algorithm run by a
data owner using its key SK. It generates a search query token Tω for a keyword
ω.
• Rω ← Search(ID, Tω, PP ) : A deterministic algorithm run by the server to execute
a search query Tω on the index ID. It generates a result Rω which is returned to
the data owner.
• {0, 1} ← Verify(Rω) : A deterministic algorithm run by the data owner, which
outputs 0 or 1.
Definition 3.1.8 (Correctness of VSE). A VSE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N, for
all (SK,PP )
$← KeyGen(1κ, A), for all δ(D) ⊆ A, for all ID $← BuildIndex(δ(D), SK, PP )
and for all Tω
$← Query(ω, SK,PP ) we have that:
P[(SK,PP ) $← KeyGen(1κ, A),
ID $← BuildIndex(δ(D), SK, PP ),
Tω ← Query(ω, SK,PP ),
Rω ← Search(stS , ID, Tω),
1← Verify(Dω)] = 1.
3.2 Security of Searchable Encryption
One of the main goals of any data encryption scheme is to provide confidentiality of the
encrypted data, that is given a ciphertext an adversary should be able to learn nothing
regarding the corresponding plaintext. This is called semantic security. A paradigm
called oblivious RAM (ORAM) [70] can be used to construct an SE scheme which leaks
nothing about the underlying plaintexts or the access pattern to an adversary, except
the volume of data returned per query. However, ORAM is not currently practical to
use on large datasets. SE schemes are generally designed to leak some information,
such as the access and search patterns, in order to achieve a more efficient scheme.
We define the access and search patterns for SE precisely as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. (Access pattern) For a sequence of search queries Ω = (Tω1 , ..., Tωq)
where ωi and ωj are not necessarily distinct for i 6= j, along with an index ID, the
access pattern is defined as:
AP (ID,Ω) = (Rω1 , ...,Rωq).
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The access pattern is the set of search results produced by the sequence of queries Ω.
Definition 3.2.2. (Search pattern) For a sequence of q search queries Ω = (Tω1 , ..., Tωq)
where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q and ωi and ωj are not necessarily distinct for i 6= j, the search pattern
is defined as a q × q symmetric binary matrix SP (ID,Ω) where:
SP (ID,Ω)i,j = 1 ⇐⇒ Tωi = Tωj .
Intuitively, the search pattern reveals when the ith and jth queries are the same, which
happens when queries are issued for the same keyword.
Definition 3.2.3. (Setup leakage) For an index ID we define the setup leakage as:
Lsetup(ID) = |ID|,
(the size of the index). Intuitively the setup leakage is all the information that is
leaked from the index alone. This may include other leakage depending on the type of
encryption used.
Definition 3.2.4. (Search leakage) For an index ID along with q search queries Ω =
(Tω1 , ..., Tωq) we define the search leakage as:
Lsearch(ID,Ω) =
(
AP (ID,Ω), SP (ID,Ω)
)
.
Intuitively the search leakage represents all the information that is leaked from the index
and the search queries during the search procedure.
3.3 Adversarial models
There are three main adversarial models considered in the SE literature. The server
is viewed as the adversary in an SE scheme and the adversarial models are defined as
follows:
Definition 3.3.1 (Honest-but-curious). An honest-but-curious server will follow the
protocol set out for it but it may try and learn additional information about the en-
crypted data from the information it has access to. The server will not try to actively
manipulate the protocol in any way in order to gain access to more information outside
of what it is authorized to know.
Definition 3.3.2 (Semi honest-but-curious). A semi honest-but-curious server may
not follow the protocol that has been set out for it. For example, a server may only
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compute a fraction of a search or return an incomplete set of search results in order to
conserve its own resources (such as computation power or bandwidth).
Definition 3.3.3 (Malicious). A malicious server may actively manipulate or deviate
from the protocol and return incorrect and/or incomplete search results to the user.
3.4 Literature Review
In this section we discuss the relevant literature in the area of searchable encryption.
For a detailed review of the literature in verifiable searchable encryption and multi-user
searchable encryption, please see Sections 5.1.1 and 6.1.1 respectively.
3.4.1 Oblivious RAM
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [70], allows a user
to retrieve data items from a server without revealing to the server which data items
were retrieved (access pattern). In order to mask the access pattern each access to
the data is designed to be indistinguishable to an adversary. Suppose the user stores n
data items on the server, in order to achieve the masking of the access patterns the user
is required to store an extra
√
n dummy data items and a shelter storing another
√
n
data items. First off a random permutation pi is applied to the data items at position
(1, ..., n +
√
n), i.e. everything but the shelter. In order to access the ith data item,
the shelter is scanned to check whether the ith data item is in the shelter (this will
not be the case on the first access, however after each access the contents of the access
is stored in the shelter). The items in the shelter are accessed in a predetermined
order, regardless of whether the desired data item has been located. If i is not found in
the shelter then it is retrieved by calculating pi(i), which is the location of the desired
data item. If i was located in the shelter then the next dummy data item in the
permuted memory is accessed at pi(n + j), where j is the current step in the access.
In either case the retrieved data item, the dummy one or the actual one, is written
to the shelter, by scanning all of the items in the shelter again. The contents of the
shelter is returned to the user. This ORAM solution is called the quadratic solution.
Many other methods for achieving ORAM have been put forward in order to enhance
its efficiency [29, 45, 56, 57, 66]. Using ORAM to achieve searchable encryption is
one of the most secure methods for searchable encryption. However, due to the high
computational costs incurred by the multiple accesses per search it does not scale well
to encrypted search over a large database.
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3.4.2 Public Key Searchable Encryption
The first public key searchable encryption scheme was presented by Boneh et al. [33].
Their scheme, entitled public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), allows many
users to encrypt data using the data owner’s public key, to be stored on a remote server.
The data owner is then able to use their private key to produce search tokens to locate
specific items of interest in the encrypted data. The motivating example given in the
paper is that of a secure email gateway. The gateway intercepts all incoming mail,
which has been encrypted using the data owner’s public key. The data owner generates
search queries which they give to the gateway to allow it to detect when a certain
encrypted message contains a specific keyword. The gateway can then route the email
accordingly. The encrypted data is made up of two parts, the first being a public key
encryption of the data item which is then appended to the second part which consists
of a list of m keywords that have been encrypted separately using the PEKS scheme
as follows, where PKA is the public key of the data owner and PEKS is the encrypt
algorithm of the PEKS scheme:
EPKA(M)||PEKS(PKA, ω1)||...||PEKS(PKA, ωm).
The specific PEKS scheme in [33] is based on a variant of the Decision Diffie-Hellman
assumption and uses a random oracle in the construction. They define an adaptive
notion of semantic security which ensures that an adversary cannot learn anything
from the PEKS ciphertexts without a search query, that is, given a PEKS ciphertext
and the choice of two keywords the adversary is unable to distinguish which keyword
is encrypted in the PEKS ciphertext with probability negligibly greater than that of
a random guess. We refer to this notion of security as IND-PEKS-CKA2. It is also
shown in this paper that given an IND-PEKS-CKA2 secure PEKS scheme one is able
to derive a chosen ciphertext secure identity based encryption (IBE) scheme, where the
keywords in PEKS can be viewed as the identities in the IBE scheme. The authors also
hypothesise that one can build an IND-PEKS-CKA2 secure PEKS from any anonymous
IBE scheme, this claim is confirmed in [2]. Following on from this Abdalla et al. [3]
conclude that the IBE scheme also needs to be robust, meaning that it is hard to
produce a ciphertext that is valid for two different users. This property was always
implicitly assumed in previous constructions.
Questions about the correctness of PEKS were raised by Adballa et al. [2]. In this
work the authors describe three new notions of correctness in terms of the advantage
of the adversary in a correctness security game:
• Perfect: The advantage of any computationally unbounded adversary is zero.
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• Statistical: The advantage of any computationally unbounded adversary is neg-
ligible.
• Computational: The advantage of any polynomial time adversary is negligible.
The correctness requirement mentioned in Boneh et al’s work [33] is congruent to the
notion of perfect correctness as described above, but as the authors of [2] point out the
scheme does not meet this criterion due to the fact that there exist distinct keywords ω
and ω′ such that search algorithm outputs 1 given (PKA,PEKS(PKA, ω′), Tω), where
Tω is the search query corresponding to ω, meaning, in the example scenario of the
email gateway, email may get routed incorrectly. They show that PEKS is in fact com-
putationally correct, meaning that in theory, incorrect routing of email is a possibility,
however it is unlikely to happen. So although the notion of correctness in the PEKS
scheme is slightly weaker than was initially intended, in practice it is still a useable
scheme. This work also recognizes an issue with the PEKS model in that a search
query from the data owner can be stored and used to search future ciphertexts which
may not be desirable by the data owner. They present a scheme, public key encryption
with temporary keyword search (PETKS) , where the trapdoors are only valid for a
limited period of time after which the trapdoor will expire and and can no longer be
used by the server to search the encrypted data. The security of PETKS is defined
analogously to that of PEKS with respect to a time period of the adversary’s choice.
The first PEKS scheme to be constructed from something other than bilinear maps
is due to Di Crescenzo and Saraswat [58]. The security of the scheme is based on the
hardness of computing quadratic residues modulo a large composite integer. Due to the
theorem proven in [33] regarding the relationship between IBE and PEKS, the PEKS
scheme of [58] gives rise to the first anonymous IBE scheme that is not built using
bilinear maps. The scheme is based on the IBE scheme due to Cocks [54]. The PEKS
scheme defined in this paper is IND-PEKS-CKA2 secure.
A paper by Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo [13] called attention to a major issue
inherent in PEKS which is the requirement of a secure channel for transferring the
trapdoors from the receiver to the server. Building and maintaining a secure channel is
costly which could make PEKS unsuitable in practice. They propose a scheme, secure-
channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS), where the server has its own public and secret key
pair. A SCF-PEKS ciphertext is created using both the data owner public key and the
server public key, ensuring that, given a search query, only the server is able to carry
out the search. The security notion defined in this work is analogous to IND-PEKS-
CKA2 with the additional notion that an outside adversary, without the server’s secret
key, cannot learn anything from a SCF-PEKS ciphertext (except its size) even with
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all possible search queries. These notions are collectively defined as IND-SCF-CKA2.
The security of the scheme defined in [13] holds in the random oracle model. Later
work presented in [61] presents a scheme where the security holds in the standard
model. Khader [91] presents a SCF-PEKS scheme based on K-resilient IBE, which is
also secure in the standard model. SCF-PEKS has more recently been investigated
in [60]. Work by Rhee at el. [95] points out weaknesses in the security of the scheme
in [13]. They point out that the ability of the adversary in the security game is too
weak to be realistic and extend the security to allow the adversary to obtain relations
between search queries and ciphertexts (excluding the challenge ciphertexts).
Work by Joong et al. [82] was the first to increase the expressiveness of the queries
in PEKS. There are potential solutions for conjunctive keyword search using single
keyword equality PEKS schemes, namely:
• Set Intersection. The data owner sends a separate search query to the server
for each keyword in the desired conjunction then computes the intersection of all
the search results. This is not an ideal solution in terms of security and efficiency
as it involves the server carrying out extra processing in the way of calculating
the intersection of the results and perhaps more importantly the server learns
more information than necessary as it will know which documents contain each
of the separate keywords, instead of just those that contain all the keywords.
• Meta Keywords. Meta keywords are created for every possible conjunctive
query. However a document containing n keywords will have associated with it
2n meta keywords, vastly increasing the amount of storage needed.
Due to the disadvantages of these trivial solutions Joong et al. present two schemes that
support conjunctive keyword searches over the encrypted data. Both of the schemes
are constructed using symmetric prime order pairings and require the encrypted data
to have m fixed keyword fields, some of which can be assigned null values, however no
two keyword fields for a data item can contain the same keyword. The second scheme
is more efficient than the first as it does not employ an admissible encoding scheme in
the construction, however both schemes have search queries whose size is dependent on
the number of keywords in each conjunctive search query. The security of each scheme
holds in the random oracle model and is similar to that of IND-PEKS-CKA2, however
insufficiencies in the proofs in this paper are pointed out in [76].
Boneh and Waters [34] extended the expressive of queries in PEKS to include sub-
set queries, range queries, equality queries and general conjunctions of each of these
types of queries. The construction in this paper uses hidden vector encryption [34].
The authors also present a framework that generalises the notion of a public key en-
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cryption scheme that supports various queries over the encrypted data. The security
of this scheme is slightly weaker than that of IND-PEKS-CKA2 as it is only selectively
secure. This means that the challenger in the security game has to commit to their
challenge keywords before submitting any queries to the challenger, we denote this
form of security as SEL-PEKS-CKA. Bethencourt et al. [26] also present a conjunctive
range query scheme using binary interval trees over the integers. In this scheme each
encrypted data item can be represented as a point in multi-dimensional space and the
range query forms a hyper-rectangle in multi-dimensional space. The range query is
satisfied if the point lies within the hyper-rectangle. The scheme is constructed using
prime order bilinear maps (either symmetric or asymmetric) and achieves SEL-PEKS-
CKA security in the standard model. There is extra leakage in this scheme compared to
others described in this section, in that the attribute values are leaked if an encrypted
data item satisfies a query.
A generalisation of querying on encrypted data in the public key setting, named
predicate encryption, was introduced by Katz, Sahai and Waters [89]. The construction
uses inner products over ZN (where N is a large integer) to evaluate disjunctions,
polynomials, threshold predicates and arbitrary conjunctive/disjunction normal form
formulae. The main aim of the work was to achieve attribute hiding in the different
forms of queries, which is captured in the selective security definition. Each encrypted
data item and search query is associated with a vector. In order for an encrypted data
item to satisfy the search query the inner product of these two vectors must result in 0.
More specifically, viewing the ‘attributes’ as keywords, HVE can be used to construct
an SE scheme supporting queries containing conjunctions and disjunctions of keywords
for example.
Byun et al. [39] highlight a vulnerability present in public key based keyword search
schemes. These types of schemes are susceptible to an attack known as an oﬄine
keyword guessing attack. In this attack an adversary is able to uncover the keyword(s)
that were used to generate the search query. An adversary is able to intercept search
queries as they are not sent through a secure channel to the server. The adversary is
also able to generate arbitrary indexes for keyword(s) of their choosing as these are
created using a public key. The adversary can then evaluate the intercepted search
queries on the arbitrarily generated indexes and if a search query generates a positive
result then the adversary will know which keyword the search query corresponds to as
it knows the keywords used to generate the index. Oﬄine keyword guessing attacks
are also discussed in [69].
Work by Chen and Tang [48] presented a scheme which is not susceptible to the
oﬄine keyword guessing attack called public key encryption with registered keyword
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search (PERKS). They note that the existing security definition for PEKS, IND-PEKS-
CKA2, does not capture the vulnerability of PEKS to the oﬄine keyword guessing
attack. Their scheme requires an extra round of communication between the user and
the data owner before the user can encrypt data using the data owner’s public key. The
user has to register each keyword used in the PERKS ciphertext with the data owner
prior to encryption, this prevents an adversary from being able to generate arbitrary
search queries, hence thwarting the oﬄine keyword guessing attack. There are several
issues generated with this scheme that are noted in the paper. These include the
requirement of a secure channel between the user and the data owner and the need for
the extra round of communication between the user and data owner prior to encryption.
Their scheme is constructed using bilinear maps.
Other work by Wang et al. [49] present a scheme that is immune to the oﬄine
keyword guessing attack but including an extra server in the PEKS system model.
The idea is that the search computation is split across two servers, while the security
against oﬄine keyword guessing attacks holds so long as the two servers do not collude.
Katz et al. [88] investigate file injection attacks on searchable encryption schemes.
They conclude that these types of attack can completely reveal the search queries
in a searchable encryption scheme, but are only realistic in some scenarios, such as
email routing. In other scenarios, such as a single user storing and searching over the
encrypted data items, a file injection attack is not so realistic. Cash et al. [41] also
investigate some other leakage-abuse attacks which specifically exploit the information
leakage rather than the construction of the SE scheme.
Until the work by Baek et al. [12] the encryption of the data items was considered
separately to the PEKS ciphertexts and was encrypted using a standard PKE scheme.
The work of [12] looks at considering just one scheme, PKE/PEKS, to accomplish
both encryption of the data items and the encryption of the PEKS ciphertexts. They
consider a stronger adversary which may modify the encrypted data stored on the
server and conclude that there should be a mechanism that binds the PEKS ciphertext
to the encrypted data item to prevent the modification of the encrypted data. They
call this mechanism tagging. The scheme is secure against a chosen ciphertext attack in
the random oracle model. The notion of combining PKE and PEKS is also investigated
in [77, 50].
Most of the schemes that have been discussed so far leak the access pattern and
search patterns and achieve linear search times with respect to the number of encrypted
data items, which is deemed to be acceptable for SE schemes. Bellare et al. [20]
investigate deterministic PKE schemes and how they can used to achieve more efficient
SE schemes, whilst sacrificing some privacy.
59
3.4. Literature Review
Using deterministic encryption has ingrained limitations. Firstly if it is known that
the plaintext, x, has been drawn from a small space, X, then, given a ciphertext cx
and the public key it would be possible to work out which x ∈ X corresponds to
cx. This could be done computing the ciphertext for every x ∈ X and seeing which
one is equivalent to cx. Hence privacy can only be guaranteed if the plaintext comes
from a space that has large minimum entropy. It is noted that database fields are not
guaranteed to have a high minimum entropy, so it may be the case that no privacy is
achieved at all in some cases. Taking these limitations in to account, a new, weaker,
notion of privacy is defined for deterministic encryption which is called PRIV. They
define a scheme called encrypt-and-hash (EaH) which achieves fast search times and is
shown to be PRIV secure in the random oracle model. A process called bucketization
can help to increase privacy levels when database fields are not of large minimum
entropy. It works by increasing the number of hash collisions and thus the number of
false positives, generating noisy results. The user is then required to sift through the
noise in order to obtain the true result. Although this process increases the privacy it
also increases the cost of computation for the end user so is not an ideal solution.
The scheme of Hwang et al. [76] which we discussed in relation to conjunctive
keyword search, can also be extended to support multiple users. In order to send
encrypted data to multiple receivers using the single user PECKS scheme defined in
the paper, the user would have to generate multiple encryptions of the same data using
the public key of each of the recipients. Multi-receiver PKE schemes are investigated
in [19, 17]. The multi-user scheme presented in [76] combines multi-user PKE with
PECK. The multi-user PECK (mPECK) ciphertexts in this scheme are linear in size
with respect to n · `, where n is the number of receivers of the encrypted data and ` is
the number of keywords in the conjunctive query. The scheme is shown to be secure
against chosen keyword attacks in the random oracle model.
3.4.3 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
The first searchable encryption scheme, presented by Song et al. [126], was built using
symmetric-key primitives. The search in this scheme is carried out using a sequential
scan of the encrypted data. It is not an index-based scheme unlike the majority of
searchable encryption schemes. Each word in the data item is encrypted separately
and then this sequence of ciphertexts is post-encrypted using a stream cipher. The
weaknesses of this method include its incompatibility with existing encryption schemes
and the fact that it cannot be used on data that has been compressed. The search time
is also linear in the size of the data item collection. The security is defined in terms
of the standard IND-CPA security, however, there is no consideration for the search
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queries in the security definition, hence the security in this work is not considered
adequate for searchable encryption.
The work of Goh [68] presents the notion of index-based searchable encryption. He
presents a method for secure indexing which he claims can be used for many purposes,
including searchable encryption. However, as this method is not specifically designed
for searchable encryption the security notion does not consider the security of the search
queries or the information that may be leaked during a search. This notion of security
is referred to as IND-CKA. This scheme is shown to be adaptively IND-CKA secure in
the standard model. The index is created using a Bloom filter [30] per data item and
keywords associated with the data item are inserted into the Bloom filter. This is an
example of a forward index as there is an entry in the index per data item, hence the
search time is linear in the total number of data items. Bloom filters can also produce
false positive results and can leak the number of keywords that they store. Padding the
Bloom filter with extra keywords can mitigate the leakage of the number of keywords,
however this comes at a cost of increasing the false positive rate.
Chang and Mitzenmacher [46] try to improve on the security definition of [68],
by considering the security of the search queries in addition to the encrypted index.
However, their notion of security was broken by the authors of [55]. The index in their
scheme is constructed using a bit string of length m per data item and a fixed dictionary
of keywords of size m. If a data item contains the ith keyword in the dictionary, then
the ith bit of the associated bit string is set to 1. The search time is linear in the
number of data items. They also specify an extension to their scheme that supports
updates (limited to the addition of data items only).
The work of Curtmola et al. [55] has been very influential in the field of searchable
encryption. It defines defines two notions of security IND-CKA1 and IND-CKA2 which
are selective and adaptive respectively. These definitions are accepted to be standard
notions of security for searchable symmetric encryption. A rigorous framework for
searchable symmetric encryption is also presented, which classifies the information
leakage that occurs during search. The index is constructed using a linked list of search
results per keyword, this is an example of an inverted index. The search query is used
by the server to locate the correct linked list and the search results are sequentially
decrypted. Hence, the search time is linear in the number of data items matching
the search query which the authors argue is optimal as the minimum amount of work
required to retrieve the data items from the server is also linear in the number of data
items retrieved.
Another scheme with the same search complexity as [55] is that of [100], which also
allows updates to the data. Two schemes are presented, the first requiring two rounds
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of communication between the server and the user during the search phase (as well as
for the index generation and update phases), the second only requires one round of
communication for each of these phases but the search phase is more computationally
intensive. The search time is logarithmic in the number of distinct keywords in the
data items and both schemes are shown to be IND-CKA2 secure in the standard model.
Work by Chase and Kamara defined the notion of structured encryption, which
generalises searchable symmetric encryption and supports queries on arbitrarily struc-
tured data. It generalised the security notion presented by Curtmola et al. [55] for
arbitrarily structured data.
The strongest security model used in the SSE literature is that of universal compos-
ability, meaning the scheme remains secure when it is arbitrarily composed with other
protocols. The scheme presented by Kurosawa and Ohtaki [93], which is based on that
of Curtmola et al. [55], achieves UC-security.
The first SSE scheme to consider a dynamic data, where data items can be added,
deleted and updated, was that of Kamara et al. [86]. Their scheme is based on the linked
list construction of [55], which they extend to support dynamic data by augmenting
the index to include two additional data structures. The leakage is parameterized using
leakage functions to explicitly show the leakage that occurs during setup (before any
search queries), search and updates. Security is proven in the random oracle model and
under an extended notion of IND-CKA2 security, taking into account the dynamicity
of the data.
Due to the sequential nature of the search in [86] it is not possible to parallellize
the search to improve the search time. Further work by Kamara et al. [85] uses a
tree-based index which is parallellizable for a more efficient search. The index consists
of a keyword red-black (KRB) tree per keyword. A KRB tree is a dynamic data
structure that stores the data item identifiers at the leaf nodes and at each internal
node stores an m-bit vector. The ith bit of this vector is set to 1 if there is a path
from that node to a leaf node for data item dj such that dj contains the keyword ωi.
The search time complexity is O(D(ω) log n) where D(ω) is the number of data items
containing keyword ω and n is the total number of data items. This can be reduced to
O(D(ω)p log n) where p is the number of processors computing the search. The scheme
is shown to be IND-CKA2 secure in the random oracle model.
All the schemes discussed so far only support keyword equality queries. Golle et al.
present the first conjunctive keyword search scheme in the symmetric-key setting [71].
They propose the method of assigning keyword fields to each data item in the index.
If we consider the data to be emails, for example, the keyword fields could be made up
of the sender’s email address, the date and the subject. The scheme requires that each
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field needs to be assigned a value, however these values can be null values if required. A
disadvantage of this method is that the user needs to be aware of the keyword fields and
ensure that the keywords are in the correct position in the conjunctive search query.
They use the same security as that of [68] (IND-CKA) in the random oracle model
which they extend to encompass conjunctive queries. Two schemes are presented in this
paper, one which is more space efficient on the server but requires oﬄine computation
to be sent to the server ahead of querying. In this scheme the search query is of constant
size. The second scheme requires twice the amount of storage on the server and the
size of the search queries is linear in the number keyword fields, however requires no
oﬄine computations prior to querying.
A conjunctive scheme that is proven IND1-CKA secure in the standard model is
that of [14], which is constructed using Shamir’s Secret Sharing. Byun et al. [38] also
present a conjunctive SSE scheme which is made more efficient for large datasets with
the use of bilinear maps. This scheme is proven IND1-CKA secure in the random oracle
model.
The schemes of [14, 38, 71] all have search queries of size linear in the number of
terms in the conjunctive query. Work by Ryu and Takagi [124] reduces the size of the
search query to around the size of single keyword query. The scheme is shown to be
secure in the sense of IND1-CKA in the random oracle model, similary to the other
conjunctive schemes discussed.
All conjunctive SSE schemes discussed so far have required keyword fields in the
construction of the index. Pieprzyk et al [116] present a conjunctive scheme that does
not require keyword fields. The search queries also conceal the number of keywords
in the conjunctive query. The keyword fields are removed by using a different bilinear
map on each keyword for each index entry.
The work of [37] give a formal definition of security for the conjunctive keyword
search schemes based on a relational database. They also discuss some issues associated
with these schemes, such as the reusability of search queries.
Shen et al. [125] present a symmetric-key predicate encryption scheme which sup-
ports inner product queries and also achieves search query privacy. The work of Katz,
Sahai and Waters [89] in public-key predicate encryption showed that inner products
can be used to support a wide range of expressive queries, such as conjunctions, dis-
junctions, polynomial evaluate and conjunctive normal form and disjunctive normal
form formulae. Shen et al. define the notion of full security in terms of searchable
encryption, meaning that no information is leaked by the encrypted data items, the
search query or the search phase except the access pattern. The size of the search
query is dependant on the number of data items, meaning that this scheme would not
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be suitable for large data sets.
Recent work of Cash et al. [43] describes an SSE scheme that supports conjunctive
and general Boolean queries. The emphasis on this work is that of practicality. They
present a scheme that adapts the schemes of [55] and [47] and is the first example of
a sub-linear conjunctive search. They define bounded leakage functions, which leak
more information than just the intersection of all the searched keywords, however,
this is sacrificed for greater efficiency. Futher work by Cash et al. [42] presents a
generalisation of the previous work [43] to support dynamic data and maintain search
efficiency in very large databases.
Range queries in the symmetric-key setting can be achieved using OPE (defini-
tion 2.3.12). OPE is a form of deterministic encryption that preserves the ordering of
the plaintexts in the corresponding ciphertexts, hence can achieve fast search times.
OPE was introduced by Agrawal et al. [4], yet Boldyreva et al. [31] were the first to
introduce a concrete implementation of an OPE scheme that satisfied their security no-
tion, POPF-CCA (pseudorandom order-preserving function against chosen-ciphertext
attack). This security notion requires an adversary cannot distinguish whether they are
have oracle access to an instance of the encryption scheme or a random order-preserving
function. In this paper the authors highlight their concerns about the security of using
this scheme in practice as there is no analysis regarding how the information leakage
from the index can be used by an adversary. This work is revisited in [32] where
the authors goal is to outline the security and functionality trade-offs associated with
OPE in order to help practitioners make informed decisions on implementing OPE. In
this work the authors also study some schemes that are not built using OPE, but yet
support efficient range queries over encrypted data along with an extension to OPE,
namely Modular OPE, that improves the security of OPE. More recent work by Ker-
schbaum [90] enhances the security of OPE by randomizing the ciphertexts to conceal
the frequency of the plaintexts. Work by Naveed et al. [105] demonstrate some attacks
on low entropy ciphertexts encrypted using OPE, where the plaintext can be recovered
using only the ciphertext and publicly available information.
The work of Ishai et al. [78] presents an SSE scheme using a two-server system
model, which is referred to as distributed SSE. It leaks no access pattern information
up to a certain threshold number of queries.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we defined SE in the public-key and symmetric-key settings, as well as
presenting a general model for SE. In addition we defined multi-user SSE and verifiable
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SE which feature prominently in the work in the following chapters. We outlined the
security and adversarial models associated with SE and give a literature review of
related work in the field of SE.
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This chapter was based on research conducted at Thales Research and Tech-
nology (UK), which appears in [120].
4.1 Introduction
The literature regarding SE is extensive (see Section 3.4), however SE is not widely
deployed in practice. This chapter identifies and analyses different scenarios to which
SE can be applied in the real world and investigates the suitability of certain types of
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SE schemes for each scenario. We also explore the reasons as to why SE schemes are
not widely implemented and look at the security issues and functionality of protocols
that are currently being implemented that achieve some form of search over encrypted
data.
The inspiration and research for this chapter came from my internship at Thales
UK Research and Technology. One of the aims of the research was to introduce SE
as a new technology and demonstrate its uses. In this role at Thales we analyzed
practical scenarios that arose from combat situations, working with sensitive data and
controlling access to data with varying degrees of classification and looked at ways SE
could be used to solve problems within these scenarios. When analyzing the scenarios
we looked at features such as the number of users, the adversarial threat, sensitivity
of the data involved and whether static or dynamic data is used and assessed the
suitability of particular SE schemes to each scenario. We used this research to define
four basic scenarios to which SE could be applied based on the number of users and
the capabilities of each user. Within each of these basic scenarios we detailed a generic
method of SE that is well suited for use in that scenario and identified varying features
of these scenarios that occur in the real world. We then mapped specific SE schemes
into the different instances of the scenario depending on the varying features.
There is a comprehensive survey of provably secure searchable encryption schemes
that post-dates this research that can be found in [35]. The authors of [35] follow a
similar categorization of SE schemes, however their survey takes a theoretical approach
and does not consider the practical reasons behind the categorisation of the SE schemes.
We do not intend to provide a comprehensive survey of every SE scheme to date.
Rather, the intention here is to explore what features of a SE scheme might make it
more suitable for use in a particular scenario in order to facilitate the design of protocols
that use SE to provide solutions to real-world problems.
4.2 Architecture of Searchable Encryption
In this section four basic scenarios for searching over encrypted data in the cloud are
described, along with general methods of achieving SE that are potentially suitable for
these environments. This section analyses SE schemes that achieve a single keyword
equality search over encrypted data. The four basic scenarios are as follows:
1. Scenario 1: Only the data owner reads and writes all the data.
2. Scenario 2: Only the data owner can read the data, all users can write data.
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3. Scenario 3: Only the data owner can write the data, many users can read the
data.
4. Scenario 4: Many users (including the data owner) can both read and write
data.
In Section 4.3 we describe each of these scenarios in detail, give a practical example
of each scenario and present a generic method of SE that can be applied to each
scenario. In the real world each scenario will present a number of variables that can
affect which SE scheme would be best to use in each case. We consider the following
variables:
• Size and type of data (static or dynamic),
• Frequency of queries,
• Number of additional users (if any),
• Sensitivity of data,
• Type of search query (equality, conjunctive etc.),
• Available local storage.
For each of these variables we identify the most suitable SE scheme according to
its construction and features.
4.3 Application of searchable encryption to provide solu-
tions in the Scenarios
4.3.1 Scenario 1: Only the data owner reads and writes all the data
The simplest scenario is where only the data owner is involved in reading and writing
data and there are no additional users in the system. The data owner sets up the
system and generates the secret key. They create an encrypted index for the data
items using the secret key and outsource it to the remote server along with the set of
encrypted data items. The data owner generates search queries for the server using
their secret key which the server then uses to compute the search results satisfying the
search query. The search results are then transferred to the user.
In practice the data owner in this scenario could be the owner of a small business
who wishes to outsource their confidential client data to a public cloud server due to
an inadequate local storage capacity.
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Figure 4.1: Only the data owner reads and writes all the data.
As there is only one entity reading and writing the data in this scenario PKE does
not offer advantages over more efficient SKE schemes as no secret key distribution is
required. A generic method for performing SE in this scenario is SSE (Definition 3.1.1).
There are many different SSE schemes defined in the literature which support static
data [68, 46, 47, 55, 93, 100, 126] and dynamic data [86, 42, 43, 85, 106, 127, 114], to
provide a few notable examples.
• Size and type of data. If the dataset is very large it will be beneficial to choose
an SE scheme whose search time does not increase linearly with the size of the
data set. SSE schemes that achieve a sub-linear search time using a static dataset
are [47, 55]. The schemes of [47, 86] only require D(ω) symmetric decryptions
per search, where D(ω) is the number of data items satisfying the search query.
Examples of schemes that support a dynamic data set and sub-linear (with respect
to the number of data items) search are those of [43, 86, 85, 100]. The scheme
of [85] is also parallellizable so it can achieve a search complexity of O(D(ω)p log n)
where n is the number of encrypted data items, and p is the number of processors.
The work of [42] has been designed specifically to support search over ‘very large’
databases.
• Frequency of queries. If a vast number of search queries will need to be
evaluated on the encrypted data, then choosing a scheme with efficient Query
and Search algorithms will be beneficial. Fast search times can be produced us-
ing deterministic and order-preserving encryption [20, 31]. Searchable encryption
schemes using deterministic encryption can produce very fast (logarithmic) search
times, however in order to achieve this some security is sacrificed. The index con-
sists of deterministically encrypted keywords, hence repetitions in these keywords
will be revealed to the server. Deterministic encryption in the symmetric-key
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setting is more secure against keyword guessing attacks than in the public-key
setting. When the ciphertexts are created using a public key an adversary is
able to create ciphertexts corresponding to arbitrary plaintexts of their choosing.
Hence, if an adversary obtains a ciphertext they can compare it to any of their
arbitrarily created ciphertexts in order to determine the associated plaintext. In
the symmetric-key setting an adversary is unable to mount an attack like this as
they do not have the secret key to generate any ciphertexts. For more expressive
queries, such as range queries, order-preserving encryption can be used to achieve
a fast search time. The security sacrifices for the faster search time using order
preserving encryption and similar to those for deterministic encryption. If the
data owner just wishes to minimize their computation requirements, it will be
beneficial to have a Query algorithm which is not so computationally intensive.
The schemes of [68, 85, 100] only require the evaluation of one PRF per search
query, which makes their Query algorithms very efficient.
• Number of additional users. Not applicable to this scenario.
• Sensitivity of data. As outlined in Section 3.4, ORAM can be used to perform
searches over encrypted data without leaking the access pattern, a downfall of
most SE schemes. However these types of schemes can be very computationally
expensive so will not be suitable for very large datasets. Several schemes have
been presented that improve the efficiency of the ORAM technique [29, 45, 56, 57,
66]. TWORAM, presented in [66], is the most promising ORAM-type searchable
encryption scheme that can conceal the search pattern, however, it requires that
the data items are stored in oblivious access memory in order to conceal the
access pattern. This scheme achieves a sub-linear search time.
• Type of search query. The searchable encryption scheme suitable for this
scenario with the most expressive queries is that of [125], which supports the
following types of queries: conjunctive, disjunctive, polynomial and conjunc-
tive/disjunctive normal formulae. This scheme uses bilinear maps in the con-
struction of the index and the search queries, which are fairly computationally
intensive for the user. Recent SSE schemes [42, 84] can support arbitrary dis-
junctive and Boolean queries, however the scheme of [84] is slightly more efficient
in terms of search time as in the worst case its searches are sublinear, whereas
for arbitrary disjunctive and Boolean queries using [42] these types of searches
are performed in linear time.
• Available local storage. In this setting, where only the data owner is reading
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Figure 4.2: Data owner can read data, all users can write data.
and writing data to the remote server, if the data owner has local storage available
then an index for the encrypted data could be stored locally, un-encrypted. This
would achieve the fastest possible search, as the data owner is searching on un-
encrypted data.
4.3.2 Scenario 2: Data owner can read data, all users can write data
In this scenario both the data owner and a number of arbitrary other users are able to
write data (Figure 4.2). The data owner, however, is the only party that can read the
data.
This scenario is well illustrated by an email routing system. Users send encrypted
emails to the data owner. To allow relevant routing of these emails the server receives
all the incoming emails and routes them according to the data owner’s preferences. In
order to ascertain how to route the encrypted emails they will be securely indexed with
keywords (these could be all words in the subject of the email, for example). The data
owner supplies the server with search queries to enable it to detect which emails con-
tain a specific keyword and then route them according to the data owner’s instructions
without revealing the plaintext email to the server.
As there is more than one party that can write data, SE schemes for this scenario need
to be able to support dynamic data as encrypted data will most likely be added to the
server at different times by different parties. In terms of encryption, PKE schemes are
well suited here. Using PKE allows simple key distribution to the users as encryption
can be done using the data owner’s public key. The secret key is used by the data
owner to generate search queries. This also ensures that only the data owner is able to
produce search queries and decrypt the data items.
• Size and type of data. As encrypted data items in this scenario are uploaded by
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different users, the index is necessarily a forward index, having an entry per data
item. Subsequently, the search times are linear in the number of encrypted data
items, which might not be suitable for practical systems. In addition most of the
public-key schemes suitable for this scenario use pairings and computationally
intensive group operations in the Search and BuildIndex algorithms, which for
large datasets may not be feasible for a practical system. The scheme of [91] does
not use pairings in the BuildIndex or Search, which may make it a more practical
choice.
• Frequency of queries. Due to the computationally intensive primitives used
in the algorithms in public-key searchable encryption schemes they might not
be suitable for use in scenarios where a high frequency of queries are issued to
the server. The schemes of [13, 58, 91] do not use group operations or pairings
in their Query algorithms, they use hash functions ([13, 58]) and polynomial
evaluation ([91]).
• Number of additional users. As the data is encrypted using a public key, no
secure channel is needed for key distribution, hence a large number of additional
users does not impact the efficiency of the scheme in this sense. However, more
users may imply more encrypted data being stored on the server so it could indi-
rectly affect the efficiency of the scheme due to the issues arising from searching
over very large datasets (see previous point regarding size and type of data).
• Sensitivity of data. Public-key searchable encryption schemes may be vul-
nerable to the oﬄine keyword guessing attack described in Section 3.4.2. The
schemes of [48, 49] are not susceptible to this attack, however [48] involves a
user registering a keyword prior to encrypting data, so there is an extra round of
communication between the user and the data owner prior to encryption. The
scheme of [49] requires an extra server in order to prevent oﬄine keyword guessing
attacks, with the assumption that the two servers do not collude.
• Type of search query. The most expressive searchable encryption schemes
for this scenario are that of [34, 89]. The scheme presented in [34] supports
conjunctive, subset and range queries, whereas [89] supports the following types of
queries: conjunctive, disjunctive, polynomial and conjunctive/disjunctive normal
formulae.
• Available local storage. As the encrypted data is sent straight to the server
by the users, in order to index the data locally the data owner will either need to
download the encrypted data in order to index it or allow the additional users to
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Figure 4.3: Data owner can write data, many users can read data.
upload the index information. This will need to be repeated every time encrypted
data is added by a user. Due to the large communication costs associated with
this method, we do not consider this a feasible option.
4.3.3 Scenario 3: Data owner can write data, many users can read
data
In this scenario, all the encrypted data stored on the server is written by the data
owner, who wishes to provide read capabilities to other users, whilst not allowing them
the ability to write data (Figure 4.3). As only the data owner is writing data, SKE is a
good choice for constructing SE schemes for this scenario and the data could be either
static or dynamic.
In practice a corporation may want to outsource some encrypted data to a remote
cloud server. In order to allow employees to read the data a SE scheme that supports
multiple readers is required. This group of users could also be dynamic meaning that
users may get their read capabilities revoked, when an employee is fired for example,
or new users maybe enrolled into the system when the corporation hires new employees.
Although this scenario seems to reflect many real-world instances of searching on en-
crypted data, the literature is not very extensive. In Section 6.3 we investigate generic
solutions to multi-user search on encrypted data some of which are applicable here.
• Size and type of data. Using broadcast encryption as a method for read-
only user addition and revocation was put forward in [55]. Using this method
a single user SSE scheme can be converted to a multi-user one, inheriting the
properties of the underlying single-user scheme. Choosing a suitable single-user
SSE scheme (see Section 4.3.1) and applying a broadcast encryption scheme to it
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would provide a good solution here, allowing only authorised parties to generate
valid search queries.
• Frequency of queries. The solution described in the point above also applies
here.
• Number of additional users. If there is a dynamic user group searching the
encrypted data then the user addition and revocation mechanisms will need to be
efficient. The scheme of [135] stores a unique key per user on the server which is
used together with a search query to search the encrypted data. To revoke a user
the user’s key is deleted from the server which prevents the server from being
able to execute the user’s search queries. The revocation in this scheme does not
affect the other authorised users.
• Sensitivity of data. There are no ORAM solutions specifically for this scenario.
One could use a broadcast encryption scheme along with single user ORAM in
order to allow multiple users to query the encrypted data.
• Type of search query. Using broadcast encryption extends a single-user SSE
scheme to multi-user one, hence the single-user schemes detailed in Section 4.3.1
are also applicable here when combined with a broadcast encryption scheme to
handle user revocation and addition.
• Available local storage. If users have available local storage then each one
could store an index locally, if trusted by the data owner. This would work most
efficiently when using a static dataset, as any updates to the data would require
the data owner to update all the user indexes. If the additional users do not have
equal access rights then it would be possible using this method to have a different
index for each user, so the user can only learn information regarding data items
they are authorized to search.
.
4.3.4 Scenario 4: Many users can read and write data
In this scenario many users including the data owner have read and write capabilities
(Figure 4.4).
An example of this scenario in the real world is the management of encrypted electronic
health records (EHRs). If you take just one hospital, there are numerous doctors, nurses
and other staff (which represent the users and data owners) that write information to
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Figure 4.4: Many users can read and write data.
the EHRs. Due to the sensitive nature of the data, access will be restricted to certain
users only. For example, a general practitioner may be authorised to read the records
of their patients only, whereas a heart specialist may be authorised to read all records
relating to heart conditions. All medical staff may need to write data to the records.
As there is more than one entity writing data, as in Section 4.3.2 we need to support
dynamic data. Both SKE and PKE are possible in this scenario but produce a subtle
difference in the SE schemes’ functionality. In a scheme that uses SKE a revoked user
will no longer be able to read or write data, whereas when using PKE a revoked user
will no longer have read capabilities, however they will still be able to write data to
the server as this is done using the public key. We shall look at PKE and SKE based
methods for building SE in this scenario.
• Size and type of data. For large datasets deterministic encryption [20] could
be used along with a proxy server that uses proxy re-encryption to transform
user’s queries to the correct form. Each user could encrypt data using their own
public key. In order to search other user’s encrypted data the proxy server can
convert search queries to the correct form depending on which user encrypted
the data. This could involve the proxy server computing many different search
queries in order for a user to search many different users’ data, so this method
might not scale well to a large number of users.
• Frequency of queries. A scheme by Bao et al. [15] allows multiple readers as
well as writers using SKE. It employs a trusted authority to generate keys and
enrol/revoke users in the system. The method used to add and revoke users is
similar to that using BE, however generating a search query and writing a data
item to the server requires a valid value which varies from user to user. The server
stores information regarding these values and authorized users in a dynamic list.
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Using SKE makes the Query and Search algorithms more efficient, hence this
method might be suitable for a system with a high volume of queries.
• Number of additional users. Multi-receiver PEKS [13] extends the PEKS
scheme to a setting that allows multiple readers as well as writers. Each user in
the scheme has their own public key. For a large number of additional users this
scheme is suitable as user keys can be transferred to the users publicly.
• Sensitivity of data. If the data is very sensitive, then ORAM techniques may
be applicable. A multi-user ORAM scheme is presented in [81], which uses a
chain of proxy servers to protect the data access pattern of each user. Another
multi-user ORAM scheme is presented in [29], however, this involves an ORAM
per user and only supports a user reading data from their own ORAM, whereas
they can write data to other users’ ORAMs.
• Type of search query. Wang et al. [116] present a conjunctive scheme suitable
for this scenario. No other schemes supporting more expressive search queries are
detailed in the literature.
• Available local storage. As the encrypted data is sent straight to the server by
the users, in order to index the data locally the data owner will need to download
the encrypted data. This will need to be repeated every time a user submits
encrypted data, or otherwise the user could also submit indexing material along
with the encrypted data. Due to the large communication costs associated with
this method, we do not consider this a feasible option.
4.4 Searchable Encryption in the Real World
In this section we give a brief analysis of some products that claim to support searching
on outsourced encrypted data. We try to detail the type of encryption used and the
setup and search leakages, although as some of these products are proprietary full
details of the encryption method may not be available.
• CipherLocker: A product named CipherLocker which has been created by a
company called Private Machines Inc. claims to be ‘the first platform that lets
you securely search through files that are stored encrypted on the server, without
having to download the files’ [1]. The model used is different to that of standard
SE (Section 3.1) as the index is not kept on the server. The data items themselves
are encrypted using a semantically secure authenticated encryption scheme before
they are transferred to the server for storage. The searches are performed locally
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by the user hence there is no related leakage from the searches to the server,
except for the list of data items retrieved. CipherLocker provides a secure way
to locate and retrieve encrypted data items from a server, but the model is very
different to that of SE that is discussed in this thesis. We can say that if every
SE scheme stored an index and performed the search locally then all schemes
would achieve this high level security. In the literature a standard assumption is
made that a data owner wishes to outsource sensitive data to a remote server due
to local storage restraints, hence CipherLocker may not be a suitable solution to
searching on encrypted data for everyone. Internal adversaries may also need to
be taken into consideration when using this method.
• CryptDB: CryptDB [118] was developed by Popa et al. and is one of the most
well-known and documented solutions to searching on encrypted data. The au-
thors are very transparent about the types of encryption used in CryptDB along
with the associated leakages, unlike other products discussed in this section. This
scheme works on data in SQL databases and allows the evaluation of SQL queries
over the encrypted data. Using CryptDB it is possible to encrypt different parts
of the database using different types of encryption, depending on what types of
queries will be evaluated on that part of the database. This scheme is a good
example of the relationship between functionality and security that is often con-
sidered when designing a SE scheme.
– Random (RND): This is the strongest form of encryption used in CryptDB
and produces ciphertexts that are IND-CPA secure. It does not allow any
computation on parts of the database encrypted with this form of encryption.
– Deterministic (DET): Deterministic encryption [20] leaks which values
are equal in the encrypted data, i.e. equal plaintexts produce equal cipher-
texts. Using this type of encryption one can perform equality checks on the
encrypted data which enables the user to locate encrypted data that matches
a target value. Work by Naveed et al. [105] has shown that the information
leakage from ciphertexts encrypted using this form of encryption could be
used to uncover the underlying plaintext.
– Order preserving encryption (OPE): OPE [32] leaks the order relations
between ciphertexts. If we have that a plaintext x is less that a plaintext
y then if using OPE the resulting ciphertexts cx, cy will retain this order
relation i.e. cx is less than cy. Using OPE to encrypt the data one can
perform range queries and determine the maximum and minimum values
within the encrypted data. Work by Cash et al. [59] has shown that when
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there are multiple correlated columns in a database encrypted using OPE
then these columns can be used together to reveal more information about
the underlying plaintexts than previous attacks could reveal on each column
individually.
– Homomorphic encryption (HOM): Homomorphic encryption [113] pro-
duces ciphertexts that are IND-CPA secure and allow add queries to be
performed over the encrypted data. The leakage is limited to size of the
ciphertexts. The security for this form of encryption is similar to that of
RND.
– Word Search (SEARCH): The scheme that is used to perform text search
is that of [126]. The text is split into individual keywords and the repetitions
are removed and the words permuted. Each keyword is encrypted using
the scheme as defined in [126]. The ciphertexts are then padded to ensure
they are all the same size. The leakage is limited to which data matches
the search query. If there exists RND encryptions of the same data then an
adversary may be able to detect the number of distinct keywords in the data
by comparing the size of the SEARCH ciphertexts with the RND ciphertext.
CryptDB performs much more than keyword search as we have detailed. It also
provides flexibility for the user to assess what kind of security they need on their
data and whether they would like to sacrifice leaking some information to the
server in exchange for being able to evaluate more expressive queries. It requires
a proxy between the user and the server in order to translate the SQL queries to be
compatible with the encrypted data, as well as decrypt the query results before
transferring them to the user. CryptDB has been used by several companies
including Google, SAP, Lincoln Laboratory, Skyhigh and Microsoft [117].
• CipherCloud: CipherCloud market a type of encryption called Searchable Strong
Encryption, which is not the same as the notion of ‘SSE’ discussed in this thesis.
It involves a local index being stored by the user in order to support searching,
similarly to Cipherlocker. They also use tokenization to support search on en-
crypted data. They claim that in some countries which have strict data residency
laws, such as Singapore and Luxembourg, companies are not allowed to encrypt
their data, hence tokenization is used instead of encryption for clients in these
countries to comply with regulations whilst still somewhat protecting their data.
Although any form of encryption on the data is more secure than nothing at all it is
obvious that the claims of some companies that supply products that support searchable
encryption are slightly misleading for prospective clients.
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4.5 Deployment challenges
Despite the existence of seemly practical searchable encryption schemes, there is still
scarce evidence of their deployment. Some companies claim that they can achieve
searchable encryption but with further investigation into their systems they are usu-
ally built using a technology called tokenization. Tokenization works by replacing a
plaintext string (a keyword for example) by a completely random string (token) before
uploading it to the server and storing a map of these replacements locally. Although
the tokens are chosen randomly, identical plaintext strings are mapped to the same
token meaning equality between plaintexts will be leaked. This will provide a fast
search (same as searching a plaintext) but requires a lot of data (the mapping) to be
stored locally meaning if the entirety of the data is tokenized then there will be just as
much data locally stored (excluding repeated keywords) as there is on the server. This
method of data confidentiality seems to be more suited to scenarios where only parts
of the outsourced data needs to be protected. For example in a database of customer
details, only the very sensitive portions of the data such as social security numbers
might need protecting. The level of security provided by tokenization is roughly equiv-
alent to that of DE yet it also has the requirement of local storage space, as the user
needs to store a dictionary for all the tokenized values. SSE although only achieving a
fairly coarse grained search is still able to achieve sub-linear search times and a high
level of security so why are companies and consumers not adopting these methods to
achieve data confidentiality in the cloud environment? We discuss several reasons that
we believe form barriers to the adoption of the cryptographic techniques for searching
on encrypted data detailed in this work.
Usability. Searching over data in the clear is an everyday task for most people. Users
are accustomed to the efficient and highly functional search facilities found with search
engines such as Google. As a result they expect the same levels of usability from an
encrypted search. Unfortunately the SE schemes in the literature do not offer this
combination of functionality with efficiency; they cannot compete with the search tools
that users are accustomed to in this respect. This ties in with the point regarding user
education, if users understood the security benefits of using SE compared with other
methods, such as tokenization, then it might make SE a more appealing choice.
Lack of prototypes. SE is a relatively new technology, and there exists few proto-
types or demonstrations to illustrate the successful adoption of SE in the real world.
This makes the implementation of SE into new products or systems over established
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methods highly risky for the user. Alongside this is the issue of the lack of standardised
algorithms and protocols relating to SE which make it harder to implement without
specialised knowledge in the area of SE. There are a wide variety of SE schemes avail-
able which are well suited to different scenarios yet without any evidence demonstrating
the suitability of a scheme to a particular scenario there is no motivation for the user
to choose this new technology over established methods. This ties into the next point
regarding user education.
User education. Users may not understand how SE can be used to solve their prob-
lem or the security benefits it provides over existing methods. Furthermore users may
not understand the security issues associated with using an alternative method such
as tokenization. Educating users on these issues will help them make a more informed
choice and prevent the implementation of a method that is not fit for their purpose.
Legal issues. The Investigatory Powers Bill (IPB) [109] gives new powers to law en-
forcement allowing them to issue subpoenas to cloud providers storing encrypted data
requiring them to break the encryption and release the plaintext data. In the case of
SE where the encrypted data stored on a company’s server is encrypted and outsourced
by a third party and not by the cloud provider itself they would be unable to provide
the plaintext data in this case. This could prevent the deployment of SE as the cloud
providers would be unable to store third party encrypted data as if requested by law
enforcement they would be unable to provide the plaintext data. There are many ques-
tions that arise from the passing of the IPB and what power it gives the government
to decrypt private data as the wording in some aspects of it is ambiguous. Hence, it
is hard to predict the effects it will have on peoples’ willingness to encrypt their data.
However, we acknowledge that it may affect how people choose to encrypt and store
their data.
Compliance. It is obvious that SE would be of great benefit to users or institutions
that handle a lot of sensitive data, such as banks. However new technologies such as
SE are effectively prevented from being deployed, as they do not comply with these
institution’s regulations which usually require the use of legacy systems. Institutions
also have policies in place regarding how data is to be handled and how their systems
are used. Failure to comply with these regulations by an employee would result in dis-
ciplinary or legal action against the employee. It is believed that this provides enough
of a deterrent to a potential inside adversary and provides a means for keeping sensitive
data confidential without the use of encryption. However data breaches are becoming
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more frequent and severe [119] which motivates the need for provably secure methods
of data protection as opposed to ones that rely on trust and user compliance. There
are laws in place dictating that access to particular types of sensitive data, such as
medical records, should be restricted. The laws do not dictate how to enforce such a
restriction however. These laws should be updated to specify how the data should be
protected, to eliminate the reliance on compliance for data security.
Lack of communication between academia and industry. In researching for
this work we encountered first hand experience of this issue. There is a distinct lack of
dialogue between the academics that research in the area of SE and the practitioners
that would like to implement the technology. Without a conversation between these
two parties, academic researchers do not know which features of SE are most desirable
for a practitioner and hence may not focus on these features in their research. In order
to facilitate the development of SE schemes that meet the needs of practitioners there
needs to be a more open dialogue between academia and industry. Some companies
(Skyhigh, for example) have started to address this issue by appointing a cryptographic
advisory board consisting of five leading academic researchers. This gives the company
access to information regarding cutting edge technologies and specialised advice and
on the other hand gives the academic researchers problems and areas of research to
focus their work on.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we defined four scenarios in the real world in which searchable encryp-
tion can be applied. We discussed various features of SE schemes and map suitable
SE schemes into the four scenarios. We hope that this work will help practitioners
design products that implement SE over less secure methods such as tokenization, by
highlighting suitable SE solutions and discussing the tradeoffs between security and
efficiency within these scenarios.
We discussed some SE products that are available to users along with their pros
and cons.
Lastly we discussed some issues we feel are preventing the deployment of SE schemes
in the real world.
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5.1. Introduction
In this chapter we employ the techniques of VDC (Section 2.4.3) to extend
the functionality of VSE (Definition 3.1.7). The scheme we present allows
the user to verify that search results are both correct and complete in addi-
tion to allowing more complex verifiable computations to be performed on
the encrypted data such as averaging and counting functions as well as the
standard keyword matching queries. The results of this chapter are published
in [6].
5.1 Introduction
The majority of existing work in SE focuses on achieving secure search over encrypted
data in the presence of an honest-but-curious adversary. The paradigm of Verifiable
Searchable Encryption (VSE) assumes a stronger semi honest-but-curious adversarial
model (Definition 3.3.2) where the server might execute only a fraction of the search
or return only a fraction of the search results to the user in order to conserve its own
computational resources or download bandwidth respectively. A VSE scheme allows
the user, who created the search query to verify that the search results it receives
in response to their search query from the server are both correct and complete. Our
scheme, extended VSE (eVSE), supports multiple users reading data with a single user,
the data owner, writing data (Scenario 3, Section 4.3.3). Verifiability of search results
is of particular interest in this scenario as users (other than the data owner) would most
likely not have seen the data prior to it being encrypted and outsourced to the server
as they do not own the data. We use a CPABE scheme (Definition 2.3.5) as the main
building block for eVSE : we encode the index for the encrypted data into a CPABE
secret key which is stored on the server along with the encrypted data and the search
queries are composed of two CPABE ciphertexts. Each user that is authorized to query
the data has their own secret key which is used in conjunction with the CPABE public
key to create the search queries.
Related work on VSE (as described in Section 5.1.1) does not allow very expressive
queries over the encrypted data and only permits the user that initiated the search
query to verify the correctness of the search results. Our scheme eVSE extends the
range of queries and computations that a VSE scheme can verifiably perform as well as
supporting the public verification of the search results. To summarise, our contributions
in this chapter are:
• More expressive queries: Our scheme supports search queries such as boolean
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formulae involving conjunctions, disjunctions and negations, threshold opera-
tions, polyomials, arbitrary CNF and DNF formulae (depending on the underly-
ing CPABE scheme used - see discussion in Section 5.3.1).
• Evaluation of computations: Our scheme supports some simple computations
such as averaging and counting on the encrypted data. This is achieved by in-
dexing the data items with keywords that represent binary data values as well as
the standard alphabetic keywords, see Section 5.3.4.
• Public verifiability of search results: Any user in the system is able to verify
the correctness and completeness of the search results.
5.1.1 Related work
Verifiable searchable encryption
The first VSE scheme was presented by Chai and Gong [44]. It supports verification of
search results from a single keyword equality query. This scheme uses a trie to index
the data items. A trie is a structure that efficiently stores words by reading each one
in from root to leaf, hence a word ω of length |ω| can be searched for in the trie in a
maximum of |ω| steps. The method of verification in this scheme involves producing a
proof value for every step in the search process as the server traverses the trie. This
concatenation of proof values is sent to the data owner along with the search results
to allow the data owner to verify that the server completed the search correctly. The
proof consists of a chain of hash values and a set of search results concatenated with
a hash of the search results. To check the completeness of the search results, the data
owner computes the hash of the received search results and compares it to the received
hash value. If these values are equal then the data owner can be sure the set of search
results is complete. To check that the correct search was carried out the data owner
decrypts the values in the concatenation and compares them with values in the search
query. Each proof value contains information regarding the previous node in the trie,
hence the path through the trie can be verified by the user. The size of the proof
received from the server leaks how many letters matched in the searched keyword. For
example, if a server returns a negative search result and the proof has size j, then this
tells the data owner that the first j − 1 letters matched, but there was a mismatch on
the jth letter.
Another verifiable search scheme that supports keyword equality search only is that
of [93]. They use a similar technique to [44] for the verification as they include a MAC
of the search results (instead of a hash of the search results). The data owner is able
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to verify if the MAC value included in the search results is correct by computing the
MAC of the search results themselves. This scheme is shown to be UC-secure, meaning
the scheme can be arbitrarily composed with instances of other schemes, or instances
of the same scheme.
A scheme by Kissel et al. [92] extends the construction in [44] to support multiple
groups of users searching over the encrypted data. It achieves a form of multi-level
access, where different users have different access privileges to the data. The users are
divided into groups, each one receiving a dictionary of keywords that it is allowed to
search for. The user’s search queries are restricted to this dictionary of keywords only,
hence the users are restricted to search over a portion of the encrypted data.
A scheme by Cheng et al. [51] is the first scheme to apply indistinguishability
obfuscation (IO) [16] in the SSE setting. The authors also show an extension to the
scheme which supports conjunctive queries. In this scheme the IO circuit is applied
to the index. Search queries are then put in to this IO circuit which produces the
search results. To verify search results a public verification circuit is created, into
which a verification key is embedded. IO is then applied to this verification circuit
which allows the data owner to verify the search results. The leakage of this scheme is
similar to that of [55].
Another approach in [102] extends a public key encryption with keyword search
scheme [33] to support verification of search results from a single keyword equality
query, where the indexes are created using a public key.
Several verifiable search schemes have been proposed that use ABE in their con-
struction [102, 129, 137]. The schemes use Bloom filters to perform the searches on
the encrypted data. A signed Bloom filter is included in the search results so the data
owner is able to verify whether the search was performed correctly or not. The ABE
scheme is used to control the access to the encrypted data, i.e. a user can only search
a file if they have the correct credentials. The scheme of [129] allows the user to verify
the freshness of the search results, which ensures the search results are from the latest
version of the data and have not been recycled from previous searches. It uses signed
Bloom filters similarly to [102] in order to achieve this.
Another dynamic scheme is presented in [36]. It extends the dynamic SSE scheme
of [127] to support verifiability of search results. The scheme uses verifiable hash tables
to allow the data owner to verify search results.
Following our work the notion of public verifiability has also been explored further
by Azraoui et al. [9]. The authors present a scheme that uses Cuckoo hashing to index
the encrypted data, which is authenticated using polynomial-based accumulators and
Merkle tree. The root of the Merkle tree is used to verify the search results.
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Verifiable computation
Verifiable computation allows a client with limited resources to efficiently outsource a
computation to a more powerful server, and to verify the correctness of results. Gennaro
et al. [67] considered the use of garbled circuits, whilst Parno et al. [115] introduced
publicly verifiable computation (PVC) built from key policy attribute based enryption
(KP-ABE), where a single client computes an evaluation key for the server and pub-
lishes information enabling other clients to outsource computation to the server. Any
client may verify the correctness of a result. Alderman et al. [5] considered an alterna-
tive system model that used ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) to
allow clients to query computations on data held by the server (or initially outsourced
by a client) called Verifiable Delegable Computation (VDC). This can naturally be ap-
plied to problems like querying on remote data, as well as MapReduce. Data remains
statically stored on the server and may be embedded in a server’s secret key, whilst the
computation of many different functions can be requested by creating ciphertexts using
only public information. Other notable approaches in the realm of querying remote
data can be found in [8, 11, 10, 23, 24, 28, 53].
5.1.2 Organisation of chapter
In Section 5.2 we describe the system model and give a formal definition of eVSE,
we also describe the types of search queries eVSE supports. Section 5.2.3 defines our
notions of security along with the respective security games. In Section 5.3 we give the
construction of our eVSE scheme and Section 5.4 details the security proofs to show
that eVSE is secure according to our security notions defined in Section 5.2.3. Finally,
Section 5.5 summarises and concludes the chapter.
5.2 Extended Verifiable Searchable Encryption
This section describes our system model and gives a formal definition for eVSE .
5.2.1 System model
We consider a system model comprising a data owner, a remote storage server, and
a set of authorised users as described in Section 3.1. The architecture of our scheme
makes it suitable for use in Scenario 3 (Section 4.3.3). The data owner sets up the
system to generate a master secret key and holds a set of data items (e.g. a database or
a set of data items) that they wish to encrypt and outsource to the remote server. The
data owner creates the index by assigning meta-data in the form of keywords or numeric
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values to the data items and encoding these values to form the encrypted index. The
data owner can also control which users are able to search over the encrypted data
by issuing user secret keys to authorized users which are necessary to construct the
search queries. The users form the search queries using the same encoding of keywords
and numeric values as the data used to construct the encrypted index. Queries can
be formulated to locate a set of data items associated with specified keywords as in
standard SE schemes, however eVSE also permits computational queries of functions
in the class NC1 which consists of Boolean functions computable by circuits of depth
O(log n) where each gate has a fan-in of two (where n is the number of data items), over
encoded data values. The query is sent to the server who performs the query on the
encoded index to generate a result. We allow any entity to verify the correctness and
completeness of the result (public verifiability, Section 5.2.3). The reason we permit
the server to verify correctness is to avoid the rejection problem, where a server may
learn some useful information by observing if results are accepted, but we restrict the
ability to read the value of the result to only authorised data users (holding a retrieval
key). We assume a separation between the server entity and the user and data owners
entities as we do not allow the server to issue queries. This prevents the server from
trivially learning the encoding used for keywords to create the encrypted index. Users
that are authorized to query the encrypted data must know this encoding in order to
form their queries.
Users are added and revoked from the system using broadcast encryption. When
enrolled each user is given a secret key related to the broadcast encryption scheme
which allows them to create valid search queries.
As a practical example consider workgroups within an organisation. The manager
or system administrator acts as the data owner for the organisation and outsources a
shared database to a remote server. Authorisation is granted by issuing a secret key to
each user. This key is used when creating a query token for a particular query Q. As
well as each user being able to generate their queries at will using their secret key, the
data owner is also able to generate queries and issue them to particular workgroups
based on their roles and responsibilities. Each workgroup would then be authorised to
query the encrypted data using only the queries generated for them by the data owner.
This allows the data owner to restrict what information is released from the encrypted
data to that particular workgroup. This is a form of multi-level access (MLA) (see
Chapter 6).
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5.2.2 Formal Definition
We now formally define our eVSE scheme. We use the following notation. Data to be
outsourced is denoted D and is considered to be a collection of n data items. Prior to
outsourcing, the data owner specifies a pre-index for D, denoted δ(D), which assigns
a set of descriptive labels to each data item, e.g. keywords contained in the data item
or specific data values that may be computed upon. The encoded form of the data,
including the descriptive labels, is referred to as the index of D, denoted ID, and is
stored by the server. Queries for functions in the class NC1 are denoted by Q and to
make such a query, a user creates a query token QTQ for Q, a verification key V KQ
which allows any entity to blindly verify the result, R, of the query, and a retrieval key
RKQ which is issued to authorised data users to enable the query result r to be learnt.
We consider a broader range of verifiable queries than many prior VSE schemes. In
particular, we consider two main types:
• Keyword matching queries: Queries of this type have formed the basis of most
prior work in SE. Suppose there exists a universe (dictionary) of keywords. Each
encrypted data item is associated with an index of one or more keywords which
describe its contents. Queries are formed over the same universe of keywords. In
this work, we permit Boolean formulae over sets of keywords (e.g. ((a ∧ b) ∨ c)
where a, b, c are keywords). Thus we can perform very expressive search queries
over keywords.
• Computational queries: Queries of this type are similar to the operations com-
monly discussed in the context of outsourced computation. We allow statistical
queries over keywords (e.g. counting the number of data items that satisfy a key-
word matching query), as well as operations over selected data values that have
been encoded using additional portions of the keyword universe. It is possible
to encode the entire database in such a way as to enable computations over all
data fields, but it would usually be more efficient to select a (small) subset of
fields that are most useful or most frequently queried. Clearly, keyword matching
queries can be seen as a special case of computational queries where the function
operator is equality testing.
• Mixed queries: Queries of this type combine both the functionalities of the
aforementioned query types (e.g. finding the average of data values contained in
all data items associated with a particular keyword).
All types of query are performed in a verifiable manner to ensure that results are
correct and complete.
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Definition 5.2.1 (Extended Verifiable Searchable Encryption (eVSE)). An eVSE
scheme comprises the following algorithms:
• (KO,KS , PP ) $← KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S) : Run by the data owner and takes as input
the unary representation of the security parameter κ, and a universe of attributes
Ω (keywords and data values) along with the server identity, S. It outputs the
data owner’s secret key KO that is used for further administrative tasks, the
server secret key KS and public parameters PP .
• (ID) $← BuildIndex(δ(D),KO, PP ) : Run by the data owner and takes as input
the pre-index of the data δ(D) and the data owner’s secret key KO. It outputs a
searchable index ID for the data D.
• (Ku,KO) $← AddUser(u,KO, PP ) : Run by the data owner to authorise a user
with identity u to produce queries by issuing them a secret key Ku and updates
the data owner’s key KO.
• (QTQ, V KQ, RKQ) $← Query(Q,Ku, PP ) : Run by a user using its secret key to
generate a query token QTQ for a query Q, a verification key V KQ and an output
retrieval key RKQ.
• R $← Search(ID, QTQ,KS , PP ) : Run by the server to execute a query given in
the query token QTQ on the index ID. It generates a result R which can be
returned to the querying user or published.
• RTQ ← Verify(R, V KQ, PP ) : Run by any party to verify the correctness and
completeness of the result R. It takes the verification key V KQ and, if the result
is accepted, it outputs a retrieval token RTQ which can be used to learn the
result. Otherwise a distinguished failure symbol RTQ =⊥ is returned.
• r ← Retrieve(V KQ, RTQ, RKQ, PP ) : Run by a data user to read the value of the
result. It takes as input the retrieval token RTQ, the retrieval key RKQ and the
user’s secret key. If the user holds a valid retrieval key for Q and the computation
was performed correctly, then it returns the actual result r = Q(ID), otherwise
it returns r =⊥.
• (KO) $← RevokeUser(u,KO, PP ) : Run by the data owner using its secret key
to revoke a user’s authorisation to make queries and read results. It does so by
updating the server’s and data owner’s key.
Definition 5.2.2 (Correctness of eVSE). An eVSE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N,
for all (MK,PP )
$← KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S), for all u there is a negligible probability that
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verification does not succeed when all algorithms are run honestly. A formal definition
follows.
An Extended Verifiable Searchable Encryption scheme is correct for a family of
queries Q if for all queries Q ∈ Q and for all data sets D:
P[(KO,KS , PP )
$← KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S),
ID $← BuildIndex(δ(D),KO, PP ),
(Ku,KO)
$← AddUser(u,KO, PP ),
(QTQ, V KQ, RKQ)
$← Query(Q,Ku, PP ),
R
$← Search(ID, QTQ,KS , PP ),
RTQ ← Verify(R, V KQ, PP ),
Q(ID)← Retrieve(V KQ, RTQ, RKQ, PP )]
= 1− negl(κ)
5.2.3 Security Model
We now formalise several notions of security for eVSE as a series of cryptographic
games. The adversary against each notion is modelled as a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithm A run by a challenger, with input parameters chosen to represent
the knowledge of a real attacker as well as the security parameter κ. The adversary A
may maintain state and be multi-stage; we refer to each stage as A for ease of notation.
The Public Verifiability game (Game 5.1), the index privacy game (Game 5.2) and the
query privacy game (Game 5.3) all have the eVSE scheme eVSE as defined in Section 5.3
as input, along with the following additional inputs: the security parameter 1κ, the
universe of attributes Ω and the server identity S. We denote this additional set of
inputs as X. We assume that oracle queries are performed in a logical order such that
all required information is generated from previous queries.
Public Verifiability.
In Game 5.1, we capture the notion of public verifiability such that a server may not
cheat by only executing a fraction of the specified query and/or returning an incorrect
or incomplete result without being detected.
The notation AO denotes the adversary being provided with oracle access to the fol-
lowing oracles: BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ), AddUser(·,KO, PP ), Query(·, ·, PP ) and
Search(·, ·, ·, PP ) as follows:
• The BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to create indexes of their
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choosing. It simply runs BuildIndex on the adversary’s chosen input (a pre-index
δ(D) and returns the output to the adversary.
• The AddUser(·,KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to request a user be added
to the system, and the adversary corrupts this user by receiving their user key.
The AddUser algorithm is run on the adversary’s chosen input, a user identity u
and the output is returned to the adversary.
• The Query(·, ·, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to generate search queries. The
Query algorithm is run on the adversary’s input, a user secret key and a query of
their choosing. The output is returned to the adversary.
• The Search(·, ·, ·, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to evaluate search queries over
an index of their choosing. The Search algorithm is run on the adversary’s chosen
inputs and the results returned to the adversary.
This is a selective notion of security where, at the beginning of the game, the
adversary chooses the challenge query and set of data items. The challenger runs
KeyGen to generate the data owner key, the server key and the public parameters. The
challenger then chooses a user identity at random from the universe of user identities
U and authorises this user to search the encrypted data by running AddUser using
the identity u as input. The challenger then encodes the adversary’s challenge data
item set and runs BuildIndex and Query on the inputs selected by the adversary at the
beginning of the game to generate the index and the query for the adversary. The query
is generated using the authorised user identity generated previously. The adversary is
then given oracle access along with the outputs from BuildIndex and Query, which are
I∗D and (QTQ∗ , V KQ∗ , RKQ∗) respectively, the server key KS and the public parameters
PP . The adversary eventually outputs a result R∗ which it believes to be an incorrect
result that will, nevertheless, be accepted by the verifier. The challenger runs the Verify
algorithm using R∗ as input and following this runs Retrieve. The adversary wins if
verification succeeds, yet the result, r∗ generated by Retrieve, is not Q(ID?).
Definition 5.2.3. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the public verifiability
game (Game 5.1) is defined as follows:
AdvPublicVerifiabilityA (eVSE, X) =
∣∣P[ExpPublicVerifiabilityA [eVSE, X] = 1]− 12 ∣∣.
eVSE is secure in terms of public verifiability if for all PPT adversaries A:
AdvPublicVerifiabilityA (eVSE, X) ≤ negl(κ)
where negl is a negligible function.
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ExpPublicVerifiabilityA [eVSE, X]
1 : (Q∗,D?)← A(1κ,Ω)
2 : (KO,KS , PP )
$← KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S)
3 : u
$← U
4 : (Ku,KO)
$← AddUser(u,KO, PP )
5 : δ(D∗) $← Encode(D∗)
6 : ID? $← BuildIndex(δ(D?),KO, PP )
7 : (QTQ∗ , V KQ∗ , RKQ∗)
$← Query(Q∗,Ku, PP )
8 : R? ← AO(QTQ∗ , V KQ∗ , RKQ∗ , ID? ,KS , PP )
9 : RTQ∗ ← Verify(R?, V KQ∗ , PP )
10 : r∗ ← Retrieve(V KQ∗ , RTQ∗ , RKQ∗ , PP )
11 : if r∗ 6=⊥ and r∗ 6= Q∗(ID?) then
12 : return 1
13 : else
14 : return 0
Game 5.1: Selective public verifiability game for eVSE
Index Privacy.
In Game 5.2, we formalise the notion of index indistinguishability against a selective
chosen keyword attack, which ensures no information regarding the keywords is leaked
from the index.
The notation AO denotes the adversary being provided with oracle access to the fol-
lowing oracles: BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ), Search(·, ·, ·, PP ), Verify(·, ·, ·, ·, PP ) and
Retrieve(·, ·, ·, PP ) as follows:
• The BuildIndex oracle allows the adversary to create indexes of their choosing.
It runs BuildIndex on the adversary’s chosen input. As the adversary is modelled
as the server in our security model it does not have access to the encoded set
of attributes Ω˜. Hence, this oracle has to execute Encode on the adversary’s
chosen data set prior to generating the index for that data set. The resulting
index generated using the encoded data set as input to the BuildIndex algorithm
is returned to the adversary.
• The Query oracle allows the adversary to generate search queries of their choos-
ing. It runs Query on the adversary’s input to generate the corresponding query
token, QTQ, verification key, V KQ and retrieval key, RKQ. It is required that
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these search queries produce the same search results when evaluated on either of
the challenge indexes i.e. for any Q submitted to Query it is required that if
R0 ← Search(ID0 , QTQ,KS , PP ) and R1 ← Search(ID1 , QTQ,KS , PP ) then we
need R0 = R1. If this is not the case then Query outputs 0, otherwise QTQ,
V KQ and RKQ are returned to the adversary.
• The Search algorithm evaluates search queries of the adversary’s choosing over
an index chosen by the adversary. The oracle runs Search on the adversary’s
chosen inputs and outputs the search results R.
• The Verify oracle allows the adversary to verify search results. The oracle runs
Verify on the adversary’s inputs and returns the results to the adversary.
• The Retrieve oracle allows the adversary to retrieve search results from the
encoded versions output by Verify. The oracle runs Retrieve on the adversary’s
inputs and returns the results to the adversary.
The game (Game 5.2) begins with the adversary outputting two data sets (D0,D1 ⊆
Ω) that they wish to be challenged on, with the restriction that |D0| = |D1| (this is
required as the CP-ABE scheme that will be used to produce the index does not
conceal the index length). The challenger runs KeyGen to produce the public and
secret parameters and selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random to determine which
data set to encode into the index. Before the index is created, the challenger needs to
create the pre-index corresponding to the data set Db. This is done using an Encode
mechanism that takes the elements of Db as input and outputs the pre-index δ(Db).
Encode is not required in our instantiation as the pre-indexes can be chosen directly
from Ω˜ as the user is able to encode the data set using its secret key which the adversary
does not have access to. The challenger then runs BuildIndex using δ(Db) to produce
the index IDb . The challenger then chooses a user identity u from the userspace and
authorises that identity to search over the encrypted data by running AddUser with
u as input. The adversary is then given the index IDb along with the server key KS
and the public parameters PP and allowed oracle access as specified. After this query
phase, A outputs a guess b′ and wins the game if the game returns 1 which indicates
that b′ = b. Hence A wins the game if they can identify which attribute set (D0 or D1)
was encoded into the index IDb .
Definition 5.2.4. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the index privacy game
(Game 5.2) is defined as follows:
AdvIndexPrivacyA (eVSE, X) =
∣∣P[ExpIndexPrivacyA [eVSE, X] = 1]− 12 ∣∣.
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ExpIndexPrivacyA [eVSE, X]
1 : (D0,D1)← A(1κ,Ω)
2 : if |D0| 6= |D1|
3 : return 0
4 : (KO,KS , PP )
$← KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S)
5 : b
$← {0, 1}
6 : δ(Db) $← Encode(Db)
7 : IDb $← BuildIndex(δ(Db),KO, PP )
8 : u
$← U
9 : (Ku,KO)
$← AddUser(u,KO, PP )
10 : b′ ← AO(IDb ,KS , PP )
11 : if b′ = b then
12 : return 1
13 : else
14 : return 0
Game 5.2: Selective index privacy game for eVSE
eVSE is secure in terms of index privacy if for all PPT adversaries A:
AdvIndexPrivacyA (eVSE, X) ≤ negl(κ)
where negl is a negligible function.
Query Privacy.
The queries themselves should not leak any information about the corresponding key-
words that make up the query. Our construction of the queries leaks the gates in the
query (i.e. whether ∨, ∧ etc.), but not the keywords themselves. This notion of query
indistinguishability against a selective chosen query attack is formalised in Game 5.3.
The game runs similarly to that of Game 5.2, subject to the following restrictions: the
challenge queries (Q0, Q1) must use the same gates. We denote the gate structure of a
query Q by GQ, and hence require that GQ0 = GQ1 .
The notation AO denotes the adversary being provided with oracle access to the fol-
lowing oracles: BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ), Search(·, ·, ·, PP ), Verify(·, ·, ·, ·, PP ) and
Retrieve(·, ·, ·, PP ) as follows:
• The BuildIndex oracle allows the adversary to create indexes of their choosing.
It is required that the two challenge search queriesQ0, Q1 produce the same search
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ExpQueryPrivacyA [eVSE, X]
1 : (Q0, Q1)← A(1κ,Ω)
2 : if GQ0 6= GQ1
3 : return 0
4 : (KO,KS , PP )
$← KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S)
5 : u
$← U
6 : (Ku,KO)
$← AddUser(u,KO, PP )
7 : b
$← {0, 1}
8 : (QTQb , V KQb , RKQb)
$← Query(Qb,Ku, PP )
9 : b′ ← AO(QTQb , V KQb , RKQb ,KS , PP )
10 : if b′ = b then
11 : return 1
12 : else
13 : return 0
Game 5.3: Selective query privacy game for eVSE
results when evaluated on any index produced by BuildIndex i.e. for any D
submitted to BuildIndex it is required that if R0 ← Search(ID, QTQ0 ,KS , PP )
and R1 ← Search(ID, QTQ1 ,KS , PP ) then we need R0 = R1. The oracle runs
BuildIndex on the adversary’s chosen input. As the adversary is modelled as the
server in our security model it does not have access to the encoded set of attributes
Ω˜. Hence, this oracle has to execute Encode on the adversary’s chosen data set
prior to generating the index for that data set. The resulting index generated
using the encoded data set as input to the BuildIndex algorithm is returned to the
adversary if we have that both challenge queries produce the same search results
when evaluated over the index. Otherwise the oracle returns 0.
• The Search,Verify and Retrieve oracles are run as described for the index
privacy game (Game 5.2).
The adversary chooses their challenge queries. The challenger returns 0 if the
gates are not equal on these queries, if they are equal then the game proceeds. The
challenger runs KeyGen to produce the public and secret parameters and then selects a
user identity randomly from the userspace. This user identity is then used as input to
AddUser by the challenger to authorise that user identity to search over the encrypted
data. The challenger then selects a bit b uniformly at random and creates the challenge
query for the adversary by running Query(Qb,Ku, PP ). This query, Qb is given to the
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adversary, along with the server key KS and the public parameters. The adversary is
given access to the oracles as specified. The adversary eventually outputs a bit b′ and
wins the game if b′ = b. Hence the adversary wins the game if they can identify which
query was given to them by the challenger.
Definition 5.2.5. The advantage of a PPT adversary A in the query privacy game
(Game 5.3) is defined as follows:
AdvQueryPrivacyA (eVSE, X) =
∣∣P[ExpQueryPrivacyA [eVSE, X] = 1]− 12 ∣∣.
eVSE is secure in terms of query privacy if for all PPT adversaries A:
AdvQueryPrivacyA (eVSE, X) ≤ negl(κ)
where negl is a negligible function.
5.3 Construction
5.3.1 Overview
We base our instantiation on a CP-ABE scheme. As shown in [6], CP-ABE can be used
to verifiably request computations to be performed on data held by a server, referred
to as VDC (see Section 2.4.3). In VDC, a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC)
initialises the system and issues a CP-ABE decryption key to the server pertaining to
the data it holds. We use a similar technique, but have the data owner act as the KDC
(so the data items need not be revealed to an external KDC, as in VDC). The index for
a set of data items is a CP-ABE decryption key for a set of attributes encoding the pre-
index, and is sent to the server. The method of encoding is described in Section 5.3.4,
we require this encoding as CP-ABE is not by definition attribute hiding hence we need
to encode the keywords and attributes used into the pre-index first before using them
to generate the CP-ABE secret key (index). This ensures the privacy of the index.
A query Q is represented as a Boolean function of encoded keywords and com-
putational data points. We consider the family B of Boolean functions closed under
complement – that is, if F ∈ B then F , where F (x) = F (x)⊕1, is also in B. A function
F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is monotonic (specifically montonic increasing) if x 6 y implies
F (x) 6 F (y), where x = (x1, . . . , xn) ≤ y = (y1, . . . , yn) if and only if xi 6 yi for all i
(for a monotonic decreasing function we have that x 6 y implies F (x) > F (y)). In the
context of CP-ABE, this means that if a user has a set of attributes X that satisfies
F (i.e. F (X) = 1) then any user with an attribute set Y : X ⊆ Y will also satisfy F .
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For a monotonic function F , the set AF = {x : F (x) = 1} defines a monotonic access
structure (the set of all sets of attributes that satisfy F ).
If a monotonic CP-ABE scheme is used then queries can be comprised of AND and
OR gates (and negation can inefficiently be handled by including both a positively and
negatively labelled attribute in the universe and requiring the presence of exactly one
of them). To see why a CP-ABE scheme with a monotonic access structure cannot
support queries comprising of NOT gates is shown by the following example: consider
three users with attribute sets A = {a1, a2, a3, a4}, B = {a1, a2, a3} and C = {a1}. Let
the Boolean function F = (a2∧¬a4); we have that B ⊆ A and F (B) = 1 and F (A) = 0
i.e. F (B) ≥ F (A) however C ⊆ B but F (C) = 0 and F (B) = 1 hence F (C) ≤ F (B).
This shows that the function F , which contains a negation, is not monotonic.
A non-monotonic CP-ABE scheme enables queries formed from AND, OR and NOT
gates, which is a universal set of gates, as they permit the queries to be formed from
non-monotonic functions. We can achieve all functions in the class NC1, which includes
common arithmetic and comparison operators useful in queries. An n-bit result can
be formed by performing n Boolean queries, each of which returns the ith bit of the
output, see Section 5.3.4.
The query token for a Boolean function Q ∈ B comprises two CP-ABE ciphertexts
for access structures representing Q and Q ∈ B respectively. The user chooses two
random plaintexts m0 and m1 from the plaintext space which will act as verification
tokens. The user also chooses a random bit b which is used to permute the ciphertexts.
The plaintexts mb and m1−b are encrypted under the queries Q ∈ B and Q ∈ B
respectively and the resulting ciphertexts are sent to the server as the query token
QTQ. The user also generates a verification key V KQ by applying a one-way function
g to each plaintext, and the bit b forms an output retrieval key RKQ. To perform
the search, the server attempts to decrypt each ciphertext under the secret key (which
forms the index). Now, by definition, the data attributes in the key will satisfy precisely
one of Q or Q. Thus, precisely one plaintext will be correctly decrypted and the other
decryption will return ⊥. This pair of decryptions is returned as the encoded result R.
Any entity may perform the verification operation using the verification key V KQ.
To determine correctness of the result, the same one-way function g is applied to the
returned results and compared to those values contained in V KQ. If either matches,
then this value is output as the retrieval token RTQ and the result is accepted; otherwise
the verifier rejects the result.
Finally, an authorised entity that has been granted access to the retrieval key RKQ
may apply this to the token RTQ to determine the permutation of the ciphertexts and
thus whether the returned plaintext corresponds to Q or to Q. If m0 is the returned
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plaintext then the result r is set to 1, and r = 0 otherwise.
5.3.2 Choosing a Broadcast Encryption scheme
Our scheme, eVSE (also our multi-level symmetric searchable encryption scheme de-
tailed in Chapter 6), uses a BE scheme as a black box. There are many types of
BE schemes described in the literature, in this section we discuss which types of BE
schemes are most suited to our applications.
We require a BE scheme which supports just one entity, the data owner in our
case, who is able to create the BE ciphertexts. The data owner updates the value
of stO (the data owner state) each time a user is revoked from the system and then
encrypts it using BE to create the server state, stS . When choosing a BE scheme that
is suitable for this purpose we have to consider variables such as the number of users
(both authorised and revoked), bandwidth required to transfer the BE ciphertexts and
the storage required by a user.
BE schemes allow encrypted data to be delivered to a large set of users, so that
only a particular subset of privileged users can decrypt it. There are two main types
of BE scheme: stateless and stateful. A stateful BE scheme provides users with keys
that may be updated when a user is either revoked or added to the system. These
schemes require users to be online in order to receive update messages. A stateless BE
scheme provides users with long term keys that do not change over the lifespan of the
system, a user can be revoked without having to change or update the keys of currently
authorised users.
BE schemes can also be either public key or symmetric key. Public key BE schemes
are more suited to scenarios where more than one user is creating the BE ciphertexts,
as the encryption key distribution is simplified by the use of public keys. Symmetric
key BE schemes are more suited to scenarios where just one entity is creating the BE
ciphertexts.
In our scenario users may not be online at all times, so a stateless BE scheme seems
more practical, and as there is just one entity creating the BE ciphertexts, a symmetric
key BE scheme would be well-suited.
Stateless BE was first investigated by Naor, Naor and Lotspiech. The complete
subtree (CS) method for achieving BE was proposed by Naor et al. [104]. It models
each user as a leaf of a binary tree (hence it is required that the total amount of users
is a power of 2). Every node in this tree is associated with a distinct key, and a user
receives each key associated with each node from the root to their leaf node. In order to
encrypt a message for only authorised users, several ciphertexts need to be created. To
determine the keys needed to create these ciphertexts the minimal cover of authorised
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users’ leaves in the binary tree needs to be calculated. The keys associated with these
nodes that provide the minimum cover are used to create the ciphertexts.
Another method of BE known is known as the Subset Difference (SD) method,
which was also presented by Naor et al. [104]. In this method the data owner (more
generally known as the sender in BE) generates independent keys for each node in the
tree (as in the CS method). Subsets of these keys are then distributed to the users.
Instead of using the minimal cover to determine which keys to use to create the BE
ciphertexts, the number of subsets is increased significantly to O(n2), where n is the
total number of users. The set of subsets is defined as follows:
S = {Si,j |vi is an ancestor of vj},
where:
Si,j = {Descendants of vi} \ {Descendants of vj}.
Defining the subsets in this way allows a message to be encrypted for n\r authorised
users (where r is the number of revoked users) with at most 2r − 1 subsets (with the
average number of subsets required being 1.25).
The SD method was improved by [74] which presents another method for achieving
BE called the Least Subset Difference (LSD) method. This method is also tree-based
and reduces the amount of keys that each user needs to store by nearly a square root
factor. The BE schemes detailed in [27, 72] also improve on the work of [104] with
Goodrich et al. [72] producing a scheme that reduces the storage required by the users,
however this is at the cost of an increase in computation for the user.
There are two main types of tradeoff in BE schemes: reduced message length usually
implies an increase in user storage and reduced user storage usually implies an increased
message length. The type of scenario our scheme is implemented in will affect the
choice of BE scheme. If the users have resource constrained devices then schemes that
minimize the user storage might be preferable such as [72, 74]. Whereas for applications
where the users’ storage space is not limited, choosing a scheme with a smaller message
length may be preferable, such as [133].
BE can be achieved trivially by encrypting the plaintext a number of times so
there is a different BE ciphertext for each authorised user. These ciphertexts are
then broadcast to all users, who each have a distinct key to decrypt their respective
ciphertext. The aim of most BE schemes is improve on the efficiency of this trivial
scheme. However, in some scenarios when the number of users is low, using the trivial
BE scheme might be feasible. In eVSE (also our multi-level symmetric searchable
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Scheme Average message length Storage per user Computation per user, prior to decryption
- (n \ r) O(1) O(1)
[104] r log(nr ) log n O(log log n)
[104] 1.38r 12 log
2 n+ 12 log n+ 1 O(log n)
[74] 2r O(log1+ n) O(log n)
[27] 2r − 1 O(log2 n) O(log n)
[72] 1.25r O(log n) O(n)
[133] < 1.38r O(2λ log n) O(log n)
[80] O( rp + n−rc ) O(cp) O(c− 1)
Table 5.1: Comparison of Broadcast Encryption Schemes
encryption scheme detailed in Chapter 6) it is only required that one k−bit value (stO)
is encrypted in the BE ciphertext, meaning the BE ciphertexts are not very large.
Hence, requiring a number of BE ciphertexts linear in n (where n is the number of
authorised users) might be feasible in a scenario where n is small.
5.3.3 Choosing a CP-ABE scheme
Our scheme, eVSE, uses a CP-ABE scheme as a black box. We have discussed a few
requirements of the CP-ABE scheme previously, however here we discuss which CP-
ABE schemes would be well suited for use with eVSE. We also discuss the features of
our scheme that effect the choice of CP-ABE scheme used.
Due to the way the attribute universe is defined eVSE requires a large universe CP-
ABE scheme. Large universe CP-ABE was first explored by Okamoto and Takashima [111].
This scheme is based on the dual pairing vector spaces framework and each attribute
can take on several values chosen from a space of exponential size. There is a bound on
the number of times each space can be used in a policy which is chosen when setting up
the system and remains fixed throughout the life span of the system. Rouselakis and
Waters [122] claim that as this bound increases the scheme becomes less efficient. In
this same paper [122], Rouselakis and Waters present a large universe CP-ABE scheme
which has no restriction on the attributes used in the policies and has constant size
public parameters.The authors extended their scheme to a multi-authority one in [123].
This construction uses bilinear groups of prime order which optimizes the computation
of the pairings used in the construction [73].
Other work [107] which uses techniques from [122], details a large universe CP-ABE
scheme with white-box traceability.
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Scheme Encryption Decryption Storage per user (key size) Monotonic/Non-monotonic
[122] (5|`|+ 2)E |I|E + (3|I|+ 1)P O(|k|) Yes
[107] (3 + 5|`|)E (2 + |I|)E + (3|I|+ 1)P O(|k|) Yes
Table 5.2: Comparison of Large Universe CP-ABE schemes
When choosing a CP-ABE scheme to implement eVSE we consider the following to
be important for optimizing the efficiency of our scheme: fast search query generation,
search time and verification, and minimal storage per user. These features are all
related to the user and streamlining their experience. We look at the following large
universe CP-ABE schemes [107, 122] as discussed above and consider how they perform
when considering these features. We omit the scheme of [111] due to the issues discussed
in [122].
Looking at the Query algorithm in eVSE we can see that it requires the generation
of n pairs of CP-ABE ciphertexts (where n is the number of encrypted data items). In
order to optimize the query generation for the user a CP-ABE with the most efficient
encryption algorithm would be preferable. In the Search algorithm the main bottleneck
is the n pairs of CP-ABE decryptions, hence a CP-ABE scheme with the most efficient
decryption algorithm would be preferable. Each user has to store their secret user
key which consists of a CP-ABE user key (along with a secret key for a symmetric
encryption scheme and a PRF and its key). Hence, choosing a CP-ABE with the
shortest user keys would be recommended. The CP-ABE scheme is not used in the
verification steps in eVSE, hence this can be omitted from our analysis.
Overall, the scheme of [122] is more efficient in the encryption and decryption
algorithms, and both schemes have the same storage requirements for the user, hence
this scheme would be recommended for use with eVSE, as it is also a large universe
CP-ABE.
eVSE supports both monotonic and non-monotonic functions in the policies. If a
monotonic CP-ABE scheme is used then negative attributes need to be included in the
attribute universe, effectively doubling its size. An open area of research here would
be to investigate possible large universe, non-montonic CP-ABE schemes.
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5.3.4 Data Encoding
Defining the Index.
Suppose the data D to be outsourced comprises n data items. We now discuss how
to form a pre-index δ(D), which represents the keywords and data fields that may be
queried over.
Let ∆ be a dictionary of keywords that describe the data items. ∆ alone suffices
for keyword matching queries but for computational queries, we also need to be able
to encode data values such that they can be input to queries represented as access
structures encoding Boolean functions.
For each data field x that may be input to a computational query, let the maximum
size of the data value bemx bits. We definemx additional attributesAx,1, Ax,2, . . . , Ax,mx ,
and define the universe C = ⋃x∈D ∪mxi=1Ax,i to be the union of these attributes over all
data fields. Let y be a value stored in the data field x and let the binary representation
of y be y1, . . . , ymx . We view y as a characteristic tuple of an attribute set Ay ⊆ C,
where Ay = {Ax,i : yi = 1} – we include an attribute for position i in the set if and
only if the ith bit of y is 1.
Finally, to enable the index for all n data items to be encoded within a single
CP-ABE key (and hence for computations to be performed simultaneously on all data
items), and to ensure that the correct index data is used for each query, we must encode
a labelling of the data item that each attribute pertains to. We define our attribute
universe Ω for the CP-ABE scheme to be Ω = {∆∪ C}× [n]. That is, we take n copies
of ∆ and C. Each element of Ω describes a particular keyword or data value, and each
copy relates to a different data item in D: if we index each copy of an attribute w ∈ Ω
as {wi}ni=1, then wi denotes the presence of w in data item i. In practice, it may be
desirable to use a ‘large universe’ CP-ABE scheme, wherein arbitrary textual strings
are mapped to attributes (group elements), e.g. using a hash function H. Thus, for a
keyword or data value w in data item i, the attribute could be defined as H(w||i).1
The pre-index of the data D is a set of attributes δ(D) ⊆ Ω and represent the sets
of keywords and data values associated with the set of data items D. We define an
algorithm δ(D)← Encode(D) that encodes a data set D in to the pre-index δ(D). The
index that is outsourced will be a CP-ABE key generated over this attribute set in the
pre-index.
Here we provide a simple example that shows how we define the index. Suppose we
have three data items with the following characteristics:
1In this case, it may be possible to avoid the use of symmetric encryption in our construction by
letting the secret k be the key for this cryptographic hash function.
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• Document 1: Keywords: Male, Vaccinated. Data: Age = 7 = 1112.
• Document 2: Keywords: Female. Data: Age = 4 = 1002.
• Document 3: Keywords: Male, Vaccinated. Data: -
Then we define the index for these three data items as follows:
∆ ={Male, Female, Vaccinated},
C ={AAge,1, AAge,2, AAge,3},
Ω ={MaleDoc1, MaleDoc2, MaleDoc3,
FemaleDoc1, FemaleDoc2, FemaleDoc3,
VaccinatedDoc1, VaccinatedDoc2, VaccinatedDoc3,
A(Age,1),Doc1, A(Age,1),Doc2, A(Age,1),Doc3,
A(Age,2),Doc1, A(Age,2),Doc2, A(Age,2),Doc3,
A(Age,3),Doc1, A(Age,3),Doc2, A(Age,3),Doc3},
δ(D) ={MaleDoc1, VaccinatedDoc1, A(Age,1),Doc1, A(Age,2),Doc1, A(Age,3),Doc1,
FemaleDoc2, A(Age,3),Doc2,
MaleDoc3, VaccinatedDoc3}.
Hiding the Index.
In general, CP-ABE schemes do not hide the attributes within the decryption key. This
is usually expected behaviour since CP-ABE is often used to cryptographically enforce
access control policies and it is natural to assume that an entity is aware of their access
rights.
However, in this setting we are using CP-ABE not to protect objects from unau-
thorised access, but instead to prove the outcome of a function evaluation. The keys
in our setting are formed over attributes encoding the index of outsourced data, as
opposed to encoding access rights. Since the server should not learn any information
about the data items, including the index, we must implement a mechanism by which
the CP-ABE decryption key hides the attributes associated with it.
In many CP-ABE schemes, and in particular in that proposed by Waters et al. [134],
the public parameters comprise an ordered set of group elements, each associated with
an attribute from the universe; that is, ∀i ∈ Ω, choose ti $← Zp, then form the encoded
attribute set {gti}i∈Ω. Thus, given a key (or ciphertext) that comprises gti , it is possible,
based on the ordering of this set, to determine the attribute i ∈ Ω it relates to. In
addition, the attributes may be listed in the clear, and attached to keys and ciphertexts
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to indicate which group elements should be applied at each point. Clearly, this is
unsuitable for our requirement for a hidden index.
To this end, we first apply a random permutation to Ω such that the position of
the group elements within the ordered set does not reveal the attribute string (unless
the permutation is known). We then use a symmetric encryption scheme to encrypt
each attribute x ∈ Ω under a key k, and then instantiate the CP-ABE scheme on this
universe of encrypted attributes. Thus, without knowledge of the key k, the server
should be unable to determine the attribute x that a given group element corresponds
to. We assume that only the keywords or data items being computed over are considered
sensitive, and not the logical makeup of the Boolean function (in terms of gates).
5.3.5 Formal Details
The data owner initialises the system and encodes the data as an index which is pushed
to the server. Each (authorised) user will be issued with a personalised secret key
enabling them to form queries. Suppose that to make a query Q, a user chooses
a random plaintext from the plaintext space M to act as a verification token, and
encrypts this using the CP-ABE scheme under the access structure encoding Q. The
server attempts to decrypt the ciphertext and recovers the chosen plaintext if and only
if Q(ID) = 1. By the indistinguishability security of the CP-ABE scheme, the server
learns nothing about the plaintext if Q(ID) = 0 since this corresponds to an access
structure not being satisfied. Thus, if a server returns the correct plaintext, the user
is assured that the query evaluated to 1 on the data. If, however, Q(ID) = 0, then
decryption will return ⊥. This is insufficient for verification purposes since the server
can return ⊥ to convince a user of a false negative query result. Thus, the user must, in
fact, produce two CP-ABE ciphertexts. As described in Section 5.3.1, one corresponds
to the function Q, whilst the other corresponds to Q, the complement query of Q.
Hence, the CP-ABE secret key that forms the index will decrypt exactly one ciphertext
and the returned plaintext will distinguish whether Q or Q was satisfied, and therefore
the value of Q(ID). A well-formed response (d0, d1) from a server, therefore, satisfies
the following:
(d0, d1) =
(mb,⊥), if Q(ID) = 1(⊥,m1−b), if Q(ID) = 0. (5.1)
Public Verifiability is achieved by publishing a token comprising a one-way function
g applied to both plaintexts. Any entity can apply g to the server’s response and
compare with this token to check correctness. To achieve blind verification, a random
bit b permutes the order of the ciphertexts. Thus, verifiers that do not know b cannot
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determine whether a plaintext is associated with Q or Q.
Our adversarial model can allow the adversary (and hence server in our system) to
hold more than one key (for multiple datasets); if this is the case we must ensure that
a key cannot produce a valid looking response to a query on a different index. We can
achieve this by labelling each pre-index with a label l(δ(D)) and define an attribute for
each label. Then, for a pre-index δ(D), the decryption key is formed over the attribute
set (δ(D) ∪ l(δ(D))). Recall that encoded data stored in the server side index is a
collection of n sets of attributes, each one corresponding to a data item, which we label
D1, . . . , Dn. When making a query Q(ID), a sub-query Qi may be formed for each
attribute set (e.g. to check if a given keyword is contained in each data item). In this
case, the encryption algorithm takes the access structure encoding of the conjunction
(Di ∧ l(δ(D))) for i ∈ [n]. A valid result can only be formed by applying the sub-
query to the specified attribute set. Decryption succeeds if and only if the function is
satisfied and the label l(δ(D)) is matched in the key and ciphertext. Note that a key
for a different pre-index will not include the correct label. For ease of notation we omit
the labels from our construction, but we note that our scheme can be extended in this
way to support a server that holds multiple datasets.
5.3.6 Instantiation Details
Let CPABE = (ABE.Setup, ABE.KeyGen, ABE.Encrypt, ABE.Decrypt) define a CP-
ABE encryption scheme over the universe Ω. Let SKE = (SKE.KeyGen, SKE.Encrypt,
SKE.Decrypt) be an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme secure in the sense of
IND-CPA. Let BE = (BE.KeyGen, BE.Encrypt, BE.Add, BE.Decrypt) be a broadcast
encryption scheme that retains IND-CPA security against a coalition of revoked users.
Finally, let g be a one-way function and let Π and φ be pseudo-random permutations
(PRPs) (with keys kΠ and stO respectively). Then Algorithms 5.1–5.8 define an eVSE
scheme for a class of queries Q.
The KeyGen algorithm sets up the system and produces the secret key for the
data owner and the public parameters. The data owner’s secret key consists of seven
parts: a secret key for CPABE, a secret key for BE, a secret key for SKE, a PRP Π,
a key for Π, the data owner’s state and the authorised user group. KeyGen starts by
generating the initial two parts of the data owner’s secret key by running BE.KeyGen
and SKE.KeyGen to generate kBE and kSKE respectively. The algorithm then encrypts
each element in the attribute universe using SKE, this encrypted set of attributes is
denoted Ω′. A key for the PRP Π is generated and Ω′ is then permuted using Π to
generate the set Ω˜. The key generation algorithm, ABE.KeyGen, is then run on input
Ω˜ to produce the public and secret key pair for CPABE, (kABE, PPCPABE). The secret
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(KO,KS , PP )←$KeyGen(1κ,Ω, S)
1 : (kBE, PPBE)←$BE.KeyGen(1κ, |U|)
2 : kSKE ←$SKE.KeyGen(1κ)
3 : for i ∈ Ω
4 : ωi ←$SKE.Encrypt(i, kSKE)
5 : endfor
6 : Ω′ ← {ωi}i∈[1,|Ω|]
7 : kΠ ←$ {0, 1}κ
8 : Ω˜← ΠkΠ(Ω′)
9 : (kABE, PPABE)←$ABE.KeyGen(1κ, Ω˜)
10 : stO ←$ {0, 1}κ
11 : kS ←$BE.Add(kBE, S)
12 : G ← {S}
13 : stS ←$BE.Encrypt(stO,G, kBE)
14 : return
15 : KS ← (kS , stS)
16 : KO ← (kABE, kBE, kSKE,Π, kΠ, stO,G)
17 : PP ← (PPABE, PPBE, Ω˜)
Algorithm 5.1: KeyGen algorithm for eVSE
key for CPABE along with the PRP Π and its key form the next parts of the data
owner’s secret key. The data owner’s state is generated by choosing a κ−bit binary
string string uniformly at random, stO. The server’s secret key is then generated by
running BE.Add using the server’s identity as input. The authorised user group G is
initialised as a set containing the server’s identity. Finally the server state is generated
by encrypting the data owner’s state, stO using BE.Encrypt. The two states, stO and
stS are used for adding and revoking user’s querying rights. The authorised user group
along with stO form the final parts of the data owner’s secret key which is output as
KO = (kCPABE, kBE, kSKE,Π, stO,G). The server’s secret key is made up of the BE user
key generated using the server’s identity, along with the server state: KS = (kS , stS).
The public parameters are: PP = (PPABE, PPBE, Ω˜).
ID ←$Buildindex(δ(D),KO, PP )
1 : ID ←$ABE.KeyGen(δ(D), kABE, PPABE)
Algorithm 5.2: Buildindex algorithm for eVSE
The BuildIndex algorithm generates the index for the encrypted data The index,
ID is generated using the ABE.KeyGen algorithm with the preindex δ(D) as input
along with the public and secret key pair for CPABE. The δ(D) corresponds to the
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attribute set that is input into into ABE.KeyGen algorithm in the standard definition
(see Definition 2.3.5). The output of the ABE.KeyGen algorithm is the CPABE secret
key corresponding to the set of attributes in δ(D) and is referred to as the index ID.
(Ku,KO)←$AddUser(u,KO, PP )
1 : G ← G ∪ {u}
2 : ku ← BE.Add(u, kBE)
3 : st′O ←$ {0, 1}κ
4 : stO ← st′O
5 : st′S ←$BE.Encrypt(stO,G, kBE)
6 : stS ← st′S
7 : Update server key with current value of stS
8 : return
9 : Ku ← (ku, kSKE,Π)
10 : KO ← (kABE, kBE, kSKE,Π, stO,G)
Algorithm 5.3: AddUser algorithm for eVSE
The AddUser algorithm authorizes users new users to allow them to query the
encrypted data. The new user’s identity u is added to the authorised user group G
and a user key is generated using BE.Add using the new user’s identity as input. A
new data owner state is then generated and the old value of the data owner’s state
is updated. The new server state is created by encrypting the new data owner state
using BE.Encrypt with the updated authorised user group as input. The server’s key
is then updated so it holds the new value for stS . The new user’s secret key is output
as: Ku = (ku, kSKE,Π). The key kSKE and the permutation Π are given to the user to
allow them to read the encoded attributes and generate search queries.
The Query algorithm generates the search queries which users can send to the server.
Initially the user retrieves the current server state, stS from the server and decrypts
it using their user key. Only users that were authorised to search on the encrypted
data when the server state was created will be able to decrypt the server state. If the
user was not a member of the authorised user group then decryption will fail and the
algorithm will return ⊥. If the user is authorised to search on the encrypted data, the
query is formed by encrypting pairs of plaintexts using CPABE, with the search query
and the complement of the search query as input respectively. A bit b is chosen prior
to encryption and used to permute the plaintexts.The query token is formed by the
ciphertext pairs concatenated and then used as input to the permutation φ, using stO
as the key. The verification token is created by applying the one-way function g to
each plaintext and the retrieval token is the bit b.
The Search algorithm evaluates the search query over the encrypted data in the
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(QTQ, V KQ, RKQ)← Query(Q = {Qi},Ku, PP )
1 : Retrieve stS from server
2 : st′O ← BE.Decrypt(stS , ku)
3 : if st′O =⊥ then
4 : return ⊥
5 : else
6 : stO ← st′O
7 : for i = 1, ..., |Q| do
8 : (m0i ,m1i)
$←M×M
9 : bi
$← {0, 1}
10 : cbi ← ABE.Encrypt(mbi , Qi, PPABE)
11 : c1−bi ← ABE.Encrypt(m1−bi , Qi, PPABE)
12 : QTQi ← (cbi , c1−bi)
13 : γi ← φstO (cbi‖c1−bi)
14 : V KQi ← (g(m0i), g(m1i))
15 : RKQi ← bi
16 : endfor
17 : QTQ ← {γi}, V KQ ← {V KQi}, RKQ ← {RKQi}
Algorithm 5.4: Query algorithm for eVSE
R← Search(ID, QTQ = {γi},KS , PP )
1 : st′O ← BE.Decrypt(stS , kS)
2 : for i = 1, ..., |Q| do
3 : (cbi‖c1−bi)← φ−1st′
O
(γi)
4 : dbi ← ABE.Decrypt(cbi , ID, PPABE)
5 : d1−bi ← ABE.Decrypt(c1−bi , ID, PPABE)
6 : Ri = (dbi , d1−bi)
7 : endfor
8 : R = {Ri}
Algorithm 5.5: Search algorithm for eVSE
index ID. It outputs a result R which can then be verified by the user. The server
initially decrypts the current value of the server state and uses this as the key for the
inversion of the PRP φ to reveal the pairs of CPABE ciphertexts that make up the
query token. The index is then used to decrypt these pairs of ciphertexts. As one of
each pair was encrypted using the search query and the other using the complement
of the query exactly one of each pair will decrypt successfully to the original plaintext.
These pairs of decryptions form the search results R.
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RTQ ← Verify(R = {(di, d′i)}, V KQ = {(V Ki, V K′i)}, PP )
1 : for i = 1, ..., |Q| do
2 : if V Ki = g(di) then
3 : RTQi = di
4 : elseif V K′i = g(d
′
i) then
5 : RTQi = d
′
i
6 : else RTQi =⊥
7 : endfor
8 : RTQ = {RTQi}
Algorithm 5.6: Verify algorithm for eVSE
The Verify algorithm checks the correctness and completeness of the search result,
R, using the verification key, V KQ. The one-way function g is applied to the results
which are then compared to the relevant parts in the verification key V KQ. One of
these pairs from R should match the verification key, this part is added to the retrieval
token RTQ. If neither match then this tells the verifier that the search has not been
performed honestly and the relevant part of the retrieval token is set to ⊥.
R← Retrieve(V KQ = {(g(mbi ), g(m1−bi ))}, RTQ = {RTQi}, RKQ = {bi}, PP )
1 : for i = 1, ..., |Q| do
2 : if g(RTQi) = g(m0) then
3 : ri = 1
4 : elseif g(RTQi) = g(m1) then
5 : ri = 0
6 : else ri =⊥
7 : endfor
8 : r = {ri}
Algorithm 5.7: Verify algorithm for eVSE
The Retrieve algorithm reveals the final search results using the retrieval key RKQ.
The retrieval key enables the user to determine whether the ciphertext encrypted with
the search query or the ciphertext encrypted with the complement of the search query
decrypted correctly and hence, for each data item the user can tell whether it satisfies
the search query or not. The final search results are output as a bit string of length
n, with an entry corresponding to each data item. An entry of 1 implies that the data
item satisfied the search query and an entry of 0 tells the user that the data item did
not satisfy the search query.
The RevokeUser algorithm removes a user’s capability to produce search queries,
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KO ← RevokeUser(u,KO, PP )
G ← G \ {u}
st′O ←$ {0, 1}κ
stO ← st′O
st′S ←$BE.Encrypt(stO,G, kBE)
stS ← st′S
Update server key with current value of stS
return
KO ← (kABE, kBE, kSKE,Π, stO,G)
Algorithm 5.8: RevokeUser algorithm for eVSE
and hence search the encrypted data. The revoked user’s identity is first removed from
the authorised user set G. A new data owner state is then created and encrypted
using the BE scheme with the updated authorised user set as input. The resulting BE
ciphertext is the updated server state, stS . The server key is updated with this new
value for stS and the data owner’s key is updated with the new value of the data owner
state, stO.
Theorem 5.3.1. Given a selective IND-CPA secure CP-ABE scheme, a symmetric
encryption scheme and a broadcast encryption scheme, both secure in the sense of
IND-CPA, pseudo-random permutations Π and φ, and a one-way function g, let eVSE
be the extended verifiable searchable encryption scheme defined in Algorithms 5.1–5.8.
Then eVSE is secure in the sense of Public Verifiability, Index Privacy and Query
Privacy.
Note that we can add additional contextual access control following Alderman et
al. [5] by replacing φ with a key assignment scheme.
5.4 Proofs of Security
5.4.1 Public verifiability
Lemma 5.4.1. An eVSE scheme eVSE as defined in Algorithms 5.1–5.8 is secure
against Public Verifiability (Game 5.1) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 5.3.1.
Proof. Suppose AeVSE is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selec-
tive Public Verifiability game (Game 5.1) when instantiated with Algorithms 5.1–5.8.
We begin by defining the following three games:
• Game 0. This is the selective Public Verifiability game as defined in Game 5.1.
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• Game 1. This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that in Query, we
no longer return an encryption of m0 and m1.
Instead, we choose another random plaintext m′ 6= m0,m1 and, if Q(ID∗) =
1, we replace c1 by ABE.Encrypt(Q,m
′, PPABE). Otherwise, we replace c0 by
ABE.Encrypt(Q,m′, PPABE). In other words, we replace the ciphertext associated
with the unsatisfied function with the encryption of a separate random plaintext
unrelated to the other system parameters, and in particular to the verification
keys.
• Game 2. This is the same as Game 1 with the exception that instead of choosing
a random plaintext m′, we implicitly set m′ to be the challenge input w in the
one-way function game.
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective Public
Verifiability game can be used to construct an adversary that may invert the one-way
function g.
Game 0 to Game 1. We begin by showing that there is a negligible distinguishing
advantage between Game 0 and Game 1.
Suppose otherwise, that AeVSE can distinguish the two games with non-negligible
advantage δ. We then construct an adversary AABE that uses AeVSE as a sub-routine
to break the selective IND-CPA security of the CP-ABE scheme. We consider a
challenger C playing the IND-CPA game with AABE, who in turn acts as a challenger
in the public verifiability game (Game 5.1) for AeVSE:
1. AeVSE is given the security parameter and Ω by the environment, and declares
(to AABE) its choice of data set D? and the query Q∗.
2. AABE uses oracle calls to C in order to obtain the encrypted-then-permuted uni-
verse Ω˜. C runs kSKE ← SKE.KeyGen(1κ) and uses the symmetric key k to sym-
metrically encrypt each element of Ω and therefore obtain Ω′. C then applies
the permutation Π to the set Ω′ that results in the permuted set Ω˜. Further-
more C runs kBE ← BE.KeyGen(1κ) from the broadcast encryption scheme to
produce (kBE, PPBE) and ABE.KeyGen(1
κ, Ω˜) from the ABE scheme to produce
(kABE, PPABE). It then chooses an authorised user group G ∈ U , a data owner
state stO
$← {0, 1}κ and encrypts it to produce stS . C also generates components
of the server key by running BE.Add using the server identity S as input.
3. C sets the public parameters to be PP = (PPABE, PPBE, Ω˜) and gives them to
AABE, who shares them with AeVSE.
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4. C sets the master key to be KO = (kABE, kBE, kSKE,Π, stO,G) and keeps it private,
except for kBE, stO,Π,G that it shares with AABE.
5. The server key is set as KS = (ks, stS) and shared with AABE.
6. AABE chooses a random user u authorised user group G which is then used as
input for AddUser, which generates the secret key for user u. AABE possesses all
parameters to run this algorithm. It sends the updated values of stO and G to C.
7. AABE proceeds to create the index. It does so by sending the challenge data set
D∗ to C who then runs Encode to produce the pre-index δ(D∗). It then runs
BuildIndex using the pre-index as input to produce ID∗ .
8. AABE must send a challenge access structure to the challenger. It first computes
r∗ = Q∗(ID?), that is, the outcome of the challenge query Q∗ applied to the
challenge index. If r∗ = 1, AABE sets A? = FQ? , where FQ? is the query Q∗
represented as a function. Else, r = 0 and A? = FQ? . The challenge access
structure, A∗ is sent to C.
9. AABE sends stS to C who runs j˜ ← BE.Decrypt(stS,uku) and returns j˜ to AABE
in the Query stage. It checks whether j˜ = j. If so it proceeds with the next step,
otherwise the game aborts.
10. Each query Q can comprise multiple subqueries Qi. Therefore the following is
done for all i ∈ [|Q|] = {1, . . . , |Q|}:
• To generate the challenge input, AABE begins by choosing a random bit
bi, three random plaintexts m0i , m1i and m
′
i from the plaintext space, and
another random bit ti.
AABE sends the plaintexts m0i and m1i to C as the challenge plaintexts
for the CP-ABE game. C chooses a random bit ci and returns CT ? ←
Encrypt(mci ,A?, PPABE).
– If r = 1, AABE generates cbi ← Encrypt(Q∗i ,m′i, PPABE) and sets c1−bi =
CT ? (formed over A? by C). It also sets V Kbi = g(m′i) and V K1−bi =
g(mti).
– Else r = 0, andAABE sets cbi = CT ? and computes c1−bi ← Encrypt(Q∗i ,m′i, PPABE).
It sets V Kbi = g(mti) and V K1−bi = g(m
′
i).
AABE sets QTQ∗i = (cbi , c1−bi), V KQ∗i = (V Kbi , V K1−bi) and RKQ∗i = bi.
Finally, AABE computes γi ← φstO(cbi‖c1−bi) and sets for all i ∈ [|Q∗|]
QT ∗Q = {γi}, V KQ = {V KQ∗i }, and RK∗Q = {RKQ∗i }.
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11. AABE sends the output from Query along with the public information to AeVSE,
who is also given oracle access to which AABE responds as follows:
• BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ): To generate the evaluation key for the queried pre-
index δ(D), AABE makes use of the KeyGen oracle in the CP-ABE game.
AABE then makes an oracle query to C for OKeyGen(δ(D), kABE, PPABE). C
shall generate a CP-ABE decryption key for δ(D) if and only if δ(D) 6∈ A?.
• All other oracles are run as described in Section 5.2.3.
12. Eventually, AeVSE outputs R? which it believes is a valid forgery (i.e. that it will
be accepted yet does not correspond to the correct value of Q(ID?)).
13. AABE parses R? as {R?i } for all i ∈ [|Q∗|]. For each i ∈ [|Q∗|] AABE does the
following: AABE parses R?i as (dbi , d1−bi) and using the retrieval key RKQi = bi,
finds d0i and d1i . One of d0i and d1i will be ⊥ (by construction) and we denote
the other value by Yi.
Observe that, sinceAeVSE is assumed to be a successful adversary against selective
public verifiability, the non-⊥ value, Yi, that it will return will be the plaintext
mci since the challenge access structure was always set to be unsatisfied on the
challenge input.
Thus, if g(Yi) = g(mti), AABE outputs a guess c′i = ti and otherwise guesses
c′i = (1− ti).
If ti = ci (the challenge bit chosen by C), we observe that the above corresponds
to Game 0 (since the verification key comprises g(m′i) where m
′
i is the plaintext
a legitimate server could recover, and g(mci) where mci is the other plaintext).
Alternatively, ti = 1−ci and the distribution of the above experiment is identical
to Game 1 (since the verification key comprises the legitimate plaintext and a
random plaintext m1−ci that is unrelated to the ciphertext).
Now, we consider the advantage of this constructed adversary AABE playing the
selective IND-CPA game for CP-ABE. Recall that by assumption, AeVSE has
a non-negligible advantage δ in distinguishing between Game 0 and Game 1,
that is:
|P(1← ExpGame 0AeVSE [eVSE , X])− P(1← ExpGame 1AeVSE [eVSE , X])| > δ,
The probability of AABE guessing ci correctly is:
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P(c′i = ci) = P(ti = ci)P(c′i = ci|ti = ci) + P(ti 6= ci)P(c′i = ci|ti 6= ci)
=
1
2
P(g(Yi) = g(mti)|ti = ci) +
1
2
P(g(Yi) 6= g(mti)|ti 6= ci)
=
1
2
P(1← ExpGame 0AeVSE [eVSE , X]) +
1
2
(1− P(g(Yi) = g(mti)|ti 6= ci))
=
1
2
P(1← ExpGame 0AeVSE [eVSE , X]) +
1
2
(
1− P(1← ExpGame 1AeVSE [eVSE , X])
)
=
1
2
(
P(1← ExpGame 0AeVSE [eVSE , X])− P(1← ExpGame 1AeVSE [eVSE , X]) + 1
)
> 1
2
(δ + 1)
Hence,
AdvAABE >
∣∣∣∣P(ci = c′i)− 12
∣∣∣∣
>
∣∣∣∣12(δ + 1)− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
2
14. Overall the above is done for all i ∈ [|Q∗|] and therefore we have n·AdvAABE > n· δ2 .
Hence, if AeVSE has advantage δ at distinguishing these games then AABE can
win the selective IND-CPA game for CP-ABE with non-negligible probability. Thus
since we assumed the CP-ABE scheme to be secure, we conclude that AeVSE cannot
distinguish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible probability.
Game 1 to Game 2. The transition from Game 1 to Game 2 is simply to set the
value of m′i to no longer be random but instead to correspond to the challenge w in the
one-way function inversion game. The game basically formalizes that it is infeasible for
any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to invert the one-way function g, i.e. to
find a pre-image of a given value z. We argue that the adversary has no distinguishing
advantage between these games since the new value is independent of anything else
in the system bar the verification key g(w) and hence looks random to an adversary
with no additional information (in particular, AeVSE does not see the challenge for the
one-way function as this is played between C and AABE).
Final Proof. We now show that using AeVSE in Game 2, AABE can invert the one-
way function g. That is, given a challenge z = g(w) we can recover w. (The following
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can be done analogous for all i ∈ [|Q∗|].) Specifically wlog, during Query, we choose
the plaintexts as follows:
• if Q∗(ID∗) = 1, we implicitly set m1−bi to be w and set the verification key
component V K1−bi = z. We choose mbi and V Kbi randomly as usual.
• if Q∗(ID∗) = 0, we implicitly set mbi to be w and set the verification key compo-
nent V Kbi = z. We choose m1−bi and V K1−bi randomly as usual.
Now, since AeVSE is assumed to be successful, it will output a forgery comprising the
plaintext encrypted under the unsatisfied query (Q∗ or Q∗). By construction, this will
be w (and the adversary’s view is consistent since the verification key is simulated
correctly using z). AABE can therefore forward this result to C in order to invert the
one-way function with the same non-negligible probability that AeVSE has against the
public verifiability game.
We conclude that if the CPABE scheme is selectively IND-CPA secure and the one-
way function is hard-to-invert, then eVSE as defined by Algorithms 5.1–5.8 is secure in
the sense of selective Public Verifiability.
5.4.2 Index privacy
Lemma 5.4.2. eVSE as defined in Algorithms 5.1–5.8 is secure against Index Privacy
(Game 5.2) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 5.3.1.
Proof. Suppose AeVSE is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the Index
Privacy game (Game 5.2) when instantiated with Algorithms 5.1–5.8. We begin by
defining the following two games:
• Game 0: Fix an adversary AeVSE we define Game 0 to be the selective Index
Privacy game as defined in Game 5.2.
• Game 1: This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that we use a
random permutation in Algorithm 5.1 to construct Ω˜. We re-label Ω˜ as Ω˜′ to
differentiate it from the Ω˜ generated using a PRP in Game 0. This means that
in Game 1, PP will contain a randomly permuted set Ω˜′ instead of one generated
using a PRP, as in Game 0.
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective
Index Privacy game can be used to construct an adversary ASKE which may break
the IND-CPA security (Definition 2.6.3) of a symmetric key encryption scheme SKE
= (SKE.KeyGen, SKE.Encrypt,SKE.Decrypt).
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Game 0 to Game 1. The PRP-assumption [22] is formulated as follows. Let D be
a distinguisher algorithm that takes as input a permutation ( which is either pseudo-
random or truly random) and outputs a bit, b. In the following, let Π be a random
permutation, Π′ be a PRP and S be a set. We define the PRP-advantage of D to be:
∣∣P[S˜ $← Π(S) : D(S˜) = 1]− P[S˜ ← Π′(S) : D(S˜) = 1]∣∣.
The PRP-assumption states that for any efficient algorithm D, the PRP-advantage
is negligible.
• Fix an adversary AeVSE that is able to distinguish between Game 0 and Game
1 with non-negligible advantage δ. That is, AeVSE’s probability of success in one
game is non-negligibly different to their probability of success in the other game
(suppose the probability of success in Game 0 is higher than that of Game 1,
without loss of generality). We can build a distinguisher D that is able to distin-
guish whether a permutation is either truly random or pseudorandom with non-
negligible probability, by using AeVSE as a subroutine (hence has non-negligible
PRP-advantage), leading to a contradiction.
• Given a permutation pi, D instantiates AeVSE in Game 5.2 using pi to permute
the universe of attributes instead of Π. Note that if pi is a PRP then AeVSE is
acting in Game 0 and if pi is a truly random permutation then AeVSE is acting
in Game 1.
• AeVSE outputs a bit b′ at the end of their game.
• If AeVSE wins their game then D outputs 1, indicating that they believe pi is a
PRP and 0 otherwise.
• D will be able to distinguish pi with exactly AeVSE’s (non-negligible) advantage, δ
contradicting the PRP-assumption. Thus we conclude that AeVSE cannot distin-
guish Game 0 from Game 1 with non-negligible probability. Hence we continue
the proof using Game 1 and assume that AeVSE can only gain at most an extra
negligible advantage γ from hopping from Game 0 to Game 1.
Reduction to IND-CPA. Now let AeVSE be an adversary with non-negligible ad-
vantage δ against Game 1. We now show that using AeVSE as a subroutine in Game 1,
ASKE is able to break the IND-CPA security of SKE. That is, given a challenge ci-
phertext c which is an encryption mb where b
$← {0, 1}, ASKE can distinguish whether
c is an encryption of m0 or m1.
116
5.4. Proofs of Security
Fix an adversary AeVSE that is able to break the index privacy of eVSE with non-
negligible advantage γ. Let C be the challenger forASKE in the proof, ASKE will act as
the challenger for AeVSE.
1. AeVSE chooses their challenge sets: D0 = (d0,1, d0,2, ..., d0,q) andD1 = (d1,1, d1,2, ..., d1,q) ⊆
U such that |D0| = |D1|. Note that a rational adversary will always choose
D0 6= D1 i.e. D0 and D1 differ by at least one element. AeVSE submits these
challenge sets to ASKE.
2. The challenger C chooses a bit b $← {0, 1}.
3. KeyGen is run between C and ASKE:
• ASKE generates the secret key for the broadcast encryption scheme BE =
(BE.KeyGen,BE.Encrypt,BE.Add,BE.Decrypt):
kBE ← BE.KeyGen(1κ, |U|),
which is retained by ASKE and shared with C.
• C generates the secret key for the symmetric encryption scheme SKE =
(SKE.KeyGen, SKE.Encrypt,SKE.Decrypt):
kSKE ← SKE.KeyGen(1κ),
which is retained by C.
• C provides ASKE with access to the following oracles SKE.Encrypt(·, k):
which takes as input a plaintext m and returns its symmetric encryption
under kSKE and LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) which takes as input two plaintexts m0,m1
and a bit b and outputs the symmetric encryption of mb under kSKE.
• For all d0,j 6= d1,j , ASKE submits the pair (d0,j , d1,j) (where such pairs exist
as the challenge sets are not equal) to LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) and receives challenge
ciphertexts, cj , in return.
• These challenge ciphertexts are included in Ω′. To compute the rest of
Ω′ ASKE submits every other pair (d0,i, d1,i) ∈ {D0,D1} : d0,i = d1,i, to
SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE) and includes the output in Ω′. To ensure Ω′ con-
tains an encryption of each attribute in Ω, ASKE submits the remaining
attributes of Ω: an /∈ (D0 ∪D1) to SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE) and includes the
output in Ω′. Ω′ now contains an encryption of every element in Ω. To map
elements from Ω to Ω′ (which is required to run Encode), every attribute
117
5.4. Proofs of Security
in Ω needs to have a corresponding ciphertext in Ω′ which is defined as fol-
lows: for each pair of attributes that were submitted to LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) we
let the output denote the corresponding element in Ω′ for the attribute on
the left hand side of the submitted pair. For all attributes in Ω submitted
to SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE) the output is the corresponding element in Ω′
for that attribute. This defines a bijective mapping of attributes in Ω to
elements in Ω′ as required.
• ASKE defines the set Ω˜ ← Π(Ω′), where Π is a random permutation and
runs:
(kABE, PPABE)← ABE.KeyGen(1κ, Ω˜).
• ASKE chooses the data owner state uniformly at random: stO $← {0, 1}κ and
then generates the first part of the sever key:
kS
$← BE.Add(kBE, S).
• The authorised user group G is initialised as the set containing the server
identity and the server state, stS is generated:
stS
$← BE.Encrypt(stO,G, kBE).
• The server key is set as KS = (ks, stS), and given to AeVSE.
• ASKE retains kABE, kBE and stO and sets PP = (PPABE, PPBE, Ω˜) which is
given to AeVSE.
4. The challenge bit for AeVSE, bˆ, is set to b.
5. ASKE creates a pre-index δ(Db) to encode into the challenge index for AeVSE. This
is done using Encode, which takes as input the elements from the challenge set Db
and maps them to elements in Ω′. Due to the way the mapping is defined using
LR(·, ·, kSKE, b), this will produce a preindex containing encryptions of elements
from the challenge set Db. If b = 0 then LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) would have been used for
encryption hence the attributes in D0 would have been encrypted and be included
in the preindex, wheres if b = 1 then LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) would have been used for
encryption hence the attributes in D1 would have been encrypted and be included
in the preindex.
6. ASKE runs BuildIndex using the pre-index created in step 5 to create the challenge
index IDb for AeVSE. Note that although BuildIndex takes KO as input, it does
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not require kSKE or Π. The only part of KO that is required is kABE which is
generated and retained by ASKE in step 3.
7. ASKE choses a user from the userspace and authorises the user identity by running
AddUser. They then generate a series of queries that produce the same results
when evaluated over the challenge index and return these queries to AeVSE.
8. AeVSE is given oracle access to BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ), Search(·, ·,KS , PP ),
Verify(·, ·, PP ) and Retrieve(·, ·, ·, PP ). To query BuildIndex AeVSE sub-
mits a set of attributes (with the restriction that no attributes from either chal-
lenge set are used) to ASKE. ASKE responds to BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ) queries
using Encode to produce the pre-index from the set of attributes then runs
ABE.KeyGen to produce the relevant index. To query Search(·, ·,KS , PP ) AeVSE
submits their challenge index IDb and QTQ to ASKE which runs Search using these
values along with KS and PP to produce search results R which are returned to
AeVSE. To allow verification of search results AeVSE can query Verify(·, ·, PP )
which is run by ASKE. AeVSE submits the result R along with the verification
token V KQ to ASKE which runs Algorithm 5.6 and returns RTQ to AeVSE. Calls
to Retrieve(·, ·, ·, PP ) are answered by ASKE by running Algorithm 5.7 and
returning the output to AeVSE.
9. AeVSE outputs their guess bˆ′ for bˆ.
10. AIND-CPA outputs their guess b′ = bˆ′ as their guess for b.
11. As we have assumed that AeVSE has a non-negligible advantage, δ, in the Index
Privacy game:
AdvAeVSE = δ,
we have that:
P[bˆ′ = bˆ] = δ +
1
2
.
Using these assumptions we now calculate the advantage of ASKE against the
challenger, C, in their game. We start by calculating the probability of ASKE
winning their game, P[b′ = b], as follows:
P[b′ = b] = P[b′ = b|bˆ′ = bˆ]P[bˆ′ = bˆ] + P[b′ = b|bˆ′ 6= bˆ]P[bˆ′ 6= bˆ]
= 1 · P[bˆ′ = bˆ] + 0 · P[bˆ′ 6= bˆ]
= δ +
1
2
.
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Hence,
AdvASKE =
∣∣∣∣P[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(δ + 12)− 12
∣∣∣∣
= δ
As we fixed δ to be non-negligible we have that the advantage of ASKE is also non-
negligible which contradicts the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption
scheme SKE. We conclude that if the symmetric encryption scheme SKE is IND-
CPA secure then eVSE as defined in Algorithms 5.1-5.8 is secure in the sense of
Index Privacy.
5.4.3 Query privacy
Lemma 5.4.3. eVSE as defined in Algorithms 5.1–5.8 is secure against Query Privacy
(Game 5.3) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 5.3.1.
Proof. Suppose AeVSE is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the Query
Privacy game (Game 5.3) when instantiated with Algorithms 5.1–5.8. We begin by
defining two games:
• Game 0: This is the selective Query Privacy game as defined in Game 5.2.
• Game 1: This is the same as Game 0 with the modification that we use a
pseudorandom permutation in Algorithm 5.1 to construct Ω˜.
We show that an adversary with non-negligible advantage against the selective
Query Privacy game can be used to construct an adversary, ASKE, which may break
the IND-CPA security of a symmetric key encryption scheme SKE = (SKE.KeyGen,
SKE.Encrypt, SKE.Decrypt).
Game 0 to Game 1. See Game 0 to Game 1 in proof of Lemma 5.4.2 for details.
Reduction to IND-CPA. We now show that using AeVSE in Game 1, ASKE can
break the IND-CPA security of a symmetric key encryption scheme SKE. That is,
given a challenge ciphertext c which is an encryption mb where b
$← {0, 1}, ASKE can
distinguish whether c is an encryption of m0 or m1.
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This proof follows in the spirit of the proof of Lemma 5.4.2. Let C be the challenger
for ASKE and ASKE will act as the challenger for AeVSE.
1. AeVSE chooses their challenge queries: Q0, Q1 with the restriction that all gates
match in both queries (the gates are denoted byGQ0 forQ0 andGQ1 forQ1). Note
that a rational adversary will always choose queries where the input attributes
differ in at least one position. We denote the sets of attributes contained in the
queries as (q0,1, q0,2, ..., q0,t), (q1,1, q1,2, ..., q1,t) ⊆ Ω for Q0 and Q1 respectively
(note that if all the (binary) gates in each query match the two sets of attributes
will be the same size). AeVSE submits Q0 and Q1 to ASKE.
2. The challenger C chooses a bit b $← {0, 1}.
3. KeyGen is run between C and ASKE:
• ASKE generates the secret key for the broadcast encryption scheme BE =
(BE.KeyGen,BE.Encrypt,BE.Add,BE.Decrypt):
kBE ← BE.KeyGen(1κ, |U|).
• C generates the secret key for the symmetric encryption scheme SKE:
kSKE ← SKE.KeyGen(1κ).
• C provides ASKE with access to the following oracles SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE):
which takes as input a plaintext m and returns its symmetric encryption
under kSKE and LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) which takes as input two plaintexts m0,m1
and a bit b and outputs the symmetric encryption of mb under kSKE.
• For all d0,j 6= d1,j , ASKE submits the pair (d0,j , d1,j) (where such pairs exist
as the challenge sets are not equal) to LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) and receives challenge
ciphertexts, cj , in return.
• ASKE now computes Ω′. For every pair (q0,i, q1,i) : q0,i 6= q1,i, ASKE submits
the pairs (q0,i, q1,i) and (q1,i, q0,i) to LR(·, ·, kSKE, b). For all other pairs
(q0,t, q1,t) we have that q0,t = q1,t, hence ASKE submits q0,t to
SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE) and includes the output in Ω′. To ensure Ω′ contains
an encryption of each attribute in Ω, ASKE submits the remaining attributes
of Ω: an /∈ (Q0 ∪Q1) to SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE) and includes the output in
Ω′. Ω′ now contains an encryption of every element in Ω. In order to map
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elements from Ω to Ω′ (which is required to run Encode), every attribute
in Ω needs to have a corresponding ciphertext in Ω′ which is defined as
follows: for each pair of attibutes that were submitted to LR(·, ·, kSKE, b) we
let the output denote the corresponding element in Ω′ for the attribute on
the left hand side of the submitted pair. For all attributes in Ω submitted
to SKE.Encrypt(·, kSKE) the output is the corresponding element in Ω′
for that attribute. This defines a bijective mapping of attributes in Ω to
elements in Ω′ as required.
• ASKE defines the set Ω˜← Π(Ω′), where Π is a pseudorandom function, and
runs:
(kABE, PPABE)← ABE.KeyGen(1κ, Ω˜).
• ASKE selects the data owner state: stO $← {0, 1}κ and then runs:
kS
$← BE.Add(kBE, S),
to produce the first part of the server key.
• The authorised user group is initialised as: G ← {S}.
• ASKE generates the server state by encrypting the data owner state using
the BE scheme:
stS
$← BE.Encrypt(stO,G, kBE).
• The public parameters are set to: PP = (PPABE, PPBE, Ω˜) and the server
key is set to KS = (kS , stS). These are both given to AeVSE.
4. A user, u, is selected at random by ASKE and enrolled as an authorised user:
ku
$← BE.Add(kBE, u).
5. The challenge bit for AeVSE, bˆ, is set to b.
6. ASKE creates a pre-query Q˜b to encode into the challenge query for AeVSE. This
is done using Encode, which takes as input the elements from set of attributes
corresponding to the challenge query Qb and maps them to elements in Ω
′. Due
to the way the mapping is defined using LR(·, ·, kSKE, b), this will produce a pre-
query containing encryptions of attributes corresponding to the challenge query
Qb. If b = 0 then then LR(·, ·, kSKE, 0) would have been used for encryption hence
the attributes in Q0 would have been encrypted and be included in the pre-query,
wheres if b = 1 then LR(·, ·, kSKE, 1) would have been used for encryption hence
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the attributes corresponding to Q1 would have been encrypted and be included
in the pre-query.
7. ASKE runs Query using the pre-query created in step 4 to create the challenge
query (QTQb , V KQb , RKQb) for AeVSE.
8. AeVSE is given oracle access to BuildIndex(·,MK,PP), Search(·, ·, ·, PP ),
Verify(·, ·, ·, ·, PP ) andRetrieve(·, ·, ·, PP ). To queryBuildIndex(·,MK,PP),
AeVSE submits a set of attributes to ASKE (with the restriction that the search
results produced when searching the corresponding index cannot be used to dis-
tinguish the two challenge sets, i.e. the search results have to be the same).
ASKE responds to BuildIndex queries using Encode to produce the pre-query
from the set of attributes then runs BuildIndex to produce the relevant index.
ASKE responds to queries to Search,Verify,Retrieve by running the rele-
vant algorithms using the adversary’s input.
9. AeVSE outputs their guess bˆ′ for bˆ.
10. ASKE outputs their guess b′ = bˆ′ as it’s guess for b.
11. As we have assumed that AeVSE has a non-negligible advantage, δ, in the Query
Privacy game:
AdvAeVSE = δ,
we have that:
P[bˆ′ = bˆ] = δ +
1
2
.
Using these assumptions we now calculate the advantage of ASKE against the
challenger, C, in their game. We start by calculating the probability of ASKE
winning their game, P[b′ = b], as follows:
P[b′ = b] = P[b′ = b|bˆ′ = bˆ]P[bˆ′ = bˆ] + P[b′ = b|bˆ′ 6= bˆ]P[bˆ′ 6= bˆ]
= 1 · P[bˆ′ = bˆ] + 0 · P[bˆ′ 6= bˆ]
= δ +
1
2
.
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Hence,
AdvASKE =
∣∣∣∣P[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(δ + 12)− 12
∣∣∣∣
= δ
As we fixed δ to be non-negligible we have that the advantage of ASKE is also
non-negligible which contradicts the security of the IND-CPA security of the
symmetric encryption scheme SKE. We conclude that if the symmetric encryption
scheme SKE is IND-CPA secure then eVSE as defined in Algorithms 5.1-5.8 is
secure in the sense of Query Privacy.
5.5 Summary
Our scheme extends the expressiveness of queries that can be achieved in VSE. No
other VSE schemes to our knowledge are able to perform the range of search queries
or include negation of keywords in their search queries. Additionally our scheme leaks
neither the access nor the search pattern to the server whilst executing a search. Our
combination of search queries with computational queries is also a novel functionality
in the field of VSE.
The search time, and size of the queries and search results are linear in n (the
number of data items stored on the remote server). Due to this eVSE may be more
suited to smaller databases to prevent these features from being prohibitively expensive.
The VSE scheme of [44] has a search time that is linear in the number of letters in
the queried keyword (which is usually much smaller than n). This faster search is
achieved using a tree-based index, however only a single keyword equality search can
be performed. Another scheme that uses ABE primitives in the construction, as we
do, is that of [137]. This scheme is able to achieve multi-level access, where users can
be restricted to searching only certain parts of the database. Keywords are grouped
with respect to their access control policies, and the search time is linear in the number
of groups. However, this scheme also only achieves a single keyword equality search.
The scheme of Wang et al. [132] achieves verifiable fuzzy keyword search with a search
time that is linear in the size of the fuzzy keyword set (which varies depending on the
level of fuzziness required i.e. searching for data items that contain keywords of edit
distance two will require a larger fuzzy keyword set than searching for keywords with
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an edit distance of one from the queried keyword [97]). The scheme by Kurosawa et al.
[94] uses an SSE scheme along with a MAC on the search results to achieve verification
and adding a new data item requires time linear in the number of keywords associated
with the new data item. In [127], a scheme by Stefanov et al., adding a new data
item takes time O(log2N) and this scheme, similarly to [94], also uses a MAC to verify
the search results. Both [94, 127] only achieve single keyword equality search in the
symmetric key setting. A dynamic scheme that can support conjunctive queries (the
most expressive query type of all the dynamic schemes in Table 5.3) is that of [128]
which is constructed using public key primitives, namely ABE, to create the indexes.
Each user in the system has a separate public key to create their indexes which can be
added to the server at anytime. This scheme uses a combination of Bloom filters and
signatures to achieve verifiability of search results. Cheng et al. [51] construct a VSSE
from indistinguishability obfuscation that can handle boolean and conjunctive queries.
Their scheme is able to achieve public verifiability by implementing a specific public
verification circuit.
In terms of the number of rounds of communication required per search, our scheme
is optimal requiring only one round of communication. The size of the search results
in our scheme is also linear in n. Most VSE schemes in the literature return results
of a size that is linear in the number of data items that match the query, however
this method leaks the access pattern which in turn may leak information about the
query. Our scheme hides the access pattern as all search results are of the same form,
regardless of what query was submitted.
In terms of security, as illustrated in our security games, our scheme achieves public
verifiability, index privacy and query privacy (in terms of the keywords searched for),
which is comparable to other VSE schemes that have been discussed. Overall, our
scheme sacrifices efficiency when compared to existing VSE schemes, but gains much
increased functionality and query expressiveness. Furthermore, our scheme currently
only supports static data and future work will be needed to extend our scheme to
support a dynamic data set as in the schemes in [94, 127, 128].
Table 5.3 gives a brief comparison between our scheme and those in the literature
as discussed above and throughout the chapter. The abbreviation AP stands for access
pattern and SP stands for search pattern.
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Table 5.3: Comparison of Verifiable Searchable Encryption Schemes
Scheme Data type Query type Publicly
Verifiable
Leakage Computations
[130] Static Ranked equality No AP,SP No
[94] Dynamic Equality No AP No
[128] Static Conjunctive, Disjunctive No AP No
[129] Dynamic Equality No AP No
[127] Dynamic Equality No AP, SP No
[137] Static Equality No AP No
[131] Static Fuzzy No AP, SP No
[65] Static Semantic No AP, SP No
[44] Static Equality No AP, SP No
[51] Static Conjunctive Yes AP, SP No
Our
scheme
Conjunctive, Disjunctive,
Static Arbitrary CNF/DNF Yes None Yes
formulae, NC1
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6.1. Introduction
In this chapter we extend the paradigm of searchable symmetric encryption
to support multiple users with different access levels. We call this multi-level
access. We look at general methods that can take any single-user search-
able symmetric encryption scheme as a black box and extend it to support
multi-level access as well as a specific searchable symmetric scheme that
supports multi-level access. The results of this chapter have appeared in the
proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2017.
6.1 Introduction
Many searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes, single user and multi-user, in
the literature only consider the scenario where a querier is either authorised to search
over the entirety of the encrypted data or not at all [33, 39, 55, 126], in which case
(ideally) the querier should learn nothing about the outsourced data. In practice,
however, outsourced data sets could be large and the access control requirements of such
data sets are likely to be more fine-grained than the binary ‘all or nothing’ approach
above; hence existing schemes do not suffice.
We study the problem of enforcing a multi-level access control policy (MLA), or
information flow policy, in the context of searchable symmetric encryption, where the
data items are classified at different levels (which may or may not be hierarchal) and
users are assigned access rights corresponding to the data items they are authorised to
view. A notable example of this type of data classification is government data. In the
UK the government uses three levels of classification for its data: official, secret and
top secret [110]. Employees are assigned an access level that determines which data
items they are authorised to view. In our model, a user with ‘secret’ clearance, should
be unable to learn any information about data items classified as ‘top secret’, such as
whether they contain searched keywords or not. This is an example of an information
flow policy with a total order of security labels [18]. The SE model in Section 3.1 needs
to be adapted so that users can only receive search results corresponding to encrypted
data items that they are authorised to view, to prevent any leakage of information
to unauthorised users. We provide a rigorous definitional framework for Multi-level
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (MLSSE), introduce appropriate security notions
and present several generic solutions to MLSSE using SSE as a black box as well as a
provably secure construction.
We focus on SKE solutions to MLA in SE to produce schemes that are easy to
deploy and efficient to use in real world scenarios. This branch of SE with access
control has, up to now, received little to no attention in the literature.
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6.1.1 Related work
Kissel et al. [92] present a scheme supporting multiple groups of users searching over
encrypted data where each group has a specified dictionary of keywords they are allowed
to search over. These groups are arranged hierarchically so that users at one level in
the hierarchy are able to search for all keywords in dictionaries assigned to groups at
lower levels in the hierarchy. Although this scheme presents a form of hierarchal access
in SSE, the user is still able to search over the entire data set. In most access control
scenarios, we are concerned with protecting a data item (i.e. the complete content
of a data item), not just a single keyword describing the data item. Furthermore,
we believe that expressing an access control policy in terms of authorised keywords
can potentially be difficult to administer correctly. Sensitive data items may well gain
their classification level due to semantic meaning regarding their contents (for example,
the subject to which they pertain), which may not trivially be captured through the
associated keywords. For example, consider two data items that contain information
about company spending; one data item contains a public report of company-wide
spending, whilst the other pertains specifically to the research department. Clearly,
both data items may be labelled by a keyword such as ‘finance’, but detailed knowledge
of the research spending alone may be more sensitive than a generalised report of
the entire company. Thus, simply authorising users to search for keywords, such as
‘finance’, does not suffice in this instance as not all users that can search the public
report should be able to view the specific report. The access control policy in this
case must be managed carefully — perhaps additional, more granular, keywords must
be defined e.g. ‘finance-public’ (leading to an increase in the size of the searchable
encryption index and a subsequent loss of efficiency) or a (less efficient) SE scheme
that supports ‘conjunctive keyword-only access control’ would be required such that
one can be authorised to search for (‘finance’ AND ‘public’) and only data items with
both keywords would be returned. In this work, we consider the problem of fine-grained
classification of data items directly and gain a more efficient solution.
There are solutions to multi-level access (MLA) in the area of PKE. In particular
functional encryption, has been used to achieve MLA in SE [25, 83, 99, 136]. PKE, in
general, is computationally more intensive and harder to implement than SKE which
is often built using much simpler operations, perhaps making PKE less suitable for
systems required for real world deployment.
The notion of multi-user SSE was introduced by Curtmola et al. [55]. In this work
they combine a single-user SSE scheme with a broadcast encryption scheme that is
used to add and revoke users in the system. They define the security of their multi-
user SSE scheme similarly to that of the single-user SSE scheme with the additional
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security notion of revocation, which requires that a revoked user is no longer able to
perform searches on the index stored on the server. In order to produce a search
query a user needs to be authorised by the data owner. This is done by adding the
user to an authorised user set. Initially a random value is chosen by the data owner,
which is referred to as the data owner state. This value is then encrypted using the
broadcast encryption scheme, so that only the authorized users are able to decrypt it,
and broadcast to all users. The data owner state is then used as a key for a PRP that
is applied to the search query before it is sent to the server. During the search phase
the server checks if the search query was correctly formed by applying the inverse of
the PRP. If it is not, then the server outputs a failure symbol ⊥ and the search is not
performed. As only authorised users have access to the data owner state this means
that only authorised users are able to form valid search queries. Each time a user is
revoked the data owner state is renewed and re-encrypted according to the updated
authorised user set. The access control to the data in this scheme is very coarse grained,
meaning either a user is authorised to search over all of the index or none at all.
Work by Yang [135] introduce the concept of query accountability within multi-user
SSE, by issuing a unique query key to each authorised user. For each of these unique
query keys the server holds a corresponding helper key which is related to the user’s
query key: the helper key is a group element g whose exponent contains the inverse of
the user’s query key. Their scheme uses bilinear maps to mask information in the index
and compute the search. The index entries and queries are constructed in such a way
that when the search query is combined with the helper key we get a cancellation in
the exponent of a bilinear map and can use the hash of the resulting group element to
check whether a particular index entry contains the keyword associated with the search
query. The major drawback of this scheme is that each data item is only indexed by
one searchable keyword, which does not support a very fine grained search. In order to
retrieve relevant search results using only one keyword in the index for each data item
may require the user to know some information a priori regarding the data set. This
might not be realistic in this multi-user scenario (Scenario 3) as the users searching
the data items do not own the data. An extension to the main scheme is detailed that
permits a form of multi-level access where each user is granted a set of keywords they are
authorised to search for. This is different to our definition of multi-level access where
a user’s search is restricted to the set of data items that they are authorized to view.
Only restricting the set of keywords a user is authorised to search for still permits the
user to search all the data items. The scheme of [15], which the scheme of [135] is based
on, supports users writing data to the server as well as just reading it (Scenario 4). The
revocation of users in both [15] and [135] is accomplished by instructing the server to
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delete the helper key that they posses for the revoked user. This method of revocation
relies on the server being at most honest-but-curious (Definition 3.3.1) in order to
guarantee that the helper keys are actually erased by the server. A scheme by Kissel
et al. [92] also achieves a form of multi-level search by restricting the set of keywords
that a user can search for similarly to [135]. This scheme uses key regression [64] and
broadcast encryption to add and revoke users from the system. The data owner state
as described above in relation to [55] is produced using the key regression scheme and
renewed using the same process when a new user is enrolled or revoked. The new
values are distributed to the users using a broadcast channel. In terms of revocation
the security notion guarantees that revoked users are not able to issue successful queries
after they are revoked, as in [55].
A paper by Cao et al. [40] presents a multi-user scheme where the users can perform
ranked searches, where the search results are ranked by the server according to their
relevance to the search query. They do not explicitly detail the user addition and
revocation procedures but state that they use broadcast encryption to achieve these
tasks as in [55].
There are a few solutions to multi-level search in the public key setting where users
are able to both read and write data (Scenario 4). Hattori et al. [75] present a scheme
which supports a hierarchy of users that can perform conjunctive keyword searches on
the index. They define the new notion of ciphertext-policy hidden vector encryption
(CP-HVE). Hidden vector encryption (HVE) was previously only defined in the key
policy setting (KP-HVE) where a secret key is associated with a vector that defines
a policy and a ciphertext associated with a vector of attributes. It was first defined
for searchable encryption by Katz et al. in their seminal paper [89]. The secret keys
that define policies are used as search tokens and the index entries are ciphertexts
associated with a vector of attributes, this method of SE is known as predicate-based
encryption (Definition 2.3.7). It is very similar to the notion of ABE (Definition 2.3.5)
which associates a ciphertext with a policy and a secret key with attributes but PBE
requires that the policies are hidden. The new notion of CP-HVE is the dual concept of
KP-HVE where the secret keys are associated with hidden policies and the ciphertexts
associated with attributes. In this scheme a search result is only returned if the policy
on the ciphertext is fulfilled by the attributes associated with the user that generated
the search query and the keyword(s) in the search query are contained in the data
item. There is no revocation mechanism for users defined in this scheme. The scheme
of [76] presents a public key conjunctive keyword search scheme that supports multiple
users, but also does not consider the revocation of users. An extension is discussed that
allows the data owner to choose which users can search their data items when creating
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an index, however this involves making multiple indexes if the data owner wishes their
data to be searchable by multiple users. It also requires the data owner to know the
public key of each user they wish to authorise.
The majority of multi-level search schemes that support multiple users searching the
data but not writing data (Scenario 3) involve some from of attribute based encryption
(ABE) in the construction. The scheme of [83] is based on the linked list construction of
Curtmola et al. [55], but the concept behind their construction could be applied to most
single user SSE schemes. It is an example of one of our generic solutions to multi-level
search which is defined in Section 6.3.2, and achieves multi-level search by encrypting
the search results with ABE. Usually in an SE scheme, the search results consist of
identifiers of data items that satisfy the search query, the user does not need to process
these search results any further. Encrypting the search results with ABE ensures that
the user can only view search results that they are authorised to by the policy defined
on their ABE secret key. However this scheme reveals the total number of search
results, even when the user is not authorised to decrypt all of them. To prevent this
leakage, they propose another scheme using a trusted third party, another one of our
generic methods outlined in Section 6.3.3, that intercepts the search results and sorts
them according the user’s access rights before sending the final set of search results
to the user. The work of [52] points out the high computational overheads of ABE
and presents a scheme that outsources the key generation and decryption processes
associated with the ABE scheme. A solution that uses the techniques of [52] for multi-
level search in Scenario 3 is that of [62]. To reduce the computational overheads of ABE
in this scheme the data owner and users are able to outsource their ABE computations
to a proxy server. Another extra entity is also introduced into the system model: a
trusted authority (TA) which is used to setup the system and revoke users. The user
revocation mechanism is similar in this scheme to that of [15, 135] as a helper key is
stored on the server for each user. When a user is revoked from the system the TA
instructs the server to delete the relevant helper keys. The search query generation is
a two step process in this scheme as a user needs to send a search query request to the
proxy server before they are able to generate a search query. The search is also a two
step process as the server first verifies that the user’s attribute set associated with the
search query is genuine. The server does this by creating a CP-ABE ciphertext from a
random plaintext m with the policy of the ciphertext being the intersection of all the
users attributes. The user then attempts to decrypt this ciphertext using their secret
key (which is associated with their attributes) and sends the resulting plaintext back to
the server. If this plaintext matches the original plaintext m that the server encrypted
then this verifies that the user does in fact possess the attributes that it claims to have.
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As the attributes in this scheme are not encrypted the server identifies which set of
data items the user is authorised to search and performs the search over those data
items only. The scheme of Ye et al. [98] adds another server into the system model
and considers the additional security notion of a revoked user colluding with one of the
servers. The index is duplicated across the two servers. Each server stores helper keys
similarly to other schemes discussed above, which are then deleted by the servers when
a user is revoked. This scheme provides a verification mechanism for the search which
compares the two sets of search results, if they are equal then the search is verified as
correct and if not then the search results are rejected. The fine-grained access control
is implemented as a threshold check on the users attributes before search. If the user’s
attribute set contains a fixed amount (or greater) of matching attributes to that of the
data item, then they are allowed to search that data item.
6.1.2 Organisation of chapter
In Section 6.2 we outline the notion of SSE along with descriptions of the type of
indexes that are used in SSE and the type of leakage that can occur. In Section 6.3 we
describe some methods of achieving multi-level access using a single-user SSE scheme
as a black box. In Section 6.4 we define the system and security models of our multi-
level SSE scheme, and our construction is defined in Section 6.5. Our security proofs
are given in Section 6.6. We conclude the chapter in Section 6.8 by summarising the
findings of the chapter.
6.2 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
This section gives an overview of Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE). The defini-
tion of SSE can be found in Definition 3.1.1, here we discuss some finer details of SSE
such as the different types of index used and the leakage associated with SSE.
6.2.1 Types of index
There are three main types of index used in SSE schemes in the literature: forward
index, inverted index and tree based index. Each of these types of indexes have advan-
tages and disadvantages and the choice of index will depend on the data that needs
to be indexed e.g. dynamic or static data and any restrictions imposed by the data
owner, such as a fast search time.
1. Forward Index A forward index contains an entry per data item and lists the
set of keywords (or attributes) associated with each data item. It is relatively
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straightforward to accommodate dynamic data sets using a forward index; when
adding an encrypted data item to the server one can just create a new entry in
the index for that data item. Furthermore, deleting or amending a data item
on the server only affects the part of the index associated with that data item
and does not require changes to any other part of the index. The search time
on a forward index will be linear in the number of data items, so this type of
index may not be suitable for large data sets. However, this process could be
parallelized to improve the search time, say we use p processors then the search
time complexity is reduced to O(np ). Some examples of SSE schemes employing
a forward index are [46, 68, 71].
2. Inverted index An inverted index (also referred to as a postings list) contains
an entry per keyword (or attribute) and lists the set of data items that contain
each keyword. An inverted index can produce a search time linear in the number
of data items that match the search query which is optimal since the amount of
work to retrieve the encrypted data items is linear in the number of data items
that match the search query, hence this is the minimal amount of work that needs
to be done. However, these indexes are not so well suited for use with dynamic
data sets as the update process has been shown to be very complex and leak
extra information from the indexes [85]. The scheme of [85] also shows that an
SSE scheme that uses an inverted index may not permit a parallel search. Some
examples of SSE schemes employing an inverted index are [55, 86].
3. Tree-based index In a tree-based index the characters of the keywords in the
data items are inserted into a tree sequentially from root to leaf and the identifiers
for the data items containing that keyword are stored in the leaves of the tree at
the end of this path. A tree-based index provides a sub-linear search time and
can also be parallelized. This type of index can also handle updates efficiently,
however has a higher space complexity then the other two types of index. An
example of SSE schemes employing a tree-based index is [85].
6.2.2 Classifying leakage
Almost all schemes designed for efficient search over encrypted data leak some form
of information from the encrypted data items stored on the server. Until recently the
possible attacks on the queries and the index that could be mounted using the available
leakage in a SE had not been investigated, however there have been several recent papers
that investigate this [41, 59, 79, 102]. Classifying the leakage in SE is an important
feature of the security definition of a SE scheme as it tells the user what information
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will be available to a potential adversary. This will help the user to decide which SE
scheme is most fit for purpose when implementing a scheme. The information leakage
in a SSE scheme can be sorted into four categories, each one relating to a specific phase
in the scheme (the add and delete leakage only corresponds to dynamic SSE schemes):
1. Setup leakage The setup leakage (see Definition 3.2.3) is the information leaked
to the server from the index. This will include information such as the size of the
index. Depending on how the information in the index is encrypted and padded
this information may also include the total number of data items indexed or the
total number of distinct keywords in all the data items.
2. Search leakage The search leakage (see Definition 3.2.4) is the information
leaked as the product of a search query being evaluated over the index. This will
include information such as the access pattern and the search pattern (Defini-
tion 3.2.1 and Definition 3.2.2 respectively).
3. Add leakage This is the information leaked to the server when a new data item
is added to the index. This could include information such as the encryptions
of the keywords contained in the new data item (these are usually deterministic)
and the number of keywords associated with the new data item. If the search is
sequential (as in [86]) then information such as the location of the previous or
next data item in the sequence could be revealed.
4. Delete leakage This is the information leaked to the server when a data item
is deleted from the index. The information here is similar to that leaked when
adding a data item. Note that depending on the type of index then it is possible
to not leak any information when adding or deleting a data item. If you consider
a forward index then you will simply need to add or remove the row in the index
that corresponds to that data item.
6.3 Generic solutions for MLSSE using SSE as a black
box
In this section we describe methods of achieving multi-level access in searchable sym-
metric encryption using any generic single user SSE scheme in a black box manner.
These methods can all be applied to any single user SSE scheme. Whether the scheme
is able to accommodate dynamic data or not will be determined by the underlying SSE
scheme.
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For each method we look at two scenarios: one where the access levels of the data
items are hidden and one where they are not. We analyse the following factors in each
scenario and compare them to those of the underlying SSE scheme:
• How much storage space is needed on the server.
• Time required for index generation and search.
• Computation required for index generation and search.
• Leakage during setup and search.
In terms of leakage, each scheme leaks the access pattern, which is standard in
most SSE schemes. One can assume an IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption scheme
is used to encrypt the data items themselves, so no information is leaked from the
ciphertexts, except their size (the size can also be hidden if required by padding each
ciphertexts to the same size). However, we consider a structure only searchable encryp-
tion scheme, which does not detail the retrieval and decryption of the encrypted data
items. We also assume that in the “non-hidden access levels” method the access levels
of both the user and the data items are revealed to the server. Hence, in relation to
this variant we only discuss the leakages associated with the search pattern and index
information.
6.3.1 Augmented Index
• Non-hidden access levels: Multi-level access can be supported by augmenting
the index in an SSE scheme. Users in each access level will share a secret key that
is used to generate search queries. A separate index, labelled with the relevant
access level will be created for each access level using the associated secret key.
A user can derive their search queries using their secret key and send them to the
server along with their access level to allow the server to determine which index
to search. The data items only need to be encrypted once and stored on the
server, along with the set of indexes. This method relies on the server to enforce
access control, so is only suitable for honest and honest-but-curious adversarial
models.
• Hidden access levels: This works similarly to the non-hidden access levels case,
however this method is only compatible with SSE schemes that use either forward
or inverted indexes. The indexes are generated as above using the relevant secret
keys and concatenated to create the rows of the indexes and then randomly
shuﬄed using a pseudo-random permutation, to create one large index. The data
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items only need to be encrypted once and stored on the server, along with the
(set of) indexes. Each secret key will only be able to produce valid search queries
for the rows of the index that were generated using that secret key (due to the
robustness of the encryption), hence users will only be able to search over and
retrieve search results corresponding to their access level. Due to the permutation
of the rows in the indexes the server will not know whether a row in the index
produced ⊥ in response to the search query not being satisfied or if the search
query was not valid for that row’s access level. This conceals the access level of
the user from the server.
Storage
The storage required for both hidden and non-hidden access level schemes is increased
by a factor of ` (where ` is the number of access levels) compared with the underlying
SSE scheme. If we have hierarchal access levels there will be repetitions in the indexes
(for example if a data item can be viewed by more than one access level, which is
typical in hierarchal access), this will require more entries in the indexes if using forward
indexes that have entries per data item.
Time
The time required for the index generation phase will be greater by a factor of l than
that of the underlying SSE scheme as multiple indexes need to be produced. The search
time for the non-hidden access level method will be the same as that of the underlying
SSE scheme as the server only searches one of the indexes, whereas the hidden access
levels method requires the server to traverse the entirety of the augmented index in
order to compute the complete search, increasing the search time by a factor of `. The
efficiency of this method could be enhanced by searching the index in parallel. If there
were ` processors then the search could be performed in the same time as using one
processor to search one index.
Computation
The computation required for the index generation phase will be greater by a factor of `
than that of the underlying SSE scheme as multiple indexes need to be produced. The
computation required during the search phase in the non-hidden access levels method
will be the same as the underlying SSE scheme as only one index is searched, whereas
the search computation will increase by a factor of ` in the hidden access levels method.
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Leakage
Both methods achieve search pattern privacy across access levels, that is only repeated
queries for a keyword at the same access level is detectable, search queries for the
keyword at a different access level will be indistinguishable. However it might be
possible to link search queries together using the information in the search results. For
example if one set of search results is the subset of another set of search results then
this may indicate that the search queries that generated these search results are for the
same keyword, just at different access levels. There is no additional index information
leakage than that of the underlying SSE scheme. There is no other additional leakage
(other than the assumed leakage as stated at the beginning of the section).
6.3.2 Encrypted/labelled Search Results
• Non-hidden access levels: The scheme is set up analogously to the single user
SSE scheme with one secret key used to create the index and shared between
users. Each identifier in the set of search results is labelled with the relevant
access level. A user submits their access level along with their search query
(computed using the secret key). The server returns only the search results that
satisfy the search query and that the user is authorised to view according to the
labels on the search results. This method requires that the server computes the
results honestly so is only suitable for an honest or honest-but-curious adversarial
model.
• Hidden access levels: The scheme is set up analogously to the single user SSE
scheme in addition to a secret key being generated for each user (not necessarily
distinct). The search results could be encrypted using CP-ABE and each user
would have a CP-ABE secret key corresponding to their access level policy. Al-
ternatively the search results can be encrypted using symmetric encryption with
a different key per access level and a key assignment scheme could also be used so
the user is able to derive all keys at lower access levels to enable them to decrypt
all relevant search results. This could also be done without using a key assign-
ment scheme, however if a search result is viewable by more than one access level
then it would have to be copied and encrypted several times according to the
access levels that are able to access it. The server will return all encrypted search
results that satisfy the user’s search query, however the user will only be able to
decrypt search results corresponding to their access level. This will prevent any
user that is not authorised to view a particular data item from seeing a search
result relating to that data item.
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Storage
The size of the indexes themselves is the same as the underlying SSE scheme however
the data stored in the index might increase in size according to the type of encryption
used.
Time
In the hidden access levels method more time will be required by the data owner to
encrypt the search results and the search becomes a two step process for the user as
they need to decrypt the search results they receive from the server.
Computation
There will be extra computation needed in order to encrypt and label the search results
when compared with the costs of the underlying SSE scheme. In the case of hidden
access levels, the user will also be required to decrypt the search results, which increases
the computation required. If a key assignment scheme is used a user will be require to
derive additional decryption keys from their own secret key in order to be able to view
all relevant search results.
Leakage
In the hidden access levels method there is index information leakage as the server and
the user see a full set of encrypted search results (as opposed to only seeing results cor-
responding to the user’s access level). If the sets of encrypted search results are padded
to be of equal size then a user will not be able to tell whether any results they cannot
decrypt are beyond their access level or just padding. This requires extra computation
in the index generation phase and higher communication costs when transferring the
search results to the user, but will leak less information to the user regarding the size
of the search results they are unauthorised to view. In the non-hidden access levels
method there is also index information leakage as the server sees a full set of search
results. The search pattern is revealed to the server in both cases.
6.3.3 Using a trusted third party (TTP)
• Non-hidden access levels: The sorting of the search results is done by the
TTP (see the hidden access levels method) hence there is no benefit to revealing
the access levels to the server.
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• Hidden access levels: This is set up in the same way as the single user SSE
scheme with the exception of a TTP that intercepts the search query and the
search results between the user and the server. The secret key used to generate
the index is distributed to each user and used to generate the search tokens. A
user submits their search queries along with their access level to the TTP who
keeps the access level information and transfers the search query to the server.
The server computes the search results as per the single user SSE scheme and
then sends the results to the TTP. The TTP holds information regarding the
access levels of the search results and sorts them according to the user’s access
level. All search results that the user is authorised to view are then returned to
the user.
Storage
No extra storage on the server is needed.
Time
The search time for the user will increase as the results need to filtered by the TTP
before they can be returned to the user. Setting up the TTP will require extra time
when initialising the scheme.
Computation
No extra computation is required for the data owner or server. Extra computation will
be required to set up and maintain the TTP.
Leakage
There is index information leakage in the hidden access levels method as a full set of
search results will be revealed to the server. The access levels and full search results
are revealed to the TTP, however this entity is assumed to be fully trusted. The search
pattern is also revealed to the server and the TTP.
6.3.4 Expanding the Keyword Dictionary
• Non-hidden access levels: The method described below, in the hidden access
levels method, of incorporating the access level into the keywords themselves
conceals the access level, hence this does not apply to the non-hidden access level
setting.
140
6.3. Generic solutions for MLSSE using SSE as a black box
• Hidden access levels: The set of keywords that can be queried over (keyword
dictionary) in a single user SSE can be expanded to include a codeword per access
level for each distinct keyword in the original dictionary. This could be done by
concatenating the access level to the keyword and using this codeword in the
search query, for example. The access level would form part of the user’s secret
key which would prevent users from searching at access levels other than their
own. The index will contain the relevant codewords depending on the data item’s
access level, hence a data item will only satisfy a search query if the access level
and the keyword match those of the search query. The search queries and index
are generated using the same secret key which is distributed to all users. Each
user also receives an access level which they can use to generate the codewords
to compute the search queries, this should be kept secret to each user.
Storage
If a data item can be accessed by several access levels then the number of keywords
used to index that data item will be increased by a factor of l, hence more storage will
be required for the index on the server compared with the single user SSE scheme. If
using an inverted index the index will have more entries as this type of index has an
entry per keyword.
Time
The search time will not be affected by using more keywords, however the time needed
to generate the index will increase by a factor of l.
Computation
Additional computation is needed to create the index due to the additional keywords
that need to be indexed. The user will be required to compute the codeword for each
search query by concatenating their access level with the search keyword before creating
the search query.
Leakage
This method will achieve search pattern privacy between access levels as search queries
for the same keyword at different access levels will be indistinguishable. However as
in Section 6.3.1 the search results may reveal which search queries correspond to the
same keyword. There is no other additional leakage.
141
6.4. Multi-level Searchable Symmetric Encryption
6.4 Multi-level Searchable Symmetric Encryption
In this section we describe our system model and give a formal definition for MLSSE.
Our new construction is based on the ground-breaking work of Curtmola et al. [55] that
uses linked lists to store the identifiers of the data items in an array. Our scheme does
not use an SSE scheme as a black box as in the generic solutions of Section 6.3. The
index in this construction is an inverted index as it stores a linked list per keyword.
Each linked list stores the identifiers of all data items that contain a specific keyword
in an array where each node contains an identifier, a pointer to the next node in the
linked list and a key that is used to decrypt the next node in the list. The server uses
the search query along with a lookup table to locate the starting node of the linked list
in the array and the key used to decrypt this node. This construction lends itself well to
the multi-level access setting as the array does not need to be augmented. There only
needs to be one linked list per keyword, as in the single user scenario, however during
a search the lookup table points the server to the node in the linked list depending on
the access level of the user that submitted the search query. For example a user at a
higher access level will be pointed to a node nearer the start of the linked list, whereas
a user at a lower access level will be pointed to a node further down the linked list.
The nodes at the higher access level cannot be accessed by the server using a search
query at the lower access level as the list can only be traversed in one direction.
6.4.1 System Model
We consider a system model comprising a data owner O, a remote server S, and a set of
m data users U = (u1, ..., um), where m is arbitrarily fixed. The data owner possesses
a set of n data items D = (d1, ..., dn) which they wish to encrypt and outsource to S
whilst authorising other users to search over some data items within D. We present a
structure only multi-level SE system model meaning we only consider the data structure
(index) and we do not encrypt any associated data items. The encryption of the data
items can be carried out separately using a suitable SKE or PKE scheme. The search
results in our model consist of a set of data item identifiers which fulfil the query; these
identifiers can be used to locate the encrypted data items themselves.
To support searching over the encrypted data items, O uploads some encrypted
meta data to the server along with the ciphertexts. It defines a dictionary of key-
words, denoted ∆ = {ω1, ..., ω|∆|}. Each data item can be associated with one or more
keywords in ∆ over which searches can be performed; we denote the plaintext set of
keywords as δD = (δd1 , ..., δdn) where δdi ⊆ ∆ is the set of keywords associated with the
data item di. The data owner produces an encrypted index ID based on δD, over which
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keyword searches are performed by S. Some schemes such as [55] use all distinct key-
words within a word document as the set of keywords associated with the document,
however we present a more generic scheme where the objects to encrypt and search
over are not necessarily word documents but could be an image or video for example,
we refer to these objects as data items. The set of keywords associated with each data
item can be arbitrarily chosen by O and do not necessarily correspond to the actual
words in a word document hence this minimises the risk of a statistical attack on the
index as the frequency of a certain word in a document is not necessarily reflected in
the set of keywords chosen to index the data item.
To prevent authorized users from receiving search results relating to all documents,
O defines an information flow policy P with a labelling function λ mapping each user
u and data item d to an access level, denoted λ(u) and λ(d) respectively, in the totally
ordered set L = {a1, ..., al}. A user with clearance λ(ui) is authorised to search over a
data item with classification λ(dj) if and only if λ(dj) ≤ λ(ui). Note that the access
control in our model is enforced at data item level, meaning that users are restricted
in which data items they are authorised to search over as opposed to restricting the
keywords a user can search for [92]. This is an extension of the standard MSSE system
model [55] where each user is able to search over and receive search results from the
entire set of data items.
Each user that has been authorised by O can submit a search query to the server.
All authorised users are added to the authorised user group G, which is input into the
key generation algorithm initially as an empty set. The group G forms part of the data
owner’s secret key. Note that O can also be enrolled as a ‘user’ in the system. Suppose
user ui with clearance λ(u) wants to search for the keyword ω ∈ ∆; we denote the
generated search query by Tω,λ(u). Let us define Dω to be the set of identifiers of all
data items that contain the keyword ω, and denote by Dω,λ(u) ⊆ Dω the search results
that u is authorised to view — that is, the set of identifiers of all data items idd that
contain ω and where λ(d) ≤ λ(u).
The addition and revocation of users in our model is handled using broadcast en-
cryption (Definition 2.3.9). A user is only able to produce a valid search query if they
are an authorized user in terms of the BE scheme.
To ease notation, let us define the tuple di
aug = (di, idi, δdi , λ(di)) to completely
describe a data item di ∈ D (being the data itself, the identifier, the associated keywords
and the security classification). We denote the information regarding all data items by
Daug = {d1aug, ..., dnaug}.
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6.4.2 Formal Definition
Definition 6.4.1. An MLSSE scheme consists of six algorithms defined as follows:
• (KO,KS , PP ) $← KeyGen(1κ, S,P,U ,G): A probabilistic algorithm run by the
data owner O that takes the security parameter κ, server identity S and infor-
mation flow policy P. It produces O’s secret key KO, a server key KS and public
parameters PP .
• ID $← BuildIndex(Daug,KO, PP ): A probabilistic algorithm run by O. It takes the
set Daug and the data owner’s secret key, and outputs the index ID.
• Kui $← AddUser(ui, λ(ui),KO, PP ): A probabilistic algorithm run by O to enrol
a new user into the system. It takes the new user’s identity and access level, and
outputs a secret key for the new user.
• Tω,λ(ui) ← Query(ω,Kui): A deterministic algorithm run by a user with clearance
λ(ui) to generate a search query. It takes as input a keyword ω ∈ Ω (where Ω is
the set of keywords) and the user’s secret key and outputs a search query Tω,λ(ui).
• Rω,λ(ui) ← Search(Tω,λ(ui), ID,KS): A deterministic algorithm run by S to search
the index for data items containing a keyword ω. It takes as input the index and
a search query submitted by a user and returns the search results Rω,λ(ui) which
consists of either a set of identifiers of ciphertexts Dω,λ(ui) containing ω such that
λ(dj) ≤ λ(ui) (where λ(ui) is the access level of the user that submitted the search
query) or ⊥.
• (KO,KS) $← RevokeUser(ui,KO, PP ): A probabilistic algorithm run by O to re-
voke a user from the system. It takes the user’s id, the data owner’s and server’s
secret keys, and outputs updated owner and server keys.
An MLSSE scheme is correct if for all κ ∈ N, for all policies in P, for all KO,KS
output by KeyGen(1κ,P), for all Daug, for all ID output by Buildindex(Daug,KO), for
all ω ∈ ∆, for all u ∈ U , for all Ku output by AddUser(KO, u, λ(u), PP ), we have that
Search(ID, Tω,λ(u)) = Dω,λ(u).
If G = ∅ along with the restrictions above then we have correctness if:
Search(ID, Tω,λ(um)) =⊥ .
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6.4.3 Security Model
In terms of security for SSE schemes it is ideally required that given the outsourced
metadata ID, an adversary playing the role of the server cannot learn any information
regarding the data set D (i.e. a curious server cannot learn information about the data
it stores). However, most SSE schemes in the literature leak some information in a
trade off for increased efficiency. For example, for a set of search queries {T1, ..., Tq},
the outcomes of these searches {R1, ..., Rq} could be leaked to an adversary, which is
the server in our case; this is referred to as the access pattern (Definition 3.2.1). The
access pattern defines the link between a search query and the search results it produces
and can be thought of as a database where each row stores two values: a search query
and a corresponding data item identifier of a data item that satisfies the search query.
As well as the access pattern most efficient SSE schemes also leak the search pattern
(Definition 3.2.2) which reveals repetitions in the set of search queries made to the
server. In most single user SSE schemes, [46, 47, 55, 68, 85, 86], search queries are
formed deterministically which enables the server to ascertain whether a particular
search query has been used previously.
In our scheme search queries for the same keyword that are produced by users
with different access levels are indistinguishable from one another. That is, a search
query for a keyword ω from a user ui with access level λ(ui) is indistinguishable from
a search query for ω from a user uj with access level λ(uj) for λ(ui) 6= λ(uj). This
means that from the queries alone an adversary is unable to deduce how many times a
certain keyword has been searched for overall, it can only deduce how many times the
same keyword has been searched for within each access level. We alter the definition
of search pattern to reflect this:
Definition 6.4.2. (Search pattern (multi-level access)) For a sequence of q search
queries {Tω1,λ(u1), ..., Tω1,λ(uq)} where ωi and ωj or λ(ui) and λ(uj) are not necessarily
distinct for i 6= j, and λ(ui) is the access level of the user submitting the ith query,
along with an index ID, the search pattern is defined as a q×q symmetric binary matrix
SP (ID, q) such that for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q:
SP (ID, q)i,j = 1 ⇐⇒ Tωi,λ(ui) = Tωj ,λ(uj).
Intuitively, the search pattern reveals when the ith and jth queries are the same, which
happens when queries are issued for the same keyword by users with the same access
level.
In terms of access pattern we also reduce the amount of information leakage com-
pared with standard single user or multi-user SSE schemes such as [46, 47, 55, 68,
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85, 86]. In particular we do not reveal whether a data item contains the keyword ωi
associated with a search query unless the access level of that data item is less than or
equal to that of the user ui that generated the search query, meaning that an adversary
cannot see a full set of search results. We alter the definition of access pattern to reflect
this:
Definition 6.4.3. (Access pattern (multi-level access)) For a sequence of q search
queries {Tω1,λ(u1), ..., Tωq ,λ(uq)} where ωi and ωj or ai and aj are not necessarily distinct
for i 6= j, and λ(ui) is the access level of the user submitting the ith query, the access
pattern is:
AP = {R1, ...,Rq}.
Where Ri =⊥ if λ(ui) < λ(dj) for all dj ∈ D, or Ri = Rωi,λ(ui) otherwise. The access
pattern is the set of search results produced by the sequence of q queries.
However when a search query is paired with the search results it generates (the
access pattern) then an adversary may be able to correlate which search queries are for
the same keyword by looking at the intersections of the search results. For example if
one set of search results is a subset of another set of search results then this may imply
that the two search queries used to generate these results are for the same keyword.
An adversary may eventually be able to build up a complete set of search results for a
particular keyword, which is equivalent to the leakage produced by a search query in a
single user SSE scheme.
The hierarchal relationships between the data item identifiers i.e. which identifiers
represent data items at higher access level than others could also be leaked in the same
way. If an adversary has ascertained that two sets of search results Rω,ai ⊂ Rω,aj
represent searches for the same keyword ω, then an adversary will be able to conclude
that identifiers in the set Rω,aj \Rω,ai are at a higher access level than those in Rω,ai .
We note that unless the search results are padded in some way this leakage is
inevitable. Padding search results is not standard in SSE schemes as it requires post-
processing of the search results by the user. Hence we do not pad the search results in
our system model in order to maintain an efficient scheme.
From this we can see that initially our scheme leaks less information about the
search pattern and access pattern than a single user SSE scheme, however over time as
more queries are generated the information leakage tends to that of a single user SSE
scheme. The information leakage relating to a keyword ω, i.e. the access patterns for
search queries corresponding to ω, only reaches that of a single user SSE scheme once a
search query has been generated at each possible access level, and our leakage remains
lower up until this point.
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Leakage functions
In MLSSE we also need to consider the leakage of information from data items during a
search that do not correspond to the user’s access level associated with the search query,
in particular we do not reveal whether a data item contains the keyword associated
with a search query unless the access level of that data item is less than or equal to
that of the user that generated the search query. We define the following two leakage
functions to precisely capture the leakage of information in MLSSE, from the output
of the setup phase (KeyGen and BuildIndex) and the search phase (Query and Search):
1. LMLSSESetup (ID) = {|ID|, id(ω, a)}
2. LMLSSESearch (ID, Tωi,λ(ui)) = {id(ωi, λ(ui)), AP (ID, Tωi,λ(ui), SP (ID, Tωi,λ(ui))}
During the setup phase the only information we expect to be leaked is the size
of the index and a codeword for each keyword and access level pair, which we denote
id(ω, a). This codeword is a ciphertext that is unique for each each keyword and access
level pair. During the search phase we have additional leakage in the form of the access
pattern and search pattern (Definition 6.4.3 and Definition 6.4.2 respectively) along
with the codeword associated with each search query.
We define an additional notion of search leakage called the maximal search leakage
with respect to an index ID, which we use to define the notion of multi-level security.
This is the leakage resulting from every possible keyword search on ID with a given
access level λmax, as follows:
Definition 6.4.4 (Maximal search leakage). Consider an access level λmax. The max-
imal search leakage on an index ID associated with access level λmax is:
LλmaxSearch(ID) = LSearch(ID, {Tωi,λmax}∀ωi∈∆).
We now formalise the notions of security we require in MLSSE. We consider security
against chosen keyword attacks and secure revocation of users such that the ability to
perform searches can be removed. We use cryptographic games to formalise our notions
of security. The adversary A for each game is run by a challenger C. The adversary is
modelled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) entity whose inputs are chosen to
reflect the information available to a realistic adversary, this information is defined by
the leakage functions.
The multi-level access game (Game 6.1) and the revocation game (Game 6.2) have
the following inputs: the multi-level access scheme defined in Definition 6.4.1, which
we denote by MLSSE along with a set of other inputs: the security parameter 1κ, the
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universe of user identities U , the access policy P, the function λ and ∆ (all as defined
in Section 6.4.1). We denote this set of inputs as X. The set Daug represents the set
of meta-data used to construct the index as defined in Section 6.4.1 and LλmaxSearch(ID)
represents the maximal search leakage as defined in Definition 6.4.4.
Multi-level Access
Our first security notion, in Game 6.1, is that of multi-level access which requires that
a user, u, cannot receive search results or learn information relating to data items di
such that λ(u) < λ(di). More specifically, a server colluding with several users cannot
learn anything about the index beyond the specified leakage according to the corrupt
users’ access rights. This notion is similar to the benchmark notion of security called
IND2-CKA which was established by Curtmola et al. in [55].
The challenger sets up the system, including instantiating several global variables
(which the challenger can use in the main game and in oracle functions, but which the
adversary cannot see): λmax is the maximum access level of any corrupted user and
chall is a Boolean flag to show whether the challenge parameters have been generated
yet. The adversary is given the security parameter, access control policy, server key and
the public parameters, as well as access to the following oracles, where the parameters
represented by · are provided by the adversary, and the adversary is given the resulting
user keys and search results:
• The AddUser(·, λ(·),KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to request that a user
is added to the system, and the adversary corrupts this user by receiving the user
key. If the challenge has not yet been generated, then the challenger adds the
requested user, checks if λmax needs updating and runs the AddUser algorithm.
Otherwise, if the challenge has been generated, the above procedure is carried
out only if the new user’s access level is less than or equal to λmax. This oracle
is described in Game 6.1.
• The RevokeUser(·,KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to revoke a user from
the system. The oracle simply runs the RevokeUser algorithm on the inputs
supplied by the adversary. We note that querying RevokeUser could potentially
alter the value of λmax in Game 6.1. We do not consider this option as revoking a
user would reduce the amount of access that the adversary has, hence a rational
adversary would have no interest in doing this.
• The BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to create indexes of
their choosing. It simply runs BuildIndex on the adversary’s input and returns
the output to the adversary.
148
6.4. Multi-level Searchable Symmetric Encryption
We denote the adversary A as having access to oracles AddUser(·, λ(·),KO, PP ),
RevokeUser(·,KO, PP ) and BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ) as AO.
After a polynomial number of queries, the adversary outputs two data sets (Daug0 ,Daug1 )
which must have identical maximal search leakage for the maximal access level, λmax,
of any corrupted user — the adversary cannot choose data sets where a user that it has
corrupted could make any query that legitimately distinguishes the data sets as this
would count as a trivial win. Whilst this may appear to be a strong assumption, we
believe it to be the minimal assumption necessary to avoid trivial wins in the multi-
user setting. The main issue is that, unlike Curtmola et al. [55], in the multi-user
setting, it is necessary to consider the server colluding with a set of users (but not the
data owner); as such, the adversary is able to perform the roles of the server and of
an authorised user and therefore may produce arbitrary queries and perform searches
himself. Thus, the challenger in the game is unable to monitor which searches have
been performed and hence cannot determine whether the traces of the actual queries
on both data sets are equal, and instead must rely on the stronger assumption that
no possible authorised query can distinguish the data sets. Note that Van Rompay et
al. [112] deal with the multi-user case without this assumption since they deal with
single word indexes and have a proxy through which all queries are made.
The challenger sets the challenge flag to true and chooses a random bit b which
determines the data set used to form an index. The adversary is given the index and
oracle access AO as defined above and must determine which data set was used.
Definition 6.4.5. (Multi-level Access (MLA)) Let MLSSE be a multi-level searchable
symmetric encryption scheme where κ ∈ N is the security parameter, for an information
flow policy P, and A a PPT adversary. The advantage of A is:
AdvMLAA (MLSSE, X) = |P[ExpMLAA [MLSSE, X] = 1]−
1
2
|,
where ExpMLAA [X] is defined in Game 6.1. We say that MLSSE is secure against non-
adaptive chosen keyword attacks in the sense of Game 6.1 if for all A, all k ∈ N and
all P:
AdvMLAA (MLSSE, X) ≤ negl(k),
for a negligible function negl.
Revocation
In MLSSE, as with other multi-user SSE schemes, we need to consider user revocation to
remove a user’s ability to submit valid search queries to the server, and hence receive
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ExpMLAA [MLSSE, X]:
1 : λmax ←⊥
2 : chall← false
3 : (KO,KS , PP )←$KeyGen(1κ, S,P,U ,L)
4 : (Daug0 ,Daug1 , st)←$AO(X,KS , PP )
5 : ID0 ←$BuildIndex(Daug0 ,KO, PP )
6 : ID1 ←$BuildIndex(Daug1 ,KO, PP )
7 : if LλmaxSearch(ID0) 6=Lλ
max
Search(ID1)
8 : return 0
9 : chall← true
10 : b←$ {0, 1}
11 : b′ ←$AO(IDb , st)
12 : if b′ = b return 1
13 : else return 0
Oracle AddUser(u, λ(u),KO, PP )
1 : if chall = false
2 : if λ(u) > λmax
3 : λmax ← λ(u)
4 : return AddUser(u, λ(u),KO, PP )
5 : else if λ(u) > λmax
6 : return ⊥
7 : else return AddUser(u, λ(u),KO, PP )
Game 6.1: Adaptive multi-level access game for MLSSE
search results. We capture this in Game 6.2. The challenger sets up the system,
by running KeyGen to produce the data owner’s key, the server key and the public
parameters. The adversary is given the input X along with the public parameters and
the server key KS and selects a data set (along with associated access levels, keywords
and identifiers). The challenger then creates the index which is transferred to the
adversary. The adversary is given access to the following oracles where the parameters
represented by · are provided by the adversary, and the adversary is given the resulting
user keys and search results.
• The AddUser(·, λ(·),KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to add a user to the
system. It runs AddUser on the adversary’s inputs u, λ(u) and returns either the
output of AddUser(u, λ(U),KO, PP ) if user u is not already an authorised user
or ⊥ if the user is already authorised. The oracle is run as depicted in Game 6.2.
• The Search(·, ID,KS) oracle allows the adversary to search the index for a
particular keyword. The adversary computes the search query for the particular
keyword using Query and sends it to the oracle as input.
• The RevokeUser(·,KO, PP ) allows the adversary to revoke a user from the
system. The oracle runs the RevokeUser algorithm on the input u supplied by the
adversary if u is an authorised user; otherwise it outputs ⊥. The oracle is run as
depicted in Game 6.2.
• The BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ) oracle allows the adversary to create indexes of
their choosing. It simply runs BuildIndex on the adversary’s input and returns
the output to the adversary.
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ExpRevokeA [MLSSE, X]:
1 : (KO,KS , PP )←$KeyGen(1k, S,P,U ,L)
2 : (Daug, st)← AO(X,PP )
3 : ID ←$BuildIndex(Daug,KO, PP )
4 : st←$AO(st)
5 : for u ∈ G
6 : (KO, PP )←$RevokeUser(u,KO, PP )
7 : Tω ←$AO(st, PP )
8 : R← Search(Tω, ID,KS)
9 : if R 6=⊥
10 : return 1
11 : else
12 : return 0
Oracle AddUser(u, λ(u),KO, PP )
1 : if u ∈ G
2 : return ⊥
3 : else
4 : G ← G ∪ u
5 : return
6 : AddUser(u, λ(u),KO, PP )
Oracle RevokeUser(u,KO, PP )
1 : if u ∈ G
2 : G ← G\u
3 : return
4 : RevokeUser(u,KO, PP )
5 : else
6 : if u /∈ G
7 : return
8 : ⊥
Game 6.2: Adaptive revocation game for MLSSE
We denote the adversary A as having access to oracles AddUser(·, λ(·,KO, PP ),
RevokeUser(·,KO, PP ), Search(·, ID,KS) and BuildIndex(·,KO, PP ) as AO. Af-
ter a polynomial number of queries, the challenger revokes all users that were queried
to the AddUser(·, λ(·),KO, PP ) oracle but were not subsequently queried to the
RevokeUser(·,KO, PP ) oracle (i.e. all users for which the adversary holds a valid user
key). The adversary must then produce a search token Tω which, when used as input
to the Search algorithm, does not produce ⊥, i.e. the adversary must produce a valid
search query even though it does not hold a non-revoked key.
Definition 6.4.6. (Revocation) Let MLSSE be a multi-level searchable symmetric en-
cryption scheme where k ∈ N is the security parameter, for an information flow policy
P, and A a PPT adversary. We define the advantage of A in Game 6.2 as:
AdvRevokeA (MLSSE, X) =
∣∣P[ExpRevokeA [MLSSE, X] = 1]∣∣.
We say that MLSSE achieves revocation if for all A, all k ∈ N and all P:
AdvRevokeA (X) ≤ negl(k).
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6.5 Construction
Our construction MLSSE is an adaptation of the scheme of Kamara et al. [86], which is
based on the construction of the influential inverted index scheme SSE-1 by Curtmola
et al. [55].
Informally, MLSSE uses an array A of linked lists, along with a look-up table T
to index the encrypted data. This produces a sequential search that lends itself well
to the hierarchical access rights on the data items that we require. For each keyword
ωi ∈ ∆, we define a list Lωi which stores the identifiers for all data items containing
that keyword and is ordered according to the access level of the data items — data
items with the highest classification are placed at the beginning of the list, and those
with the lowest classification at the end. Each list Lωi is encrypted and stored in A as
a linked list. During the search phase the look-up table T is used to point the server
to the correct node in the array depending on the information in the search query i.e.
which keyword was searched for and what access rights the user that submitted the
search query has. This node is decrypted using information in the search query and
the node itself, revealing the address of the next node in the linked list. The server
may continue to decrypt all other relevant nodes in the linked list, obtaining the set of
search results relevant to the user’s searched keyword and access level.
The key difference between our scheme and that of [86] is that, rather than pointing
to the beginning of each linked list, the entry in T will point to the appropriate position
within the linked list according to the access rights of the querier (recall that the list
is ordered by access levels). Since it is not possible to move backwards through the
encrypted lists, as only a pointer and decryption key are provided for the next node
in the current node, the only search results available are those contained beyond this
point in this list — that is, identifiers for those documents containing the keyword and
whose classification is at most that of the querier, as required by the information flow
policy.
Let BE be an IND-CPA secure broadcast encryption scheme. We define the fol-
lowing pseudorandom functions (PRFs), where the keys are represented by the first
entry:
F : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k,
G : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗,
P : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k,
H : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗,
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and a strong pseudorandom permutation (PRP), where the key is the first entry:
φ : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}κ,
A is a |∆| × |L| array and T is a dictionary of size |∆| · |L|. We denote the address of
a node N in A as addrA(N).
Let λ : {U ∪ D} → L map users and data items to their relevant access levels as
described in Section 6.4.1. We define a function γ which outputs three ordered lists
Lωi ,Xωi and Nωi given the set of identifiers Daug and the array A. We refer to the nth
item in a list Lωi as Lωi [n]. The list Lωi contains identifiers of data items in Dωi ordered
from the identifiers with the highest to the lowest access levels, the list Nωi contains
the addresses of |Lωi | empty nodes chosen randomly from A and the list Xωi contains
the indices of the identifiers in Lωi where each access level starts. For example, suppose
we have an ordered list of identifiers Lωi = (id1, id2, id3, id4, id5) where:
a1 = λ(id1) = λ(id2) = λ(id3) > λ(id4) = λ(id5) = a3.
Then we have that Xωi [3] = 4, which says that the list of nodes with access level at
most a3 starts at the fourth entry in Lωi . There is an entry per each access level in
Xωi , even if two access levels have the same starting point in Lωi ; from the example
above we can see that Xωi [2] = Xωi [3] = 4. If an access level is not authorised to view
any data items in Dωi then the entry corresponding to that access level (as well as the
entries corresponding to all access levels below it) in Xωi is set to ⊥. An identifier of
a data item di ∈ Dωi will inherit the access level label of the respective data item, i.e.
λ(iddi) = λ(di).
The KeyGen algorithm of MLSSE initialises the system and generates the keys
KO,KS , along with the public parameters, PP. The key KO includes the secret key for
the BE scheme and the sets of |L| keys for each pseudo-random function: F,G and P
and the key for the pseudo-random permutation φ (referred to as the data owner’s
state, stO) as well as the authorized user group G. The server is enrolled and its se-
cret key is also generated. PP includes the information flow policy Pand the public
parameters for BE, PPBE.
The BuildIndex algorithm initializes a set free which consists of all nodes in the
array A. BuildIndex considers each keyword contained in the dataset in turn. For each
keyword ωi, the function γ generates Lωi ,Xωi and Nωi . The free list is then updated
according to which nodes have been chosen by γ. The nodes in the array that form the
linked lists consist of the identifier from Lωi of a data item containing ωi, the address
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(KO,KS , PP )←$KeyGen(1k, S,P,U ,L,G)
1 : for i ∈ |L|
2 : kai,1, kai,2, kai,3 ←$ {0, 1}k
3 : (PPBE, kBE)←$BE.KeyGen(1k, |U|)
4 : stO ←$ {0, 1}k
5 : kS ←$BE.Add(kBE, S)
6 : G ← {S}
7 : stS ←$BE.Enc(stO,G, kBE)
8 : return
9 : KS ← (ks, stS)
10 : KO ← ({kai,1}i∈[|L|], {kai,2}i∈[|L|], {kai,3}i∈[|L|], kBE, stO,G)
11 : PP ← (P, PPBE)
Algorithm 6.1: KeyGen algorithm for MLSSE
ID ←$BuildIndex(Daug ,KO, PP )
1 : free← {addr(Ni)}[i∈|A|]
2 : for 1 ≤ i ≤ |W|
3 : (Lωi ,Xωi ,Nωi)← γ(Dωi)
4 : free← free \ Nωi
5 : for 1 ≤ j ≤ |Nωi | − 1
6 : rj ←$ {0, 1}k
7 : A[Nωi [j]]←
((
Lωi [j],Nωi [j + 1], Pkλ(Lωi [j+1]),3
(ωi)
)⊕H(Pkλ(Lωi [j]),3(ωi), rj), rj)
8 : r|Nωi | ←$ {0, 1}
k
9 : A[Nωi [|Nωi |]]←
((
Lωi [|Nωi |], 0, 0)⊕H
(
Pkλ(Lωi [|Nωi |]),3
(ωi), r|Nωi |
)
, r|Nωi |
)
10 : for 1 6 ` 6 |L|
11 : if Xωi [a`] 6=⊥
12 : T[Fka`,1(ωi)]←
(
Nωi
[
Xωi [a`]
]⊕Gka`,2(ωi))
13 : else
14 : T[Fka`,1(ωi)]←⊥
15 : return
16 : ID ← (A,T)
Algorithm 6.2: BuildIndex algorithm for MLSSE
in the array of the next node in the linked list, the key used to decrypt the following
node in the linked list and a random bit string ri ∈ {0, 1}κ. The identifier, address
of the next node and the key used to decrypt the following node in the linked list are
XORed with the output of a PRF H in order to encrypt this information. For the first
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node in the linked list the input of H is the decryption key for the current node (which
corresponds to an access level and keyword and forms part of the search query) along
with ri), hence the information stored in the node can only be decrypted by the server
if the server has a search query generated by a user who is authorized to view the data
item whose identifier is stored at that node. The decryption key for all subsequent
nodes is contained in the previous node of the linked list. BuildIndex then proceeds to
create the look-up table T. Unlike prior schemes [55], each user may have a different
access level and thus the starting points for search results within the linked lists may
vary; a search query made by a user with a higher access level should traverse more of
the list than that of a user with lower access rights (the user is authorised to search
more data items). Table T has an entry for each access level/keyword pair containing
the address of a node in A, which is the node in the linked list Lωi from which the user
with a specified access level is authorised to decrypt. If an access level is not authorised
to view any part of the linked list then the value in T is set to ⊥. Finally the index
ID = (A,T) is returned.
Tω,λ(u) ← Query(ω,Ku)
1 : Retrieve stS from server
2 : st′O ← BE.Dec(ku, stS)
3 : if st′O =⊥
4 : return ⊥
5 : tω,λ(u) ← (Fkλ(u),1(ω), Gkλ(u),2(ω), Pkλ(u),3(ω), 032)
6 : return
7 : Tω,λ(u) ← φst′
O
(tω,λ(u))
Algorithm 6.3: Query generation algorithm for MLSSE
The Query algorithm for MLSSE generates a search query for a user u to search for
a keyword w. The user first retrieves the current server state, stS , from the server and
attempts to decrypt the current server state stS using their secret key ku; we denote
the output of the decryption by st′O. Note that if u is not authorised then decryption
will return ⊥, if this is the case Query outputs ⊥. The query itself comprises four parts.
The first is the output of the PRF F applied to the keyword ω, keyed with the secret
key for F associated with the user’s access level kλ(u),1. This part of the query is used
to locate the relevant entry in T. The second part is the output of the PRF G applied
to the keyword ω and is used to mask the entry in T in order to locate the user’s
relevant starting position in the linked list corresponding to ω in A. The third part is
the output of the PRF P applied to the keyword ω, which is used to decrypt the first
relevant node in A according to the user’s access level. The fourth part of the query
155
6.5. Construction
is composed of κ 0-bits, this is to ensure that under valid inputs the set of possible
outputs of the PRP is always sparse. The PRP φ is applied to the search query, using
st′O as the key.
Rω,λ(u) ← Search(Tω,λ(u), ID,KS)
1 : st′O ← BE.Dec(KS , stS)
2 : Parse φ−1st′
O
(Tω,λ(u)) as (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4)
3 : if τ4 6= 0
4 : return ⊥
5 : Rω,λ(u) ← ∅
6 : if T[τ1] = ⊥
7 : return ⊥
8 : v2 ← 1
9 : while v2 6= 0
10 : Parse T[τ1]⊕ τ2 as y
11 : Parse A[y] as (z1, z2)
12 : Parse z1 ⊕H(τ3, z2) as (v1, v2)
13 : Rω,λ(u) ← Rω,λ(u) ∪ {v1}
14 : return Rω,λ(u)
Algorithm 6.4: Search algorithm for MLSSE
The Search algorithm finds data item identifiers associated with the searched key-
word from the subset of data item identifiers the user is authorized to search. The
server decrypts stS and applies the inverse of the PRP φ to the query it received; it
parses the result as (τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4). The server then looks up entry T[pi1] and if that
entry is not equal to ⊥, the server XORs the value with pi2 and parses the resulting
value as y. The server looks up the node at A[y] and decrypts it using the output of
H (which takes as input pi3 along with z2).
The AddUser algorithm grants a user u the ability to search the index at a specific
access level. The user is added to the set G of authorized users and a BE key, ku, is
derived for the new user. A new value for stO is created and encrypted using the BE
scheme to create a new server state, stS . The server key is updated to include the
current value of stS . The new user is given their user secret key Ku which consists of
their BE user key, ku, and the secret keys associated with their access level kλ(u),1, kλ(u),2
and kλ(u),3. The data owner’s key, KO is updated to include the current version of stO.
The RevokeUser algorithm revokes a user’s search privileges. The user is removed
from G and a new value for stO is selected and encrypted using the current version of
G to form the new server state stS . The server key is updated to include the current
version of stS and the updated version of KO is output.
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(Ku)←$AddUser(u, λ(u),KO, PP )
1 : G ← G ∪ {u}
2 : ku ←$BE.Add(kBE, u)
3 : st′O
$← {0, 1}κ
4 : stO ← st′O
5 : st′S ←$BE.Enc(stO,G, kBE)
6 : stS ← st′S
7 : Update server key with current value of stS
8 : return
9 : Ku ← (ku, kλ(u),1, kλ(u),2, kλ(u),3)
10 : KO ← ({kai,1}i∈[|L|], {kai,2}i∈[|L|], {kai,3}i∈[|L|], kBE, stO,G)
Algorithm 6.5: Add user algorithm for MLSSE
(KO)←$RevokeUser(u,KO)
1 : G ← G \ {u}
2 : st′O
$← {0, 1}κ
3 : stO ← st′O
4 : st′S ←$BE.Enc(stO,G, kBE)
5 : stS ← st′S
6 : Update server key with current value of stS
7 : return
8 : KO ← ({kai,1}i∈[|L|], {kai,2}i∈[|L|], {kai,3}i∈[|L|], kBE, stO,G)
Algorithm 6.6: Revoke user algorithm for MLSSE
Theorem 6.5.1. Let MLSSE be the multi-level access SSE scheme defined in Algo-
rithms 6.1-6.6. Given an IND-CPA secure broadcast encryption scheme BE, the pseu-
dorandom functions F,G, P,H and a pseudorandom permutation φ, then MLA is secure
in the sense of multi-level access (Definition 6.4.5) and revocation (Definition 6.4.6).
6.6 Proofs of Security
In this section we give the proofs of security for our construction in Section 6.5.
Lemma 6.6.1. MLSSE as defined in Algorithms 6.1-6.6 is secure against chosen key-
word attacks (Game 6.1) under the same assumptions as in Theorem 6.5.1.
Proof. Suppose AMLA is an adversary with non-negligible advantage against Game 6.1
when instantiated with Algorithms 6.1-6.6. We shall reduce the MLA security to the
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IND-CPA security of a symmetric encryption scheme Θ, which is defined as follows [87]:
Definition 6.6.2. Let F : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, be a PRF. We define a symmetric
key encryption Θ scheme for messages of length k as follows:
• K $← Θ.KeyGen(1κ): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter κ and generates a key K
$← {0, 1}κ.
• c $← Θ.Enc(K,m): A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the key K and
a message m ∈ {0, 1}κ. It chooses a value r $← {0, 1}κ and outputs a ciphertext
c =< r, FK(r)⊕m >.
• m ← Θ.Dec(c,K): A deterministic algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext
c =< r, s > and the key K, and outputs the plaintext message m = FK(r)⊕ s.
Theorem 6.6.3. If F is a PRF, then Θ is a fixed-length symmetric key encryption
scheme for messages of length k that has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen
plaintext attack.
Proof. The proof for theorem 6.6.3 is in the textbook Introduction to Modern Cryp-
tography by Katz and Lindell [87]. The ciphertext in this scheme is made up of two
parts: the output of a PRF and a random k-bit value. Intuitively the security of the
scheme holds, since the output of a PRF is indistinguishable from random to an adver-
sary who observes a ciphertext, hence this scheme is similar to the one-time pad. The
security relies on the value r not being used in a previous encryption, but since r is
chosen at random every time a ciphertext is created, the probability of this happening
is negligible in κ.
Theorem 6.6.4. If F is a PRF then Θ is a fixed-length symmetric key encryption
scheme for messages of length k that has anonymous encryptions under a chosen plain-
text attack, meaning given two ciphertexts one cannot ascertain whether they were en-
crypted under the same key or not.
Proof. This result can be found in [63]. The anonymity of Θ follows directly from the
pseudorandomness of F .
In our construction, we use an instance of Θ to encrypt the nodes of the array. Since
there is only a single encryption key K in the IND-CPA game associated with Θ, and
because we use multiple keys for the instance of Θ in our construction, we must first
define a sequence of games that interpolate from Game 6.1 to a modified game where
all encryptions of index components that differ between the two challenge pre-indexes
are performed under the same encryption key.
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Let G0 be the real multi-level access game (Game 6.1). Now, observe that a rational
adversary in Game 6.1 (that gains a non-negligible advantage) will certainly choose
Daug0 and Daug1 such that there exists at least one element that is both different in
each data set (to permit distinguishing) and which is labeled by λ? > λmax (since the
maximal query leakage must be equal up to λmax). Let us denote by X = {(x0,i, x1,i)}
the set of pairs of data item identifiers (x0,i, x1,i), where xj,i ∈ Daugj , that are labelled
by any label λ? > λmax, and where xj,i 6∈ Daug1−j . Let us denote each pair in X by
Xi = (x0,i, x1,i). Informally, X is the set of pairs of identifiers which differ in the
challenge data sets. When BuildIndex is run, γ creates a list of identifiers of data items
that contain a keyword ω. A separate list is created for every keyword. These lists
are then ordered from the identifiers with the highest access levels to those with the
lowest; these ordered lists are called Lωi , i ∈ [|∆|]. A set of nodes is then chosen at
random from A to store each of these identifiers (along with other data). Let yb,i
denote the set of nodes holding the identifiers in xb,i. We have that |yb,i| is equal to the
number of distinct keywords in the data item associated with the identifier in xb,i. Let
Z = {yb,1, ..., yb,|X|}, hence |Z| =
∑|X|
i=1 |yb,i|. We can thus also represent Z as follows:
Z = {zb,1, ..., zb,|Z|}.
We define a sequence of |Z| games, denoted Gi for i = 1, ..., |Z|. Game Gi is defined
in exactly the same way as Game Gi−1, with the exception that, for a random bit b,
the node zb,i ∈ Z is encrypted under a fixed key k? rather than the key defined by the
output of the PRF P during BuildIndex. For k = 1 to |Z|, we show that no efficient
distinguisher exists that can distinguish Gk from Gk−1.
Suppose, in search for a contradiction, that such a distinguisher Dk does exist with
non-negligible advantage δ. We show that, using Dk as a subroutine, one can construct
an efficient adversary Aanon that can break the anonymity of Θ.
For the anonymity game, the challenger Canon generates two keys, k and k′, where
k
$← {0, 1}κ and k′ is the output generated by the PRF P in BuildIndex that is used as
the key for the PRF H associated with node zb,i. Canon also chooses a random bit b?.
It then offers Aanon access to two encryption oracles, Enc1 and Enc2: if b? = 0, then
each oracle uses a different encryption key (k or k′); if b? = 1, both oracles use the
same key k.
Aanon simulates either Game Gk−1 or Game Gk for Dk. To do so, Aanon creates
the Game Gk−1, with the following modification. Let Y = {zb,i for i < k}. When
running BuildIndex and encrypting the node in Y , Aanon does not derive the key for
the PRF H using the PRF P or perform the symmetric encryption. Instead, the node
to be encrypted is sent to the oracle Enc1. The challenger returns an encryption under
a fixed key k, and this ciphertext is used in the index.
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When running BuildIndex and encrypting the identifier relating to item zb,k, Aanon
does not derive the key for the PRF H using the PRF P or perform the symmetric
encryption. In this case, the plaintext is sent to the oracle Enc2. Aanon receives back
either an encryption under key k (if b? = 0) or key k′ (if b? = 1).
Note that, if b? = 0, then Gk is identical to Gk−1. Otherwise, the difference between
the games is precisely that the encryption of zb,k is performed under a different key k
′ to
all items in Y which are encrypted under k. Thus, if Dk can distinguish Gk from Gk−1,
they are able to identify whether zb,k is encrypted under the same key as all items in
Y , or not. Since all of these encryptions were performed using the oracles provided
by the anonymity game, Aanon can forward Dk’s output to break the anonymity of
the symmetric encryption scheme with the same non-negligible advantage δ. Clearly,
since we assume that the encryption scheme is anonymous, such a distinguisher cannot
exist and all possible efficient distinguishers must have at most a negligible advantage
AdvDk .
Now, given that each of the above game hops has a negligible distinguishing ad-
vantage, the total game hop from G0 to Gk has negligible distinguishing advantage
(
∑κ
i=1AdvDi). We can therefore run an adversary against Game 6.1 against Game Gk
instead, and it will fail with at most a negligible probability. We hence reduce Game
Gk to the IND-CPA security of the symmetric key encryption scheme Θ.
Let C be a challenger for an adversary AINDCPA in the IND-CPA security game
of the symmetric encryption scheme Θ = (Θ.KeyGen,Θ.Dec,Θ.Dec). AINDCPA will in
turn act as the challenger in the multi-level access game against an adversary AMLA.
SupposeAMLA is an adversary that can win Game Gk for a policy P with non-negligible
probability δ. We construct an adversary AINDCPA that uses AMLA as a subroutine
that can break the IND-CPA security of Θ as follows:
• C runs Θ.KeyGen to generate a symmetric key k?, chooses a bit b uniformly at
random, and gives the security parameter 1κ to AINDCPA.
• AINDCPA sets up the multi-level access game by initialising L = ∅, λmax =⊥
and chall = false. It runs KeyGen(1κ, S,P) to generate (KO,KS , PP ), and gives
AMLA the values (1κ,P,KS ,PP).
• AMLA may now make oracle queries to AINDCPA. Each oracle is run as specified
in Game 6.1.
• Eventually, AMLA will output its choice of two data sets such that the maximal
query leakage for the highest security label, λmax, queried to AddUser is equal
for both data sets (note that this is necessarily true for a successful adversary).
AINDCPA sets chall to be true and chooses a random bit b.
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Now, observe that a rational adversary (that gains a non-negligible advantage)
will certainly choose Daug0 and Daug1 such that there exists at least one element
that is both different in each data set (to permit distinguishing) and which is
labeled by λ? > λmax (since the maximal traces must be equal up to λmax). Note
that, by definition of λmax, λ? has not been queried to the AddUser oracle.
Let us denote by X = {(x0, x1)} the set of pairs of elements (x0, x1), where
xi ∈ Daugi , which are labelled by any λ(x) > λ? and where xi 6∈ Daug1−i. Informally,
X is the set of pairs of elements which differ in the challenge data sets.
• Set bˆ = b.
• AINDCPA must now build a challenger index for AMLA, Daugbˆ , which embeds a
challenge for the IND-CPA game. To build the challenge index, AINDCPA follows
the BuildIndex algorithm as written, with the exception that, whenever an item
xb ∈ X is to be encrypted using the key Ki,j to form the entry in A, the plaintexts
associated with x0 and x1 are instead sent to the LoR oracle of C. It receives
back an encryption of xb under key k
?.
• The index is given to AMLA, who can make oracle queries as follows:
– AddUser is run as written in Game 6.1. If the maximal trace of both
challenge data sets are equal given the new user’s security label, then the
elements of the data sets are not in X and can be treated normally.
– RevokeUser is run as written in Game 6.1.
– BuildIndex: each run of BuildIndex should generate and use new keys,
therefore it can be run as written.
• Eventually, AMLA outputs a guess bˆ′ for which data set was encoded in the index.
• AINDCPA outputs their guess b′ = bˆ′ to C as their guess for b.
Observe that both data sets are identical, except for those elements contained in
X. Each pair (x0, x1) of differing elements in X are sent to the LoR oracle of C, who
always encrypts xb. Thus, if b = 0, then data set Daug0 is encoded; otherwise data set
Daug1 is encoded.
If AMLA can distinguish the datatset that was chosen with non-negligible advantage
δ in the multi-level access game, we have that:
AdvAMLA = δ,
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hence:
P[bˆ′ = bˆ] = δ +
1
2
.
Using these assumptions we can calculate the advantage of AINDCPA against the chal-
lenger, C, in their game. We start by calculating the probability of AINDCPA winning
their game:
P[b′ = b] = P[b′ = b|bˆ′ = bˆ]P[bˆ′ = bˆ] + P[b′ = b|bˆ′ 6= bˆ]P[bˆ′ 6= bˆ]
= 1 · P[bˆ′ = bˆ] + 0 · P[bˆ′ 6= bˆ]
= δ +
1
2
.
Hence,
AdvAIND-CPA =
∣∣∣∣P[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(δ + 12)− 12
∣∣∣∣
= δ
As we fixed δ to be non-negligible we have that the advantage of AIND-CPA is
also non-negligible which contradicts the security of the INDCPA-secure symmetric
encryption scheme. We conclude that if the symmetric encryption scheme SE is IND-
CPA secure then MLSSE as defined in Algorithms 6.1-6.6 is secure in the sense of
multi-level access.
Lemma 6.6.5. MLSSE, as defined in Algorithms 6.1 - 6.6, is secure against revocation
(Game 6.2) under the same assumptions as for Theorem 6.5.1.
Proof. Assume AMLA is an adversary with non-negligible advantage δ in Game 6.2
when instantiated with the Algorithms 6.1 − 6.6. We will show that if AMLA has
non-negligible advantage in Game 6.2, then we can construct an adversary ABE that
uses AMLA as a subroutine to break the security of a broadcast encryption scheme
BE = (BE.KeyGen,BE.Encrypt,BE.Decrypt), as defined in Game 2.7.
In order for Game 6.2 to output 1, it is required that the adversary produce a valid
search query. To produce a valid search query, the user is required to know stO, which
is the value of the key for the PRP used to produce the search query. As A new value
of stO is randomly selected and encrypted each time a user is revoked from the system
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using BE.Enc(KBE,G \ ui, stO) (Revoke), where G \ ui is the new group of authorised
users. This encrypted value is then broadcast to all users. The security of the BE
scheme ensures that only authorised users can decrypt this ciphertext to obtain stO
with overwhelming probability. Hence the adversary is only able to create a valid search
query if they are an authorized user, or if they are able to break the security of the BE
scheme. We note that an adversary could potentially win the game if they output a bit
string for Tω that by chance leads to some output other than the failure symbol. This
is prevented by including the fourth input to the search query which is a κ-bit zero
string to encode the search query. We use this method of adding redundancy to the
string, described by Bellare and Rogaway [21], to turn our application of the PRP to
the search query into an authenticated encryption scheme. Encoding the search query
by adding κ-bit zero string ensures the encodings are sparse. That is, the probability
that a random bit string is valid is 2−κ if the bit string is at least κ bits long. This
means that the adversary will not be able to produce a valid PRP ciphertext will all
but negligible probability. Let C be the challenger for the adversary ABE against the
broadcast encryption scheme, ABE will act as the challenger for AMLA.
1. The KeyGen algorithm is run by ABE (with the exception of the generation of
BE.KeyGen). The secret key for the broadcast encryption scheme (kBE) is gener-
ated and held by C: kBE ← BE.KeyGen(1κ) (this is equivalent to running line 3 of
KeyGen). ABE then initiates ∅ ← G and chooses stO $← {0, 1} and submits these
values to C, who runs BE.Enc(stO,G, kBE) to produce stS , which is sent to ABE.
ABE then proceeds to run the rest of KeyGen. This generates the keys KO,KS
which are held by ABE, and the public parameters PP (with the exception that
KO does not contain kBE). AMLA is given inputs X
2. ABE issues a query to C for the secret key of uAMLA . In response, C runs:
kuAMLA ← BE.AddUser(kBE) and sends kuAMLA to ABE. To fully enrol uAMLA
as an authorized user the server state also needs to be updated. This is done by
submitting G and a newly generated stO to C who runs BE.Enc(stO,G, kBE) to
generate stS . ABE is now able to form AMLA’s secret key KuAMLA . This step is
equivalent to running AddUser.
3. ABE runs BuildIndex to produce the index and the ciphertexts (ID, C), and these
values are sent to AMLA along with KuAMLA .
4. AMLA is given access to oraclesAddUser(·, λ(·),KO, PP ) andRevokeUser(·,KO,PP)
as described in Game 6.2.
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5. ABE revokes AMLA from the system by running RevokeUser. ABE runs line 1 of
Revoke a second time in order to produce two values for stO : θ0, θ1. These values
act as the challenge plaintexts for ABE, which are submitted to C along with a
set of users G ⊂ U (such that no revoked user is in G).
6. C selects a bit b $← {0, 1}.
7. C encrypts θb using the encryption algorithm of the BE scheme:
(stS)b ← BE.Enc(θb,G, kBE). C sends (stS)b to ABE as their challenge ciphertext.
ABE then transfers it to AMLA.
8. AMLA then outputs a query that they believe to be valid (in other words, will
produce a search result not equal to ⊥): Tω. This happens with non-negligible
probability δ, due to our assumptions that A has non-negligible advantage δ in
Game 6.2. AMLA sends this to ABE.
9. ABE runs line 2 of Search twice; once using stO0 as the key for the inverted PRP,
and once using stO1 as the key for the inverted PRP. The possible outputs are:
φ−1stO0(Tω) = (tω
0 ∨ ⊥); and
φ−1stO1(Tω) = (t
1
ω, ∨ ⊥).
10. If t0ω = t
1
ω = ⊥, then we have that Search(stS , ID, Tω,λ(A)) =⊥, and ABE outputs
their guess for b as b′ $← {0, 1}.
11. If t0ω 6=⊥, this tells ABE that (stS)0 was used to generate the query, and ABE
outputs their guess for b as b′ = 0. If t1ω 6=⊥, this tells ABE that (stS)1 was used
to generate the query, and outputs their guess for b as b′ = 1. We note here that
Search can also output ⊥ on line 5. However, the adversary has all the information
to form this part of the query correctly hence, for a rational adversary, this line
should never output ⊥. Thus we assume that this line will not output ⊥ in our
game. As we have assumed that AMLA has non-negligible advantage δ in their
game, we calculate the advantage of ABE to be:
|
[(
P
[
((t0ω ∨ t1ω) 6=⊥)
]
· 1− 1
2
)
+
(
P
[
((t0ω ∧ t1ω) =⊥)
]
· 1
2
− 1
2
)]
|
= |
[
δ · 1 + (1− δ) · 1
2
]
− 1
2
| = |
[
(δ + 1)
2
]
− 1
2
| = δ
2
.
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As we have assumed that δ is non-negligible, we have that δ2 is also non-neglible.
From this we conclude that there cannot exist an adversary A with non-negligible
probability against Game 6.2.
6.6.1 Achieving dynamicity
We can extend MLSSE to support multi-level access on a dynamic data set by adding
two new data structures to the index: a deletion table (Td) and a deletion array (Ad).
There are also four additional algorithms: AddToken,Add,DeleteToken,Delete. Array
Ad stores a list of nodes for each data item which point to nodes in A that would need
to be removed if the corresponding data item was deleted. This means that every node
in A will have a corresponding node in Ad, which is called its dual node. Td is a table
with an entry for each data item which points to the start of the corresponding linked
list in Ad, given a valid delete token for that data item. In addition to these two new
structures the index consists of a search array As and a search table Ts (as in the
original construction) and a free list that keeps track of all the unused space in As.
In the dynamic scheme searching for a keyword is done similarly to the static
construction in Section 6.5 and follows the concept of linked lists presented by [55].
To add a data item to the index, changes need to be made to Td,As and Ad. The
data owner creates an add token using AddToken and sends this to the server. The
server then determines the free space available in As using the free list and adds the
relevant information to the free nodes and updates the free list. When adding a new
data item the relevant nodes cannot be added to the end of each linked list; instead we
have to insert in the appropriate place in the linked list according to the access level
of the new data item. Information in the add token will allow the server to locate the
correct point at which to insert the nodes in each linked list, so instead of the entry in
Ts just pointing to the end node of each linked list this is altered so that it points to the
correct node in the linked list according to the access level of the new data item. The
respective predecessor of each new node is modified to point to the new node instead
of its previous ancestor.
In order to remove a data item, a deletion token is created which allows the server
to locate and delete the correct entries in Td. This, in turn, allows the server to locate
and delete the correct entries in As. Some nodes will need to be updated in As (as
some of the linked lists will have nodes which point to nodes that have been deleted)
and this is done using homomorphic encryption.
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Scheme Index size Search time Query comp. Search comp.
Single user [55] O(|∆|) +O(|∆|) O(1) +O(|δω|) 1PRP +1PRF 1XOR+ |δω| · (DecSKE)
MLSSE O(|∆| · ||L|) +O(|∆|) O(1) +O(|δω,λ(u)|) 1PRP + 3PRF 1PRP + |δω,λ(u)| · (1PRF + 2XOR)
[83] O(|∆|) +O(|∆|) O(1) +O(|δω|) +O(|δω|) 1PRF + 1PRP |δω| · (DecSKE + DecCPABE)
[98] O|∆| O(|∆|) 3E |∆| · (9P )
Table 6.1: Performance of MLSSE
6.7 Performance
In this section we discuss the performance of our multi-level SSE scheme and make
some comparisons to schemes in the literature that are most similar to ours.
The features we will look at to evaluate performance are the search time and search
computation, query computation time and index size. We feel these features contribute
greatly to providing a useable scheme in practice. A compact index means less server
storage needs to be used and fast query and search times make querying efficient for
the user.
Our scheme is built using symmetric key primitives, which are widely known to be
more efficient than their public key counterparts. Table 6.1 summarises the operations
required for the specified algorithms in our scheme, where E denotes group exponen-
tiation, P denotes a group pairing, XOR denotes an XOR operation, PRP denotes
evaluation of a PRP and PRF denotes evaluation of a PRF.
Comparing our multi-level user scheme to a single user scheme (without multi-level
access) we can see that adding the multi-level user functionality does not hamper the
performance of the scheme to a great degree. The lookup table T is larger by a factor
of |L|, where |L| is the number of access levels, and 2 extra PRPs are required when
generating a query. The search time of our multi-level scheme is less than that of a
single user scheme as it linear in the size of the search results. Using a single user
scheme without multiple access levels results in the user receiving all search results
matching a keyword, whereas in our multi-level access scheme the user only receives a
portion of these search results, namely, the ones that are relevant to their access level.
The only situation where the search times will be the same for these two schemes is
when the user is at the highest access level and is authorised to receive all search results
containing a specified keyword. The same applies to the search computation for these
two schemes.
The other two schemes in our comparison that support multi-level access both
require more computationally intensive operations in their search algorithms, such as
CP-ABE decryptions or pairings of group elements.
166
6.8. Summary
6.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present a new notion of searchable symmetric encryption with
multi-level access. The notion of multi-level access to encrypted data accurately re-
flects many real-world scenarios where multiple users have varying levels of access to
a central outsourced data set; a few examples being: classified government documents,
subscription services and corporate data.
We present a new system model, along with a new security model that extends the
previous notions of security in SSE to fulfil our new definitional framework.
This work is a useful first step in making SSE more suitable for deployment, since
the multi-level user notion more accurately reflects a group of users in a real world data-
sharing scenario than that of the standard SSE scheme notion, which only supports a
homogeneous user group.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis we have considered the role of searchable encryption in the real world as
opposed to only being an interesting theoretical concept. This thesis is partially about
the need for more functional schemes in some areas of searchable encryption in order
to match the expectations of potential users.
In Chapter 4 we present searchable encryption within the framework of four gen-
eral scenarios, which reflect settings where searchable encryption could be applied in
the real world. We provide a general method for performing encrypted search in each
scenario, as well as mapping specific searchable encryption schemes into each scenario,
and evaluating their applicability using several variable features. We further identified
several factors that we believe are preventing the widespread adoption of searchable
encryption, one of which is ‘user education’; that is, potential users of searchable en-
cryption, or developers of products, might not understand how the technology can
be used to solve a problem. The work in this chapter is intended to address this is-
sue, by providing informative guidance for potential adopters of searchable encryption
technology.
In Chapter 5 we focus on extending the functionality in verifiable searchable encryp-
tion. One of the factors we identified as affecting the adoption of searchable encryption
is that of ‘usability’, meaning that in order for searchable encryption to become a tech-
nology that people wish to use, its functionality needs to be similar to that of protocols
they are more familiar with. The expressiveness of queries in verifiable searchable en-
cryption was limited, compared with that of non-verifiable SE schemes, but verifiable
computation schemes can perform a wide variety of computations. We also noticed
that the system models for verifiable computation and searchable encryption are sim-
ilar. Furthermore, the attributes computed on in verifiable computation can be made
to correspond to the keywords used to describe data items in searchable encryption.
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An extension which could be implemented for our construction in Section 5.3 is
to allow multiple users to store data on a shared server without having to initialise
their own scheme. In practice, this could result in a key distribution centre, which is
used in verifiable delegable computation, setting up the system and publishing public
parameters that any data owner can use, but enabling each data owner to generate their
own CP-ABE decryption keys for the data they hold. We would also like to investigate
ways of reducing the search query size in our construction, whilst maintaining their
expressiveness.
Through research undertaken at Thales Research and Technology, we learnt that
many potential application scenarios involve many users requiring access to a dataset,
where the users possess differing access rights to the data. There are few existing
solutions within the realm of searchable encryption that support this system model.
Existing solutions were primarily based on public-key cryptographic primitives, which
can be computationally intensive. This inspired our work in Chapter 6, which presents
a searchable encryption scheme with multi-level access, constructed using simple and
efficient symmetric-key primitives, such as pseudorandom functions and pseudorandom
permutations.
We identified several areas for future work during the development of our multi-
level SSE scheme. In Section 6.6.1, we describe an extension to our construction in
Section 6.5 that allows it to support a dynamic dataset. We aim to formally define
this dynamic extension with a full construction, along with a formal security proof.
Furthermore, our MLSSE construction is secure against colluding users that are autho-
rized to search over the encrypted data. It would be interesting to extend this notion
of security to provide security against the collusion of revoked users with the server.
Another area of interest is that of user addition and revocation. In our construction we
have used a broadcast encryption scheme as a black box to add and revoke users in the
system. In order to quantify the efficiency of our scheme, we would like to investigate
this method of revocation, and determine which broadcast encryption would produce
the most practical construction.
The addition and revocation of users in a multi-user SSE scheme is also of inde-
pendent interest. It would be interesting to investigate generic methods of achieving
user addition and revocation for multi-user SSE schemes that can be applied to any
single-user SSE scheme. In some practical scenarios it may be beneficial for the data
owner to know which users have issued which search queries; this is called user ac-
countability. If the data owner wanted to audit the scheme in our construction, they
would be able to tell the access level of the user submitting each search query, but
not the individual identities. This could be desirable in some cases, but we could also
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investigate extending our construction to support user accountability.
As is common in the SSE literature, our construction leaks the access pattern and
search pattern (with respect to access levels). The standard system model is to use
one server to perform the search over the encrypted data. We hope to investigate
the security improvements we can achieve when distributing the index over multiple
servers. We hypothesise that this would also distribute the leakage, so one server only
learns a fraction of the leakage associated with the whole search.
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